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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal is about arbitrators' powers. The Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) be-
tween Idaho, other States, and most major tobacco companies provides for arbitration of disputes 
over calculation of annual payments that tobacco companies make to the States under the MSA. 
The MSA allows disputed payments to be escrowed pending resolution of the dispute. Some 
tobacco companies escrowed funds associated with disputed payments for years 2003 on. 
The MSA has a model statute (the MSA Act) that Idaho adopted. In 2006 the District 
Court ordered Idaho (1) to arbitrate whether Idaho diligently enforced the provisions of its MSA 
Act in 2003 (2) to determine whether Idaho was entitled to its full 2003 MSA payments as a 
State that diligently enforced the provisions of an MSAAct. 
Idaho, other States, and the tobacco companies agreed in writing to arbitrate issues of 
2003 enforcement of their MSAActs and 2003 payments, but no issues for any other years. The 
arbitration began. In mid-arbitration the tobacco companies and some States reached a settle-
ment called the Term Sheet. Over the objections ofldaho and a majority of States, the arbitrators 
issued a Partial Award that released escrowed MSA payment to Term Sheet States and to tobacco 
companies for years 2003 through 2012, but not to Idaho or other States. The MSA has no 
provision for releasing funds to some States but not to others under such circumstances. The 
arbitration agreement did not provide for arbitrating or resolving issues for years after 2003. 
Idaho moved to vacate the post-2003 parts of the Partial Award, which were a non-MSA-
based selective release of funds to some States, but not to Idaho. Idaho appeals from the District 
Court's denial of its Motion to Vacate post-2003 portions of the Partial Award, which denied 
Idaho the right to pursue an MSA-based claim to its share of the released funds. Idaho argues 
that the arbitrators had no power to use the Term Sheet to displace the MSA. 
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B. Course of the Proceedings Statement of the Facts 
The facts arise from proceedings before the District Court and before the arbitrators. The 
Course of the Proceedings and Statement of the Facts are combined because they are the same. 
1. Background - Relevant Portions of the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement 
(MSA) Between the Participating Manufacturers (PMs) and the States 
The MSA in General. In the 1990s Idaho and other States sued tobacco companies over 
their marketing practices ( e.g., targeting of youth), their denials of the addictiveness and health 
consequences of smoking, the public health costs of smoking, and other issues. Idaho was one of 
fifty-two Settling States1 that joined a Master Settlement Agreement with four tobacco compa-
nies called Original Participating Manufacturers (OPMs). MSA § I(hh) (OPMs defined); R., 
p. 1017, App., p. 4. In 1998 then District Judge Eismann entered a Consent Decree and Final 
Judgment under the MSA. R., pp. 31-40; MSA § II(o) ("Consent Decree" defined); R., p. 1014; 
App., p. 3. Scores of tobacco companies later joined the MSA. They are called Subsequent Par-
ticipating Manufacturers (SPMs). MSA § II(tt) (SPMs defined); R., p. 1023; App., p. 5. 
Idaho is the only State that is a party before the District Court. OPMs and SPMs Gointly, 
Participating Manufacturers, or PMs) are also parties before the District Court. MSA § II(p) 
("Court" defined); § IIGj) (PM defined), § VII( a) (PMs agree to District Court's continuing juris-
diction over MSAand Consent Decree); R., pp. 1014, 1018-1019, 1055-1056; App., pp. 3, 4, 6. 
The MSA is a public-health agreement that restricts PMs' sale and promotion of cigar-
ettes. MSA Part III, Permanent Relief; R., pp. 1025-1043 (addressing advertising, youth access 
to tobacco, etc.). The MSA also requires PMs to make payments to the States. The States in turn 
This Brief capitalizes words like "Settling State" ( often shortened to "State") defined in the MSA. 
A "Settling State" is one of fifty-two States and Territories that signed the MSA. MSA § II( qq) ("Settling 
State" defined); R., p. 1022; App., p. 5. For the Court's convenience, an Appendix of Excerpts from the 
Master Settlement Agreement (cited as App.) accompanies this Brief. 
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released and dismissed past and future claims against the PMs. MSA § II(n) ("Claims" defined); 
Part IX, Payments; Part XII, Settling States' Release, Discharge and Covenant; Part XIII, Cons-
ent Decrees and Dismissal of Claims; R., pp. 1014, 1061-1091, 1117-1129; App., pp. 7-16. The 
MSA promotes State policies to reduce youth smoking, to promote the public health, and to 
secure monetary payments. MSA Part I, Recitals; R., p. 1008; App., p. 2. See, generally, State 
ex rel. Wasden v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 523-524, 224 P.3d 1109, 1112-1113, cert. denied, 562 
U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 150 (2010), for more background regarding the MSA. 
MSA Base Payments. Original Participating Manufacturers make annual Base Amount 
Payments to the States, beginning at $4.5 billion for calendar year 2000 and rising to $9 billion 
(before adjustments) for 2018 and beyond. MSA § IX(c)(l); R., p. 1064; App., p. 7-8. Subse-
quent Participating Manufacturers also make Base Amount payments, unless MSA § IX(i)'s for-
mulas grandfather them from payments. R., pp. 1085-1087; App., p. 12-13. 
The PMs' Base Amount payments are subject to several adjustments.2 Except for the 
NPM Adjustment, each State receives adjusted Base Amount payments according to its Allocable 
Share. MSA § II(f) ("Allocable Share" defined),§ IX(c)(l); R., pp. 1011, 1063-1064; App., pp. 
3, 7-8. Idaho's Allocable Share of Base Payments is 0.3632632%. MSAEx. A; KittelmannAff., 
19 and Ex. 8; R., pp. 202, 263. The PMs' annual payments ranged from $5.9 to $7.6 billion 
during 2003-2012.3 Kittelmann Aff., 15 and Ex. 4; R., p. 201, 235-236. Idaho's payments 
ranged from $20 to $31 million during 2003-2012. Id. 
2 Base Amount payments are subject to adjustments for inflation, volume of cigarettes shipped, etc. 
MSA § II(x) ("Inflation Adjustment" defined);§ Il(aaa) ("Volume Adjustment" defined);§ IX(c)(l) (base 
payments subject to these and other adjustments); R., pp. 1015, 1025, 1064; App., pp. 4, 5, 8. 
3 For 2008-2017 the States also received or will receive Strategic Contribution payments under MSA 
§ IX( c )(2). These $861 million annual payments are subject to many of the same adjustments as Base 
Payments, including the NPM Adjustment. Id. R., pp. 1064-1056; App., p. 8. There were no Strategic 
Contributions payments for 2003. 
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The NPM Adiustment Generally. Tobacco companies that have not joined the MSA are 
called Non-Participating Manufacturers, or NPMs. MSA § II(cc) (NPMs defined); R., p. 16; 
App., p. 4. NPMs do not make MSA payments or agree to advertising restrictions, but PMs do. 
The MSA allows an NPM Adjustment, which can reduce the PMs' payments to the States under 
two conditions. MSA § IX(d)(l); R., pp. 1065-1070; App., 8-10. 
The first condition is that the PMs' national Market Share in a given year is more than 
2% below the same PMs' national Market Share in 1997. The difference in the two Market 
Shares, less a 2% buffer, is called Market Share Loss. MSA § II(z) ("Market Share" defined); 
§ IX(d)(l)(B)(i)-(iii) ("Market Share Loss" and other terms defined); R., pp. 1016, 1067; App., 
pp. 4, 9-10. The second condition, known as "significant factor", is that a consulting economist 
determines that disadvantages experienced as a result of the MSA were a significant factor con-
tributing to the Market Share Loss. MSA § IX( d)(l )(C); R., pp. 1068-1069; App., p. 10. 
When both conditions are met, the NPM Adjustment Percentage is three times the Market 
Share Loss if the Loss is less than 16½ percent. MSA § IX( d)(l )(A)(i); R., p. 1066; App., p. 9. 
For example, if the PMs' national market share were 99% in 1997 and 92% in Year Y, the Market 
Share Loss for Year Y would be 99% minus 92% equals 7%, less the 2% buffer, equals 5%. The 
NPM Adjustment Percentage would be three times 5%, i.e., 15%. During 2003-2012, Market 
Share Losses ranged from a high of 5.94444% in 2003 to a low of 3.30751 % in 2007. NPM 
Adjustment Percentages ranged from 17.83332% to 9.92253%. Kittelmann Aff., ,r 7 and Ex. 6; 
R., pp. 201,251. The significant factor condition also applied during 2003-2012. 
Reallocation ofthe NPM Adiustmenl The NPM Adjustment does not necessarily apply 
to all States: A "State's Allocated Payment shall not be subject to the NPM Adjustment" when 
(1) the State "had a Qualifying Statute ... in full force and effect" and (2) "diligently enforced 
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the provisions of such statute during the entire calendar year." MSA § IX( d)(2)(B); R., pp. 1070-
1071; App., pp. 10-11. Also MSA § II(g) ("Allocated Payment" defined); R., p. 1011, App., p. 3. 
The Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act (Idaho MSA Act), Idaho Code 
§§ 39-7801 et seq., 1999 Idaho Session Law, ch. 7, is Idaho's Qualifying Statute.4 The Idaho 
MSA Act provides that NPMs must escrow funds for each "unit sold" in Idaho. Idaho Code 
§ 39-7803(b )(1 ). "Units sold" are defined as "cigarettes sold ... as measured by excise taxes 
collected by the state on packs ... bearing the excise tax stamp of the state." Idaho Code § 39-
78020). Accord State v Maybee, 148 Idaho at 527-529, 224 P.3d at 1117-1118. Escrowed funds 
"establish a reserve fund to guarantee a source of compensation" if Idaho were to sue the NPMs 
and obtain judgments against them. R., pp. 1328-1329; App., p. 24; Idaho Code§ 39-7801(t). 
When a State diligently enforces the provisions of its Qualifying Statute, it is not subject 
to the NPM Adjustment, so its payment is not reduced, but its share of the NPM Adjustment does 
not vanish. Instead, all diligently enforcing States' "Allocated Payments ... that are not subject 
to an NPM Adjustment ... shall be reallocated among all other ... States ... and such other ... 
States' Allocated Payments shall be further reduced accordingly." MSA § IX(d)(2)(C); R., 
p. 1071; App., p. 11. In other words, as a group States that did not diligently enforce the 
provisions of a Qualifying Statute bear not only their own allocated shares of the NPM 
Adjustment, but also bear the allocated shares of States that did diligently enforce. 
To illustrate, assume an MSA payment of $10 billion and an NPM Adjustment of $1 bil-
lion offset against that payment. If no State diligently enforced the provisions of a Qualifying 
Statute, every State would be subject to the NPM Adjustment, and every State's payment would 
be reduced 10%. If States with Allocated Payments of $5 billion diligently enforced and would 
4 MSA § 1X(d)(2)(E) provides that the "Model Statute" set forth in MSA Ex.Tis a Qualifying Stat-
ute. R., p. 1072; App., pp. 11-12. Ex.Tis at R., pp. 1328-1333, and App., pp. 24-28. Idaho's MSA Act 
is the Model Statute. Compare Idaho MSA Act with Ex. T. 
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not be subject to the NPM Adjustment, the $1 billion would be allocated to the other States' pay-
ments of $5 billion, which would be reduced by 20% ($1 billion divided by $5 billion), not 10%. 
If States with Allocable Shares of 90% diligently enforced, their $9 billion in Allocated Pay-
ments would not be subject to the NPM Adjustment; the other States, with Allocated Payments of 
$1 billion, would absorb the full $1 billion and lose their payments entirely. If States with Allo-
cable Shares of 95% diligently enforced, their payments of $9.5 billion would not be reduced; 
the other States would lose their $500 million of payments; and the PMs' "Available NPM Ad-
justment" would be half of the possible $1 billion NPM Adjustment. MSA § IX(d)(2)(D); R., pp. 
1071-1072, 1075; App., p. 11 If every State diligently enforced, no State would be subject to the 
NPM Adjustment, and there would be no Available NPM Adjustment. Id. 
The Independent Auditor (IA) and Arbitration of IA Decisions. The MSA provides for 
an Independent Auditor (IA) to oversee and calculate payments. The IA (1) "calculate[ s] and 
determine[s]" (2) "payments ... adjustments, reductions, and offsets ... and ... carry-forwards" 
and (3) "allocation of such payments, adjustments, reductions, offsets and carry-forwards" ( 4) 
"among the Participating Manufacturers" and (5) "among the Settling States." MSA § II(b) (IA 
defined),§ XI(a)(l) (IA duties); R., pp. 1015, 1093-1094; App., pp. 3, 16-17. 
Disputes about the IA's calculations and determinations are subject to arbitration: Any 
"dispute, controversy or claim rising out of or relating to calculations performed by, or any 
determinations made by, the Independent Auditor (including ... the operation or application of 
any of the adjustments ... ) shall be submitted to binding arbitration" before a panel of three 
former Federal judges. MSA § XI(c); R., p. 1095; App., p. 17. Arbitrations under § XI(c) are 
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Id. 
Amendment of the MSA. The MSA provides that it "may be amended by a written in-
strument executed by all [PMs] affected by the amendment and by all ... States affected by the 
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amendment. The terms of any such amendment shall not be enforceable in any ... State that is 
not a signatory to such amendment." MSA § XVIIIG); R., p. 1140; App., p. 21. 
2. The District Court Ordered Idaho to Arbitrate the 2003 NPM Adjustment 
2003 was the frrst year for which application of the NPM Adjustment was not resolved. 
April 2006 payments for calendar year 2005 were the first payments after the 2003 significant 
factor determination satisfied the second condition for an NPM Adjustment. Some PMs withheld 
from their April 2006 payments funds equal to 17.83332% of their payments for 2003; some paid 
that percentage into the Disputed Payments Account; and some paid in full subject to a later 
claim of offset. Kittelmann Aff., ,r 9 and Ex. 9; R., pp. 202, 263-268. 
Idaho moved the District Court to declare that it diligently enforced the provisions of the 
Idaho MSA Act and was not subject to the 2003 NPM Adjustment. R., pp. 60-61. The PMs 
moved to compel arbitration because Idaho's Motion related to the IA's determination whether to 
apply a 2003 NPM Adjustment. R., pp. 67-68. Former District Judge Williamson granted the 
PMs' Motion and ordered Idaho to arbitration because "the need for uniformity is of paramount 
concern." R., pp. 129-141, 139. Neither Idaho, the PMs, nor the District Court addressed NPM 
Adjustments or diligent enforcement for any other year. R., pp. 60-141. 5 
3. The PMs, Idaho and Many Other States Signed an Agreement Regarding Arbi-
tration (ARA) for the 2003 NPM Adjustment and No Other Years 
The PMs, Idaho and many other States signed an Agreement Regarding Arbitration 
(ARA) that listed matters to be arbitrated. Bouton Aff., ,r 11 and Ex. I; pp. 405, 1368. The ARA 
referred to 2003 issues, but was silent on other years' issues. For example, the ARA: 
5 The only NPM Adjustment or diligent enforcement mentioned in the State's Motion was for 2003. 
R., pp. 60-61. The only NPM Adjustment or diligent enforcement mentioned in the OPMs' Motion or 
briefing was for 2003. R., pp. 78, 84-86, 120, 122-123. The only NPM Adjustment or diligent enforce-
ment mentioned by the District Court was for 2003. R., pp. 129-133, 140-141. E.g.: "The dispute before 
the Court is ... over ... the 2003 NPM Adjustment." R., p. 140. 
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• recited that the PMs and the States "have agreed to proceed with the arbitration of the 
2003 NPM Adjustment dispute before a single [arbitration] panel," R., p. 1356; 
• defined "Arbitration" as "binding arbitration . . . conducted to resolve the 2003 NPM 
Adjustment dispute," ,r l(a), id.; 
• defined "diligent enforcement" as whether a "State diligently enforced a Qualifying Stat-
ute during 2003," ,r l(b ), id.; 
• defined the "2003 NPM Adjustment dispute" as "whether the [PMs] are entitled to a 2003 
NPM Adjustment," ,r l(f), id, p. 1357; 
• provided that the "NPM Adjustment dispute shall be resolved through arbitration pur-
suant to§ XI(c) of the MSA," ,r 2(a), id, p. 1357; 
• provided that the PMs would instruct the Independent Auditor to release certain funds in 
the Disputed Payments Account to induce States to join the ARA, ,r 4, id, p. 1363; and 
• listed five "substantive matters that will be included in the arbitration," none of which in-
volved release of post-2003 monies, id, Ex. A, p. 1368. 
The ARA did not empower the arbitrators to address NPM Adjustment funds6 for years other 
than 2003. ARA ,r 4 provided for release of certain Disputed Payment Account funds to the 
States, but had no provision for selective release to some States and not to others. R., p. 1363. 
4. Idaho Is Not Subject to the 2003 NPM Adjustment 
The arbitration began in July 2010. In November 2011, the PMs contested 35 States and 
did not contest 16 States, including Idaho. 7 Kittelmann A:ff., ,r 10 and Ex. 1 0; R., pp. 202, 269-
271. Thus, Idaho is not subject to the 2003 NPMAdjustment. 
6 The phrase "NPM Adjustment funds" refers to funds in two accounts set out in MSA § lX(c)(l) 
and § 1X(c)(2): the "Subsection lX(c)(l) Account" (Base Payments) and the "Subsection 1X(c)(2) Ac-
count" (Strategic Contribution Payments). R., pp. 1063, 1064; App., p. 8. 
7 Montana is missing from this count because it was not ordered to arbitration. 
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5. During the Arbitration, a Minority of States and the PMs Agreed to a Term 
Sheet that Settled the NPM Adjustment for 2003-2014 and Asked the Arbitrators 
to Direct Release of Funds/or 2003-2012 Only to the Term Sheet Parties 
After receiving a no-contest, Idaho thought it was done with the arbitration, except to 
await the arbitrators' issuance of awards for the contested States, after which the prevailing and 
uncontested States would receive the rest of their 2003 payments. There was more to come. 
In November 2012 the PMs and a cabal of seven contested States whose cases had not yet 
been heard circulated a settlement called the Term Sheet, which had been negotiated without 
Idaho. Kittelmann Aff., ,r 11 and Ex. 11; R., pp. 202, 272-286. Among other things, the Term 
Sheet: 
• settled the NPM Adjustment Claims for 2003-2014 with the Term Sheet States (those that 
agreed to the Term Sheet) by those States taking 54% of their Allocable Shares of the 
NPM Adjustment and the PMs taking the other 46%, all without the arbitrators finding 
which contested Term Sheet States, if any, diligently enforced, Parts I-II; R., pp. 273-274; 
• created a new adjustment for the Term Sheet States for 2015 forward that used different 
formulas and criteria from the NPM Adjustment, Part III; R., pp. 274-278; 
• had two conditions for settlement: joinder by critical masses of States and of PMs and 
"approval of this Term Sheet's terms by the Arbitration Panel," Part IVE; R., p. 279; and 
• provided for release from the Disputed Payments Account solely to the PMs and to the 
Term Sheet States of 2003 and post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds, Appendix A, ,r,r 2-4, 6; 
R., pp. 284-286. 
The release of NPM Adjustment funds from the Disputed Payments Account would be as 
provided in the Term Sheet, not as provided in the MSA. 
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6. The Arbitrators (a) Held that the Term Sheet Did Not Affect Non-Term Sheet 
States like Idaho, (b) Held that the Term Sheet Did Not Amend the MSA, and 
(c) Ordered Payment of and Withholding of Post-2003 Funds Pursuant to the 
Term Sheet, not Pursuant to the MSA 
Idaho and a majority of States opposed the Term Sheet, in part because they contended 
that the arbitrators had no power to order release of post-2003 funds from the DPA or to apply 
the Term Sheet to Non-Term Sheet States or to rule whether the Term Sheet amended the MSA. 
KittelmannAff., ,r 12 and Ex. 12; R., pp. 202-203, 287-330. Their Opposition was for naught. 
The arbitrators' Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award (Partial Award) ordered pay-
ments of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to PMs and to Term Sheet States and forbade pay-
ments to Non-Term Sheet States, all based on the Term Sheet. KittelmannAff., ,r 13 and Ex. 13; 
R., pp. 203, 331-368. The arbitrators claimed power to enter the Partial Award because they 
ruled that MSA § XI( c) and court orders compelling arbitration gave them jurisdiction over "all 
issues related to the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute." Partial Award, ,r I. I; R., p. 333 (internal 
punctuation omitted). They also claimed power to implement post-2003 Term Sheet provisions: 
"[D]irection to the [IA] includes implementation of the ... settlement ... beyond 2003 ... . . .. 
Tribunals have jurisdiction to issue orders approving or giving effect to such broader settlements 
even where they would lack jurisdiction to adjudicate the additional claims being resolved." 
,r I.6, R., p. 335. 
The Partial Award said that its provisions for payment of funds were based upon the Term 
Sheet's settlement and that it gave effect to the Term Sheet only among the settling parties. 
5. The Panel also has jurisdiction to incorporate and direct 
the Independent Auditor to implement those provisions of the set-
tlement that govern the amount and mechanism of monetary pay-
ments as among the Settling Parties, specifically ... the Disputed 
Payments Account ("DPA)" funds to be released. 
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7. .. . [T]he Panel is not "approving" the Term Sheet, 
much less rendering it binding on absent class members [the 
Non-Term Sheet States]. It is just giving effect to the Settling Par-
ties' agreed settlement payments as among themselves, by direct-
ing the [IA] to implement the settlement provisions ... 
Partial Award ,r,r I.5, I. 7; R. pp. 334, 335 ( emphasis added). 
The Partial Award also held that the PMs and Term Sheet States gave the arbitrators 
power over post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds and that the Term Sheet's post-2003 provisions 
did not adversely affect the legal rights of the Non-Term Sheet States: 
8. . . . [I]f there any were [ were any] questions about the 
Panel's jurisdiction to give ... direction as to post-2003 years, the 
Settling Parties can agree to give the panel jurisdiction to do so, as 
long as the Panel concludes (as it has) that the direction to the 
Independent Auditor does not adversely affect the legal rights of 
the Non-Signatory States. . .. 
Partial Award, ,r I.8; R., p. 336 (emphasis added). 
The Partial Award further held that neither the Partial Award nor the Term Sheet adversely 
affected the Non-Term Sheet States and did not amend the MSA: 
4. The Panel concludes that the Stipulated Partial Settle-
ment and Award and the Term Sheet do not legally prejudice or 
adversely affect the Non-Signatory States ... as follows: 
DPA .... 
. . . Non-Signatory States have no entitlement to the favor-
able treatment that the PMs have afforded the Signatory States as 
part of the consideration for settling their dispute. . .. 
6. Neither this [Partial Award] nor the Term Sheet c011sti-
tutes an amendment to the MSA that requires the consent of any 
Non-Signatory States under MSA § XVIIIG). [T]he Term 
Sheet is not an "amendment" of the MSA at all. Rather, it is a 
settlement of disputes that have arisen under the MSA . . . . . . . [I]f 
an amendment were involved, the MSA provides that it only must 
be signed by ". . . all Settling States affected by the amendment." 
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. . . The Panel construes ... "affected by" to mean "materially pre-
judiced by." ... [N]one of the Term Sheet's provisions "affect" the 
Non-Signatory States within the meaning of the contract. ... 
Partial Award, ,i,r V.4 and V.6; R., pp. 343-344, 345-346 (emphasis added). 
As noted, Idaho and other Non-Term Sheet States objected to the arbitrators considering 
Term Sheet issues. Brief of the Majority States in Opposition to the Proposed Stipulated Partial 
Award, R., pp. 295-301, especially pp. 300-301. Nevertheless, after ruling that the Term Sheet 
did not affect Non-Term Sheet States and did not amend the MSA in a manner that required 
Idaho or other Non-Term Sheet States' written consent, the Partial Award required Non-Term 
Sheet States' Allocable Shares of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to remain in the DPA, 
basing its decision solely on the Term Sheet and not upon the Master Settlement Agreement: 
1. The Independent Auditor is directed to implement the 
provisions of the Term Sheet incorporated in Section II above. 
2. . . . [T]he [IA] will order the release of funds from the 
DPA as described in the Term Sheet ... .... In doing so, the [IA] 
will ensure that the Non-Signatory States' ... Share of both NPM 
Adjustment funds now in the DPA ... and ... to be paid into the 
DPA under ... the Term Sheet remains in the DPA. 
3. The [IA] will ... (a) order the release of the funds in the 
DPA as provided by ... the Term Sheet, (b) allocate those released 
DPA funds solely among the Signatory States in the manner pro-
vided by ... the Term Sheet .... 
4. [T]he [IA's] performance of the above requirements ... 
will include: . . . (b) allocating the amount released solely among 
the Signatory States ... as provided by ... the Term Sheet 
5. There are NPM Adjustment amounts ... not yet in the 
DPA .... If a PM ... pays ... into the DPA, the [IA] will ensure 
that ... Non-Signatory States' aggregate Allocable Share ... re-
mains in the DPA. 
Partial Award, ,r,r III.1-III.5; R., pp. 337-339 (emphasis added). 
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7. Tlte District Court Denied Idaho's Motion to Vacate Post-2003 Portions of the 
Partial Award on the Ground That Idaho Lacked Standing 
Idaho moved the District Court to vacate the post 2003-portions of the Partial Award. R., 
pp. 189-190. Many PMs opposed Idaho's Motion. R., pp. 410-414, 420-445. The District Court 
(by then District Judge Norton) summarized the issues before it as follows: 
Idaho moved ... to vacate, modify, or correct the Partial Award to 
the extent it gives effect to provisions of the Term Sheet which ad-
dress issues beyond the 2003 NPM Adjustment and orders the re-
lease of funds associated with the NPM Adjustments for later 
years. The [PMs] opposed the motion, contending: (1) Idaho 
lacks standing to challenge the Partial Award; and (2) Idaho's ar-
guments fail on the merits. . . . Idaho replied ... : (1) it did not 
need to show injury to seek relief under the FAA; (2) even if it did 
need to show injury, it could; and (3) it prevails on the merits. 
R., p. 487. The District Court quoted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) sections under which 
Idaho brought its Motion: 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (a court may vacate an award if arbitrators "ex-
ceeded their powers") and § ll(b) (a court may modify or correct an award if arbitrators 
"awarded upon a matter not submitted to them"). Id. 
The District Court did not decide the FAA issues. Instead, it held that Idaho lacked stand-
ing to pursue its Motion. The District Court quoted Young v. City of Ketchum, I 3 7 Idaho 102, 
104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2003), for the Idaho law of standing. To have standing under Young: 
. . . a litigant must "allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a 
substantial likelihood the relief requested will prevent or redress 
the claimed injury." This requires a showing of a "distinct palp-
able injury" and "fairly traceable causal connection between the 
claimed injury and the challenged conduct." 
R., p. 488, quoting Young, 137 Idaho at 104, 44 P.3d at 1159. 
Acknowledging that Idaho argued that "if a showing of injury is required, Idaho has suf-
fered harm by the selective release ofpost-2003 funds from the DPA in a manner not provided by 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 13 
the MSA," R., p. 489, the District Court: 
• quoted the Partial Award's legal analysis, concluding that "Term Sheet and Partial Award 
do not affect Idaho's rights to its share of the annual payments under the MSA," id; 
• quoted the Partial Award's legal conclusion that the Term Sheet and Partial Award "do not 
legally prejudice or adversely affect the Non-Signatory State, id, p. 490; and 
• quoted the Partial Award's legal conclusion that "the Objecting States have not suffered 
'plain legal' prejudice from and are not adversely affected by the Term Sheet," id 
The District Court' concluded that Idaho lacked standing to move to vacate part of the 
Partial Award because Idaho did not show "legal prejudice" or suffer "a cognizable injury": 
Idaho has not alleged or shown ... any legal prejudice or adverse 
effect ... as a result of the Panel's use of the Term Sheet to give 
effect to its terms. The "selective release of post-2003 funds" from 
the DPA is not a cognizable injury. The "selective release" ex-
cludes Idaho ... because Idaho did not enter into the settlement .... 
. . . Nor does the selective release of funds affect Idaho's rights to 
its share of the annual payments under the MSA. Idaho's share of 
the dispute funds remains in the DPA and its right to future shares 
is unaffected. . . . Therefore, Idaho has no standing to ask ... under 
the FAA to vacate, modify, or correct the Partial Award. 
R., pp. 490-491 (emphasis added). 
8. Idaho Timely Appealed the District Court's Judgment 
The District Court entered Final Judgment Denying Motion to Vacate Award in Part on 
November 20, 2013. R., p. 496. Idaho timely appealed on December 9, 2013. R., pp. 502-507. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
After (a) the District Court ordered Idaho to arbitrate whe.ther it was subject to the 2003 
NPM Adjustment (no other NPM Adjustment was mentioned), and (b) Idaho and the PMs signed 
an Agreement Regarding Arbitration that dealt exclusively with the 2003 NPM Adjustment: 
Issue 1. When the Partial Award provided that some States would share in release of post 
2003 NPM Adjustment funds and others (including Idaho) would not, does Idaho have standing 
to move to vacate or modify parts of the Partial Award that prohibited release of post-2003 NPM 
Adjustment funds to Idaho on the ground that Idaho contends that the Partial Award contravened 
provisions of the Master Settlement Agreement? 
Issue 2. Did the Partial Award's direction based on the Term Sheet not to release post-
2003 NPM Adjustment funds to Idaho exceed the arbitrators' powers with regard to Idaho and/or 
award on a matter not submitted to them with regard to Idaho? 
Issue 3. Must Idaho show actual harm to vacate in part an award that exceeded the arbi-
trators' powers vis-a-vis Idaho and/or awarded on a matter not submitted to them by Idaho? 
Issue 4. If so, did Idaho show actual harm because post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds 
were released pursuant to directives contained in the Term Sheet, which excluded Idaho, and not 
pursuant to the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement itself, which had no provisions for 
excluding Idaho? 
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Standing The Court Has Free Review. 
"Jurisdictional issues, like standing, are questions of law, over which this Court exercises 
free review." In re Jerome County Bd. of Com'rs, 153 Idaho 298, 308, 281 P.3d 1076, 1086 
(2012) (citations omitted). 
Arbitration Awards - There Is Statutory Review Under the Arbitration Acts. 
A court "must confirm the arbitrator's award unless it finds one of the enumerated 
grounds for relief set forth in Idaho Code §§ 7-912 or 7-913." Norton v. California Ins. Guar-
antee Ass'n, 143 Idaho 922, 924, 155 P.3d 1161, 1163 (2007) (citations & internal punctuation 
omitted). FAA"§§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the review provided by the statute." 
Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 1406 (2008). 
Scope of Arbitration The Court Has Free Review. 
"Arbitrability is a question of law to be decided by the court. . . . [W]e exercise free re-
view over questions of arbitrability .... " Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 
308,315,246 P.3d 961,968 (2010) (citations & internal punctuation omitted). "[W]hether a ... 
binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy [is] presumptively for courts to 
decide. . .. A court may ... review an arbitrator's determination of such a matter de nova absent 
clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties wanted an arbitrator to resolve the dispute." 
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. -, -, n.3, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2069, n.3 (2013) 
( citations & internal punctuation omitted). "[C]ourts have traditionally used their power to 
determine whether a particular controversy was within the scope of the parties' agreement to 
arbitrate, unless the parties specifically delegated this power to the arbitrator .... " DOMKE ON 
COMMERCIALARBITRATION, § 15.2 (2013 on-line update). 
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ARGUMENT 
Idaho first explains what this appeal is and is not about. Idaho does not challenge that 
the Term Sheet States and the PMs may settle post-2003 NPM Adjustment disputes among 
themselves. Idaho does not seek to undo releases of post-2003 funds to the Term Sheet States. 
Idaho is asking this Court to vacate the Term-Sheet-based, post-2003 parts of the Partial 
Award as to Idaho so that Idaho may pursue its contractual rights under the MSA - release of 
Idaho's allocable shares of those funds according to MSA. Once the Partial Award is set aside in 
part with regard to those post 2003-funds, Idaho will pursue its remedies under the MSA. Idaho 
summarizes its Argument in four steps: 
First, Idaho suffered an injury in fact when the Partial Award used the Term Sheet, not 
the MSA, to prohibit Idaho from sharing in release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds. Thus, 
Idaho has standing to challenge the Partial Award. 
Second, the Partial Award's Term-Sheet-based direction to the Independent Auditor to 
forbid release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to Idaho exceeded the arbitrator's powers 
with regard to Idaho and/or awarded on a matter that Idaho did not submit to the arbitrators and 
may be remedied under FAA§ 10(a)(4) and/or§ ll(b). 
Third, under the plain language of FAA § 10(a)(4) and § ll(b), Idaho need not show 
actual injury to vacate an award that exceeded the arbitrators' powers and/or to modify an award 
on a matter not submitted to the arbitrators. 
Fourth, in any event, while not necessary under the FAA, Idaho suffered actual injury 
and prejudice when the Partial Award displaced the MSA with the Term Sheet by forbidding the 
MSA from applying to the release of post-2003 funds while ordering and prohibiting releases of 
post-2003 funds pursuant to the Term Sheet. 
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I. Idaho Has Standing to Challenge the Partial Award Because It Claims 
a Right Under the MSA to Share in the Release of Post-2003 Funds, But 
the Partial Award Prevented Idaho from Doing So 
The District Court put the cart before the horse. It reached the merits ( erroneously, Idaho 
believes) before ruling on standing when it held that Idaho had neither "legal prejudice" nor 
"cognizable injury" to conclude that Idaho had no standing to move to vacate. R., pp. 490-491. 
Young directs the opposite order of analysis: "Standing is a preliminary question to be 
determined ... before reaching the merits .... " 137 Idaho at 104, 44 P.3d at 1159. The District 
Court also misapplied Young, which asks if a litigant (1) shows a distinct, palpable injury in fact 
(2) fairly traceable to the conduct at issue (3) that is likely to be redressed by judicial relief: 
To satisfy the ... requirement of standing, a litigant must allege or 
demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief 
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. This requires 
a showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable causal 
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. 
137 Idaho at 104, 44 P.3d at 1159 (citations & internal punctuation omitted). Youngs three-ele-
ment test - injury in fact, causal connection, and redressability is still the law in Idaho. E.g., 
to have standing "litigants must allege [1] an injury in fact, [2] a fairly traceable causal con-
nection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct, and [3] a substantial likelihood 
that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Doe v. Doe, 155 
Idaho 660, 662, 315 P.3d 848, 850 (2013) ( citations & internal punctuation omitted; bracketed 
numbers added). As shown below, Idaho satisfies all three elements 
(1) Idaho alleged an injury in fact. The District Court conducted a legal analysis on 
tlte merits to conclude, in effect, that Idaho had no injury in fact. Injury in fact and legal injury 
are distinct, independent inquiries. E.g., Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 738-740, 274 
P.3d 1249, 1253-1255 (2012) (plaintiff seeking back pay and reinstatement had standing because 
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his job loss was an injury in fact, although he lost on the merits); Ciszek v. Kootenai County Bd 
of Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 123, 127-130, 254 P.3d 24, 28-31 (2011) (property owner opposing rezone 
of adjacent property had standing because rezoning to mining uses was an injury in fact, al-
though she lost on the merits). "[A] party can have standing to bring an action, but then lose on 
the merits." Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 806,808,241 P.3d 979, 981 (2010). 
Young quoted from the standing analysis of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
562, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992): "[W]hen the plaintiff is not himself the object of the govern-
ment action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but is ordinarily 'substantially 
more difficult' to establish." 137 Idaho at 105, 44 P.3d at 1160. Lujan also addressed the con-
verse a plaintiff ordinarily has standing when he is the object of the action at issue: 
When the suit is one challenging the legality of ... action ... , the 
nature and extent of facts that must be averred ... or proved ... to 
establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff 
is himself an object of the action ... at issue. Ifhe is, there is ordi-
narily little question that the action ... has caused him injury, and 
that a judgment preventing ... the action will redress it. 
504 U.S. at 561-562, 112 S.Ct. 2130 at 2137. 
Idaho was an object of the Partial Award - its direction not to release NPM Adjustment 
funds to Idaho (and other Non-Term Sheet States) because that is what the Term Sheet provided. 
Thus, Idaho has shown injury in fact ( exclusion from release of NPM Adjustment funds based 
upon the Term Sheet, not upon the MSA) that satisfies the first element of Young-Doe standing 
because Idaho contends that the MSA, not the Term Sheet, should govern release of funds. 
The District Court did not rule on the other two Young-Doe elements. This Court may 
address them because they "are questions of law . . . necessary to a final determination of the 
case." Idaho Code § 1-205. The following analysis shows that Idaho also satisfies the second 
and third Young-Doe elements and thus has standing to challenge the Partial Award. 
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(2) Idaho's injury is caused by and directly traceable to the challenged conduct. 
The Partial Award itself directed that Idaho and other States not receive post-2003 releases based 
upon the Term Sheet. See quotations from Partial Award, p. 12, supra. Thus, the challenged 
conduct (the Partial Award's Term-Sheet-based directives) are the cause of the injury in fact. 
(3) There is a substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress the claimed 
injury. If the Partial Award's terms forbidding Idaho from sharing in the releases of post-2003 
NPM Adjustment funds are vacated, there is a substantial likelihood that Idaho will receive post-
2003 funds from the DPA because that is what the MSA provides. See Part IV of the Argument, 
pp. 27-31, infra. There is redressability. 
Idaho satisfies all three Young-Doe elements of standing. The District Court's legal con-
clusion that Idaho did not have standing should be reversed and the case remanded to the District 
Court for further proceedings. This Court may reach the merits of Idaho's Motion to Vacate in 
Part the arbitrators' Partial Award before remanding. Idaho Code§ 1-205, supra. The rest ofthis 
Argument addresses the merits ofldaho's Motion to Vacate. 
II. The Partial Award's Use of the Term Sheet to Release and Deny Release 
of Post-2003 Funds Exceeded the Arbitrators' Powers With Regard to Idaho 
and/or Awarded on a Matter Not Submitted to the Arbitrators by Idaho 
NPM Adjustment arbitrations "are governed by the United States Federal Arbitration 
Act" (FAA). MSA § XI(c); R., p. 1095; App., p. 17. The FAA, not the Idaho Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act, therefore governs substantive review of the arbitrators' award. Wattenbarger v. A.G. 
Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 315-316, 246 P.3d 961, 968-969 (2010). However, "the 
distinction between state and federal substantive arbitration law is largely a distinction without a 
difference ... because the applicable legal principles are one and the same." Id. at 316,246 P.3d 
at 969. This brief thus cites cases under both Idaho and Federal arbitration law because their 
provisions are substantively identical. 
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What issues are subject to arbitration? The answer is those issues that the parties agree to 
arbitrate: "An arbitration agreement is a matter of contract," "a party cannot be required to 
submit to arbitration any dispute which that party has not agreed to submit," and, "The parties 
may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate."8 DOMKE, § 15.3 (footnotes omitted). 
When awards go beyond what the parties agree to arbitrate, FAA§§ 10(a)(4) and ll(b) 
come into play. Under§ 10(a)(4) a Court may vacate an award "where the arbitrators exceeded 
their powers."9 Under § ll(b) a Court may modify or correct an award "Where the arbitrators 
have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them."10 This Court elucidated the meaning of the 
phrases "exceeded their powers" and "a matter not submitted to them" in Norton v. CIGA, supra. 
8 MSA § VII(a)(3) lists three issues subject to arbitration: "(3) except as provided in subsections 
IX( d) [ significant factor determinations], XI( c) [Independent Auditor calculations], XVII( d) and Exhibit 
0 [attorneys' fees for cases pending in 1998]," Idaho's MSA Court (the District Court in Ada County) 
"shall be the only court to which disputes under this Agreement or the Consent Decree are presented as to 
such Settling State." R., pp. 1055-1056; App., p. 6. MSA § VII(a) has no exceptions to arbitrate whether 
the Term Sheet or any other side agreement affected Idaho or amended the MSA. 
9 FAA Section 10(a)(4), 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), provides: 
§ 10. Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing 
(a) In any of the following cases the ... court ... may make an order vacating the 
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration -
( 4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers .... 
Like FAA § 10(a)(4), Idaho Code§ 7-912(a)(3) provides that "the court shall vacate an award where ... 
[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers," so decisions under both statutes apply the same substantive law. 
10 FAA Section ll(b), 9 U.S.C. § l l)(b), provides: 
§ 11. Same; modification or correction; grounds; order 
In either of the following cases the . . . court . . . may make an order modifying or 
correcting the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration -
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it 
is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted. 
Like FAA§ 1 l(b), Idaho Code § 7-913(a)(2) provides "the court shall modify or correct the award where 
... [t]he arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them ... ," so decisions under both 
statutes apply the same substantive law. 
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A reviewing court shall modify an arbitration award where 
the arbitrator has awarded upon a matter not submitted to him and 
the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the 
decision upon the issues submitted. An arbitrator's authority is de-
rived from the parties' arbitration agreement. An arbitrator ex-
ceeds his authority and jurisdiction when he rules on an issue not 
submitted by the parties. . . . [C]ourts construe the phrase "ex-
ceeded his powers" to mean that the arbitrator considered an issue 
not submitted to him by the parties, or exceeded the bounds of the 
contract between the parties." 
143 Idaho at 925, 155 P.3d at 1164 ( citations & most internal punctuation omitted). 
The District Court's 2006 Order required Idaho to arbitrate the 2003 NPM Adjustment. 
R., pp. 140-141. The Agreement Regarding Arbitration (ARA) established procedures for 
arbitrating the 2003 NPM Adjustment. R., p. 1356. Neither covered any other year's NPM 
Adjustment or funds. Nevertheless, see Part B.6 of the Statement of the Case, pp. 10-13, supra, 
the arbitrators allowed Term Sheet States and PMs to receive post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds 
and prohibited non-Term Sheet States (including Idaho) from receiving those funds, all pursuant 
to the Term Sheet, not the MSA. As explained in more detail in Part IV.B of this Argument, pp. 
27-31, infra, the arbitrator's Partial Award was inconsistent with the MSA. 
Applying the plain meaning of the statutes, the arbitrators "exceeded their powers" with 
regard to Idaho and "awarded upon a matter not submitted to them" by Idaho because: 
(1) the Partial Award held that the Term Sheet did not affect Idaho's or other 
Non-Term Sheet States' legal rights, see quotations from Partial Award, p. 11, supra, 
which was an issue of contract law that Idaho did not submit to the arbitrators; 
(2) the Partial Award held that the Term Sheet did not amend the MSA or re-
quire Idaho's or other States' written consent, see quotations from Partial Award, p. 11, 
supra, another issue of contract law that Idaho did not submit to the arbitrators; and, 
(3) the Partial Award implemented the Term Sheet against Idaho by directing 
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release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to Term Sheet States and to the PMs and not 
to Idaho or other Non-Term Sheet States, see quotations from Partial Award, p. 12, supra, 
thus ignoring what the MSA itself provides for post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds. 
Thus, under FAA§§ 10(a)(4) and ll(b), all post-2003 provisions of the Partial Award should be 
vacated or modified as to Idaho. Idaho case law supports this position. 
In Norton the insurer Reliance went into receivership while plaintiff's claim against it 
was pending. CIGA protected insureds of various insolvent companies, including Reliance. 
CIGA agreed to arbitrate whether ''the accident in which [plaintiff] was involved ... caused [his] 
injuries ... and ... any associated monetary damages." The arbitrator also determined CIGA's 
liability to plaintiff. Norton affirmed the District Court's vacatur of that part of the award: 
"Nowhere in the parties' agreement" did "they submit[] the issue of CIGA's liability to the 
arbitrator," and the "agreement confined the arbitrator's authority ... to resolving ... Reliance's 
liability." 143 Idaho at 925-926, 155 P.3d at 1164-1165. This case is like Norton because Idaho 
never submitted to the arbitrators the issues of whether Idaho was affected by the Term Sheet, 
whether the Term Sheet amended the MSA in a manner requiring Idaho's consent, or whether 
the Term Sheet prohibited Idaho from sharing in release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds. 
In Bingham County Comm 'n v Interstate Electric Co., 105 Idaho 36, 665 P .2d 1046 
(1983), an arbitrator awarded on a matter of contract law submitted to him and also awarded 
attorneys' fees for the arbitration. Because the contract with the arbitration clause had no provi-
sion for awarding attorneys' fees for the arbitration, "we hold that it was beyond the power of the 
arbitrator to award such fees." Id. at 42-43, 665 P.2d at 1052-1053. This case is like Bingham 
County because the arbitrators awarded on matters not submitted to them by Idaho - the effect 
of the Term Sheet on Idaho's MSA contract and payment rights. 
Norton and Bingham County are more than enough to show that the Partial Award should 
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be vacated in part and/or modified where the arbitrators exceeded their powers and/or awarded 
on matters not submitted to them. Cases from other jurisdictions are consistent. For example, 
Burlington Resources O&G Co. v. San Juan Basin Royalty Trust, 249 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App. 
2007), held that an arbitrator exceeded his powers by ruling on issues arising after the arbitration 
began. The fact that the Trust "did not learn of the underlying facts supporting its newly asserted 
claim until after the commencement of arbitration establishes that such a claim was not one of 
the 'existing' audit disputes ... to be resolved by the Arbitration Agreement." 249 S.W.3d at 45. 
Burlington is like this case because the portions of the Partial Award that prevented Idaho from 
sharing in releases of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds were based on the Term Sheet, which 
came into existence after the arbitration began. 
Trustees of Asbury United Methodist Church v. Taylor & Parrish, Inc., 249 Va. 144,452 
S.E.2d 847 (1995), held that an arbitrator exceeded his power when he awarded quantum meruit 
damages for performance not under the contract that called for arbitration: "The trial court's 
referral [to arbitration] of the quantum meruit request was void ... because the trial court could 
not confer jurisdiction on the arbitrator to adjudicate disputes that were not based on the parties' 
contract." 249 Va. at 153. 452 S.E.2d at 852. Asbury is like this case because portions of the 
Partial Award that prevented Idaho from sharing in releases of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds 
were based on the Term Sheet, not on the MSA or the Agreement Regarding Arbitration. 
In re Melun Industries, Inc. v. Strange, 898 F.Supp. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), arose from a 
contract that set the purchase price of stock at 80% of book value on August 31, 1986, that 
adjusted the price for changes to book value from September 1 to the closing date, and that called 
for arbitration if the parties could not agree on adjustments to book value from September 1 on. 
Melun held that the arbitrator exceeded his powers when he also arbitrated pre-September 1 
adjustments to book value. Melun is like this case because the portions of the Partial Award that 
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prevented Idaho from sharing in releases of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds were outside the 
temporal restrictions of the 2003 issues submitted to arbitration. 
Consistent with the case law applying the plain language of the statutes, the Partial Award 
should be vacated and/or modified as to Idaho because forbidding Idaho from sharing in releases 
of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds not only contravened the MSA, but also exceeded the arbi-
trators' powers as to Idaho and/or awarded on a matter not submitted to arbitration by Idaho. 
III. Under the FAA's Plain Language, Idaho Need Not Show Actual Harm 
to Vacate in Part an Award That Exceeded the Arbitrators' Powers and/or 
to Modify an Award on a Matter Not Submitted to the Arbitrators 
FAA§ lO(a) has four clauses listing grounds to vacate an award. Clause (1) (procuring 
an award by corruption, fraud, or undue means), clause (2) (arbitrators' partiality or corruption), 
and clause (4) (arbitrators exceeding their powers or issuing an incomplete award) address 
"structural" errors not requiring a showing of prejudice to vacate an award. Only clause (3), 
which lists "trial" errors (not postponing hearings on sufficient cause shown, not hearing perti-
nent, material evidence, etc.), requires a showing of prejudice to vacate an award. 11 
11 
FAA § 11 has three clauses, none of which requires a showing of prejudice to modify or 
FAA§ lO(a) provides: 
§ 10. Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing 
(a) In any of the following cases the ... court ... may make an order vacating the 
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration -
( 1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either 
of them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the 
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any 
party have been prejudiced; or 
( 4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed 
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was 
not made. 
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correct an award, and all of which address errors that are structural or per se prejudicial (miscal-
culation, awarding on a matter not submitted, or awards imperfect in form). 12 
The question becomes: Should§§ 10(a)(4) and ll(b) be construed to require a showing 
of prejudice to vacate or modify an award subject to those sections' terms?, or may an award 
subject to those sections' terms be vacated or modified with further ado? The plain language of 
the statutes gives the latter answer. 
"[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. If the statutory 
language is unambiguous, this Court need not engage in statutory construction and should apply 
the statute's plain meaning." Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 151 Idaho 
266, 272, 255 P.3d 1152, 1158 (2011) (citations omitted). Also KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S. 
-, -, 132 S.Ct. 23, 26 (2011) (courts must give effect to plain meaning of a federal statute). 
Thus, under the plain language of§§ 10( a)( 4) and 11 (b ), no prejudice need be shown to vacate or 
modify an award for "structural" errors, including the ones at issue here "where the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers" and/or "awarded upon a matter not submitted to them." Under the plain 
language of the statutes, these errors trigger automatic vacatur or modification. 
12 
Vacating and/or modifying parts of an award in excess of the arbitrators' powers and/or 
FAA § 11 provides: 
§ 11. Same; modification or correction; grounds; order 
In either of the following cases the . . . court . . . may make an order modifying or 
correcting the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration -
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident mater-
ial mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award. 
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it 
is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted. 
( c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the con-
troversy. 
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof and promote 
justice between the parties. 
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on a matter not submitted to the arbitrators without an analysis of prejudice or harm is consistent 
with the practice in Idaho. E.g., Norton, supra, 143 Idaho at 924-926, 155 P.3d at 1163-1165 
(vacatur of part of award determining liability on an issue not submitted to arbitration affirmed 
without addressing prejudice); Bingham County, supra, 105 Idaho at 42-43, 665 P.2d at 1052 
1053 (vacatur of part of award granting attorneys' fees affirmed without addressing prejudice 
when award of attorneys' fees was beyond arbitrator's powers). 
Other jurisdictions are similar. As the New York Court of Appeals explained in Matter 
of Salvano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 85 N.Y.2d 173, 623 N.Y.S.2d 790, 647 
N.E.2d 1298 (1995), in vacating part of an award made under an expedited procedure that ex-
ceeded the arbitrators' powers: "When the arbitrators act in excess of their powers, the award 
can be vacated even in the absence of a specific showing that the rights of any party have been 
prejudiced (see 9 USC§ 10[a][4])." 85 N.Y.2d at 183, cited by DOMKE,§ 38.12, n.14. 
For the reasons stated above, the Court should apply the plain meaning of Federal Arbi-
tration Act§§ 10(a)(4) and 1 l(b) and vacate as to Idaho those portions of the Partial Award that 
address post-2003 funds and/or modify as to Idaho the Partial Award to remove those portions 
the award that address post 2003 funds because the arbitrators exceeded their power and/or 
awarded on a matter not submitted to them. 
IV. In Any Event, Idaho Suffered Actual Prejudice and Legal Harm Because 
the Partial Award Displaced the MSA and Prohibited Idaho from Sharing in 
Release of Post-2003 Funds Pursuant to the MSA 
A. The Partial Award Displaced the MSA 
The Term Sheet was a side deal between the PMs and the Term Sheet States in which the 
latter (1) took on additional post-2014 enforcement obligations not in the MSA (2) in return for 
(a) eliminating the risk of losing substantial portions of their 2003-2014 MSA payments for not 
diligently enforcing the provisions of their Qualifying Statutes, and (b) obtaining a percentage of 
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the NPM Adjustment funds for 2003-2012 without awaiting the results ofNPM Adjustment arbi-
trations for those years. See R., pp. 350-368 (Term Sheet), especially Part I (release of funds), 
p. 350, and Parts II and III, pp. 350-355 (detailing the "revised NPM Adjustment"). 
The Term Sheet States' side deal with the PMs in and of itself is not reason to vacate the 
Partial Award's incorporation of portions of the Term Sheet. If the Partial Award had done only 
what it said it would do implement the Term Sheet among the Settling Parties and not render 
it binding on Non-Term Sheet States, see quotations on p. 10, supra Idaho would not have 
moved for partial vacatur. Without the Partial Award, releases of post-2003 funds would be 
subject to the MSA, which has no provision for selective releases of post-2003 NPM Adjustment 
funds in the Disputed Payments Account to a cabal of PMs and Term Sheet States while Non-
Term Sheet States like Idaho are excluded from releases. 
The arbitrators had options with respect to the Term Sheet and the Disputed Payments 
Account that would have been consistent with the MSA. For example, they could have ordered 
release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds not released to the Term Sheet States or to the PMs 
as otherwise provided by the MSA. They did not. They could have been silent on the treatment 
of those funds, in which case the MSA would still have governed. They were not silent. Instead, 
the arbitrators affirmatively prohibited the release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to Non-
Term Sheet States based upon the Term Sheet, i.e., they displaced the MSA's treatment of those 
funds for Idaho and other Non-Term Sheet States with the Term Sheet. 
The arbitrators did more than implement the Term Sheet among the Term Sheet parties: 
Like the arbitrators in Norton. Bingham County, Burlington Resources, Asbury United Methodist 
Church, and Melun Industries, who decided issues not covered by their arbitration agreements, 
the arbitrators' Partial Award decided two issues against Idaho that arose under the Term Sheet 
after the arbitration began and that did not arise under the MSA or the Agreement Regarding 
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Arbitration: (1) The Term Sheet did not affect the legal rights of Non-Term Sheet States, and (2) 
the Term Sheet was not an amendment of the MSA requiring Idaho's written consent. 13 The 
arbitrators then relied upon the Term Sheet, not the MSA or the ARA, to prohibit Idaho and other 
Non-Term Sheet States from sharing in releases of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds in the 
Disputed Payments Account. See Statement of the Case, Part B.6, p. 12, supra. 
The arbitrators' use of the Term Sheet rather than the MSA to decide that Idaho and other 
Non-Term Sheet States were not entitled to release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds dis-
placed the MSA with the Term Sheet. That is reason enough for this Court to remand to the 
District Court to vacate or modify as to Idaho those portions of the Partial Award that address 
post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds in the Disputed Payments Account. The arbitrators had no 
power to adjudicate Idaho's rights to post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds using the Term Sheet. 
The Pennsylvania MSA court reached an analogous conclusion. It held that the arbitra-
tors could not displace the MSA's NPM Adjustment reallocation provisions with a formula not in 
the MSA that reflected the arbitrators' notions of how best to implement the Term Sheet: 
13 
When the [arbitrators] adopted the pro rata reallocation method 
and instructed the Independent Auditor to treat all of the [Term 
Sheet] States as diligent [they] effectively rewrote the MSA and 
affected Pennsylvania's contractual rights. 
While the PMs were free to settle with the [Term Sheet] 
States ... , these parties could not do so in a way that "affected" the 
rights of Pennsylvania. In entering the Partial Settlement Award, 
the [arbitrators] should have done so in a way that would not even 
potentially implicate the rights of the other Settling States as it was 
beyond the authority of the [arbitrators] to enter the Partial Settle-
The Partial Award's legal conclusion - "the Term Sheet is not an 'amendment' of the MSA at all. 
Rather it is a settlement," R., pp. 345-346 - is doubtful. E.g., Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 150 
Idaho 664, 670-671, 249 P.3d 857, 863-864 (2011) ("a settlement ... is a new contract settling an old 
dispute"). The Pennsylvania and Missouri MSA courts have already ruled, see text above, pp. 29-30, that 
the Term Sheet was an amendment of the MSA that did affect Non-Term Sheet States. 
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ment Award in a way that affected the rights of any other Settling 
State without that Settling State's consent .... 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., Pennsylvania Court of Common 
Pleas, Philadelphia County, Case No. 2443, p. 50 (April 10, 2014) (Opinion explaining why part 
of arbitrators' award reallocating NPM Adjustment to Pennsylvania was vacated). 
Likewise, the Missouri MSA court held that the Partial Award violated MSA § XVIII(i)'s 
requirements that all States affected by an amendment agree to the amendment in writing: 
[The arbitrators'] reallocation method ... violates the MSA's pro-
cedure for amending the MSA. . . . The Stipulated Partial Settle-
ment and Award effectively amends § IX(d)(2), since the [Term 
Sheet] states are no longer subject to the NPM Adjustment and do 
not have to prove their diligent enforcement. 
There is no question that Missouri is materially affected by 
the Partial Settlement and the pro rata reallocation of the NPM Ad-
justment. Missouri, and the other non- signatory states, did not 
agree to ... amendment of the calculation of their annual payment. 
Missouri v. The American Tobacco Company, Cause No. 22972-01465, p. 7, Missouri Circuit 
Court, St. Louis County (May 2, 2014) (Opinion explaining why part of arbitrators' award 
reallocating NPM Adjustment to Missouri was vacated). 
Idaho did not agree to the Term Sheet or the Partial Award's use of the Term Sheet to 
override MSA's provisions for releasing funds in the Disputed Payments Account. The case law 
shows that the arbitrators' awarding under the Term Sheet and not under the MSA was per se 
beyond their power on a matter not submitted to them by Idaho. This Court should order the 
District Court, as did the Pennsylvania and Missouri MSA Courts, to vacate and/or modify the 
Partial Award where it displaced the MSA with the Term Sheet. That means the District Court 
should vacate or modify the Partial Award's prohibition against Idaho's sharing in releases of 
post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds under terms not found in the MSA. Vacating or modifying the 
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Partial Award in part as to Idaho will allow Idaho to pursue its rights under the MSA. 
B. The Partial Award Was Contrary to the MSA 
Idaho shows below that selective release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds was con-
trary to the MSA even though it need not do so to show that it is entitled to vacate or modify the 
Partial Award to remove the Term Sheet's displacement of the MSA. MSA § IX(a) provides that 
funds can be disbursed to the States or returned to PMs only as provided in the MSA: 
(a) All Payments Into Escrow. All fayments ... pursuant to 
this Agreement ( except . . . section XVII) 1 shall be made into es-
crow ... and shall be credited to the appropriate Account . . . . Such 
payments shall be disbursed to the beneficiaries or returned to the 
[PMs] only as provided in section XI and the Escrow Agreement. 
R., pp. 1061-1062; App., p. 7 ( emphasis added). MSA § XI( e) also allows payment from an 
MSA account "only if permitted ... by this Agreement [the MSA]."15 R., p. 1101; App., p. 18 
( emphasis added). But, post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds were not released to non-Term Sheet 
States as provided in the MSA; they were denied release as provided by the Term-Sheet. 
DPA funds may be released when the dispute for which the funds were put into the DPA 
"is resolved with finality." MSA § XI(t)(2);16 R., p. 1102; App., p. 19. In particular, DPA funds 
may be released to PMs when a dispute "is resolved with finality in favor of a Participating 
14 MSA § XVID dealt exclusively with costs and attorneys fees associated with cases settled by the 
1998 Consent Decrees and the MSA itself. R., pp. 1131-1133. It is not at issue here. 
15 MSA § XI( e) provides that funds may be disbursed only as permitted by the MSA: 
( e) General Treatment of Payments. The Escrow Agent may disburse amounts from 
an Account only if permitted, and only at such time as permitted, by this Agreement . . . . . .. 
R., p. 1101; App., p. 18. 
16 MSA § XI(f)(2) provides that DPA funds may be paid when the dispute is resolved with finality: 
(2) Payments to and from Disputed Payments Account. The [IA] shall instruct the 
Escrow Agent to credit funds ... to the [DPA] when a dispute arises ... and ... to credit funds 
from the [DPA] to the appropriate payee when such dispute is resolved with finality. 
R., p. 1102; App., p. 19. 
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Manufacturer." MSA § XI(i)(2)(A); 17 R., p. 1114; App., p. 20. Likewise, DPA funds can be 
released to a State when a dispute is "resolved with finality" against a PM. MSA § XI(i)(2)(B); 18 
R., pp. 1111, 1113; App., pp. 20-21. But post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds were released by the 
Partial Award before post-2003 NPM Adjustment issues were resolved with finality. 
NPM Adjustment funds are "made or held for the benefit of each individual ... State" 
according to "the results of clause 'Twelfth' of subsection IXG)." MSA § IX(i). MSA § XI(f)(6); 
R., pp. 1109-111 O; App., p. 19 .19 Clauses Fifth, Sixth and Seventh have detailed allocations of an 
17 MSA § XI(i)(2)(A) provides that DPA funds shall not be released to a PM until the dispute is re-
solved with finality: 
(i) Miscalculated or Disputed Payments. 
(2) Overpayments. 
(A) If a dispute ... is resolved with finality in favor of a [PM] where the dis-
puted amount has been paid into the [DPA] ... , the Independent Auditor shall instruct 
the Escrow Agent to transfer such amount to such [PM]. 
R., p. 1111, 1114; App., p. 20. 
18 MSA § XI(i)(l)(B)(i) provides that DPA funds shall not be released to a State until the dispute is 
resolved with finality: 
(i) Miscalculated or Disputed Payments. 
(1) Underpayments. 
(B) To the extent a dispute ... is resolved with finality against a [PM]: (i) ... 
where the disputed amount has been paid into the [DPA] ... , the [IA] shall instruct the 
Escrow Agent to transfer such amount to the applicable payee Account(s); 
R., pp. 1111, 1113; App., pp. 19-20. 
19 MSA § XI(f)(6) provides that Base Payments and Strategic Contribution Payments must be made 
or held according to the results ofMSA § IX(i): 
(6) Determination of amounts paid or held for the benefit of each ... State. For ... 
subsections ... (i)(2) [Overpayments, see note 17], the portion of a payment ... made or held 
for the benefit of each ... State shall be determined: ... (B) ... a payment credited to the 
Subsection IX(c)(l) Account [Base Payments] or the Subsection IX(c)(2) Account [Strategic 
Contribution Payments], by the results of clause "Twelfth" of subsection IXG) for each 
individual ... State. . .. 
R.,pp.1109-lll0;App.,p.19. 
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NPM Adjustment among the States that feed into clause Twelfth, but they were not used in the 
Partial Award because the Term Sheet was used instead. R., pp. 1088-1089; App., pp. 14-15.20 
The PMs' alternative to waiting for finality, however, was releasing DPA funds according 
to each State's Allocable Share, i.e., a PM may change its mind regarding maintaining funds in 
the MSA. That is what happened under the Agreement Regarding Arbitration, where the PMs 
released certain NPM Adjustment funds in the DPA to the States as a whole as an incentive to 
join the arbitration.21 See ARA ,r 4; R., p. 1363. And, pursuant to the MSA, Disputed Payments 
Account funds were distributed to all States, even ones that had not signed the ARA. That is not 
what happened here. 
The ultimate issue of what will happen under the MSA if the post-2003 provisions of the 
Partial Award are vacated or modified in part is an issue for another day. Idaho wants to reach a 
20 Clauses Fifth, Sixth and Seventh of MSA § IX(i) provide specific rules for the NPM Adjustment: 
Fifth: [for] payments due under subsections IX(c)(l) and IX(c)(2), the results of 
clause "Fourth" ... shall be apportioned among the ... States ... in proportion to their ... 
Allocable Shares, and ... be added together to form such ... State's Allocated Payment. ... ; 
Sixth: the NPM Adjustment shall be applied to the results of clause "Fifth" pursuant 
to subsections IX(d)(l) and (d)(2) ( or, [for SPMs], pursuant to subsection IX(d)( 4)); 
Seventh: .. . [for] payments ... to which clause "Fifth" applies: (A) the Allocated 
Payments of all ... States ... shall be added together; ... (C) the Available NPM Adjustment 
... shall be allocated among the [OPMs] ... ; (D) the ... result of step (C) ... shall be sub-
tracted ... ; and (E) the resulting payment amount . . . shall then be allocated among the ... 
States in proportion to the ... results of clause "Sixth" for each ... State. . .. 
R., pp. 1088-1089; App., pp. 14-15. The Term Sheet did not follow Clauses Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh in 
its allocation of the post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds among the States. 
21 Paragraph 5 of the ARA provided for release of2005 NPM Adjustment funds in the DPA: 
4. Release of Certain Funds Paid into the Disputed Payments Account. 
Each Signatory PM that paid ... the 2005 NPM Adjustment into the [DP A] will ... 
instruct ... the [IA] to release ... (i) such amounts ... multiplied by (ii) the aggregate 
Allocable Share percentage ... of all [States] that executed this Agreement ....... [I]n the 
event the aggregate Allocable Share percentage of all [States] that executed this Agreement 
... is 80% or more, each such [PM] will ... instruct ... the [IA] to release from that Account 
all such amounts attributed to the 2005 NPM Adjustment. 
R., p. 1363. This paragraph has no provision for selective release to some States and not to others. 
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mutually agreeable resolution of that issue with the PMs. If not, Idaho can go to its MSA Court 
to determine its appropriate remedy. That bridge need not be crossed in this appeal. 
All that must be decided on this appeal is: (1) the arbitrators had no power to use the 
Term Sheet to deny releases of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to Idaho, which was not bound 
by the Term Sheet, (2) the Partial Award's denial of releases of post 2003-NPM Adjustment 
funds to Idaho was based on an issue ( the effect of the Term Sheet on non-Term Sheet States) 
that Idaho did not submit to the arbitrators, and (3) that those portions of the Partial Award 
denying release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to Idaho should be vacated or modified. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-Appellant the State ofldaho prays that this Court: 
(a) reverse the judgment of the District Court denying the State of Idaho's Motion to 
Vacate in Part the Partial Award of the 2003 NPM Adjustment Arbitration Panel, and 
(b) remand to the District Court with instructions to grant the State ofldaho 's Motion 
to Vacate in Part the Partial Award of the 2003 NPM Adjustment Arbitration Panel. In particular, 
the District Court should vacate and/or modify as to Idaho all provisions of the Partial Award that 
deny release ofpost-2003 NPMAdjustment funds to Idaho. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day May, 2014. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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Attachment 1 
Order and Opinion of the Pennsylvania 
MSA Court in Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. 
Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia 
County, First Judicial District of 
Pennsylvania, Civil Trial Division, Case 
No. 2443 (April 10, 2014) 

n ..... __ . 
'COPY 
· IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPIDA COUNTY 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
CIVIL TRIAL DIVISION 
COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA : 
BY KATHLEEN G. KANE, in her official 
capacity as Attorney General of1:he 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





APRIL TERM, 1997 
NO. 2443 
Control Nos.: 13110724 and 13121706 
AND NOW, this 10th day of April, 2014, upon consideration of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania's Motion toVacate Final Arbitration Award (filed under control number 
13110724) and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Amended.Motion to Modify, or Vacate in 
Part, a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award (filed und.er control number 13121706), all 
responses in opposition or support, all replies, all matters of record, oral argument, and in accord 
with the Opinion issued simultaneously hereto, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that: 
1. The Commonwealth ofPe~ylvania's Motion to Vacate Final Arbitration Award 
is DENIED. 
2. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's ~ended Motion to Modify, or Vacate in 
Part, a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award is GRANTED and the Stipulated Partial 
Settlement and Award dated March 12, 2013 in the matter entitled In the 2003 NPM Adjustment 
Proceedings, JAMS Reference No. 1100053390, is MODIFIED. Notwithstanding section IV of 
1 
~ the Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award, the Independent Auditor1 shall treat each Settling 
_J 
State that has signed the Term Sheet referenced in the Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award as 
if such Settling State did not diligently enforce a Qualifying Statute for,purposes of section IX( d) 
-: 
of the MSA when the Independent Auditor calculates the amounts owed to Pennsylvania under 
the MSA for the sales year 2003, unless the diligence of such Settling State was not contested or 
the arbitration panel issued a separate final award determining that such Settling State was 
diligent. 
BY THE COURT: 
·M'~ 
Capitalized terms not defined herein have the meaning ascribed to them in the 
Commonwealth's Amended Motion. 
2 
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Inl997, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the "Commonwealth" or "Pennsylvania") 
. . . 
filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against a nu.nib er of 
tobacco companies. In its complaint, Pennsylvania asserted claims against these tobacco 
companies seeking to recover for health care costs it had· incurred in connection with tobacco-
related illnesses, among other things. 
In 1998, Pennsylvania settled its claims against those tobacco companies as well as 
several other companies that were not named in the complaint as part of a master settlement 
agreement between :the companies (referred to collectively as the "Participating Manufacturers" 
1 
I'") 
\, ---- . .J 
<Jr the ''PMs'')1 and Pennsylvania and 51 other U.S. States and Territories (including the District 
of Columbia) that had asserted similar claims against the PMs (referred to collectively as the 
"Settling States" or "States''). Under the Master Settlement Agreement, or "MSA," the PMs 
agreed to a number of practices aimed at decreasing smoking rates and to make annual payments 
1o the Settling States in perpetuity in base amounts that in the aggregate total billions of dollars 
every year.2 These annual payments are referred to as "MSA Payment(s)." The MSA Payment 
for 2003 is <4)proximately $6.435 billion.3 The MSA Payments to the Settling States to date · 
exceed $70 billion. 
The PMs do not make these payments directly to the individual Settling States. Rather, 
each PM makes a single, aggregate payment to an "Independent Auditor'' in an amount 
calculated and determined by the auditor. The Independent Auditor then allocates the sum of 
those payments among the Settling States by making a single, annual payment to each Settling 
State in an amount based on its pre-set "Allocable Share'' percentage. Pennsylvania's allocable 
share of every MSA Payment is approximately 5. 75%.4 Thus, the base amount Pennsylvania 
would receive from the 2003 MSA Payment would be approximately $370 million, 
MSA Payments, however, are potentially subject to certain downward adjustments. This 
case concerns the ''Non-Participating Manufacturer Adjustment" ("NPM Adjustment") and, in 
The PMs fall into two categories: (1) the "Original Participating Manufacturers," or 
"OPMs," that were original parties to the MSA and (2) the "Subsequent Participating 
Manufacturers," or "SPMs," that later joined the MSA 
2 In addition to the Non-Participating Manufacturer Adjustment that is at issue and 
discussed at length herein, the MSA's annual base amounts are also subject to a number of other 
adjustments that are irrelevant to the issues before this court or putting those issues in context. 
Therefore, those other adjustments will not be addressed. 
3 Using the base amount due to Pennsylvania for 2003 of$369,807,760.89 and its exact 
allocation percentage provided below, the exact figure for the 2003 MSA Payment is: 
$6,434,954,707.60. 
4 Pennsylvania's exact allocation percentage is: 5.7468588%. 
2 
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particular, the NPM Adjustment for 2003. The NPM Adjustment, which is provided for at 
section IX(d) of the MSA, is a potential reduction of the PM's annual MSA Payment that was 
designed to address the PMs' concern that they would incur a competitive disadvantage relative 
to tobacco companies that did not sign the MSA. Tobacco companies that did not ( or do not) 
sign the MSA are referred to as ''Non-Participating Manufacturers" or ''NPMs" and, hence,. the 
adjustment related thereto is referred to as the ''Non-Participating Manufacturer Adjustment." 
For a given year, an NPM Adjustment can reduce a Settling State's MSA Payment if 
certain conditions are met. First, the Independent Auditor compares the PMs' share of the 
cigarette market for the relevant year to their market share in 1997 to determine whether the PMs 
experienced a "Market Share Loss." A Market Share Loss is defined by the MSA to mean the 
PMs' collective market share during that year decreased by more than two percentage points 
compared to their collective market share in 1997. If there was a Market Share Loss, an 
independent economic consultant is jointly selected and retained to determine wh~ther the 
"disadvantages experienced as a result of the provisions" of the MSA were "a significant factor 
contributing to the Market Share Loss for the year in question." MSA § IX(d)(l)(C). If the 
economic consultant so finds, the NPM Adjustment is available to the PMs with one exception. 
That exception is found at section IX(d)(2) of the MSA and provides that the Settling 
States may avoid the NPM Adjustment if during the year at issue, they "diligently enforced" a 
"Qualifying Statute" ( such as the "Model Statute" set forth as Exhibit T to the MSA ) .. MSA § 
IX( d)(2). Under the MSA, the Settling States are not required to either enact or diligently 
enforce such a statute, but if they want the benefit of this contractual exemption from the NPM 
Adjustment, they must do both. Following execution of the MSA, all of the Settling States 
3 
enacted a Qualifying Statute. 5 Thus, for purposes of section IX( d)(2) of the MSA, the only issue 
is whether the Settling States "diligently enforced" their statutes. 
If a Settling State satisfies the requirement of diligent enforcement, its payment is not 
subject to reduction; If all the States satisfy the requirement, the NPM Adjustment would not 
result in a reduction of the MSA Payment for the PMs. However, if some or all of the States do 
not satisfy the requirement, and are deemed "non-diligent," the NPM Adjustment will reduce the 
MSA Payment for the PMs to the extent each non-diligent Settling State's payment is subject to 
reduction as discussed below. 
A Settling State that is non-diligent is subject to an initial reduction of its MSA Payment 
in an amount equal to its Allocable Share of the aggregate NPM Adjustment. In contrast, a 
Settling State that is diligent is spared an NPM Adjustment to its payment but, under the MSA' s 
"Reallocation Provision," the amount of the NPM Adjustment that would have otherwise been 
applied to that Settling State's MSA Payment is "reallocated among all [non-diligent] Settling 
States pro rata in proportion to their respective Allocable Shares." MSA § IX(d)(2(C) 
(italicization added). In this way, each non-diligent Settling State ultimately faces a two-tiered 
5 A "Qualifying Statute" is defined in the MSA as a statute that "effectively and fully 
neutralizes the cost disadvantages that the Participating Manufactures experience vis-a-vis Non-
Participating Manufacturers within such Settling State as a result of [the MSA]." MSA § 
IX(d)(2)(E). Following execution of the MSA, all of the Settling States enacted the Model 
Statute. The Model Statute requires each NPM to make escrow deposits based on the number of 
cigarettes it sells in the enacting Settling State in the year in question. Toe escrow deposits are to 
be made into a "[ q]ualified escrow fund," which is defined in the Model Statute as an escrow 
arrangement with a qualifying fmancial institution in which the deposits are held for the benept 
of the State. MSA, Ex. T. Toe deposits then are to remain in escrow for 25 years except insofar 
as they are used to pay a judgment to or settlement with the State for liability on claims like 
those the Settling States settled agajnst the PMs in the MSA. The escrow deposits thus guarantee 
the Settling State a source of recovery should it subsequently sue or settle with that NPM on 
claims like those the State settled against the PMs in the MSA, and avoid the risk that NPMs 
would otherwise use their MSA-related "cost advantage to derive large, short-term profits ... and 
_,J then becom[e] judgment-proof before liability [to the State] may arise." M_SA, Ex. T. 
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,,~ NPM Adjustment: first, ail initial reduction tied directly to that non-:diligent Settling State's 
( ) 
Allocable Share and, second, an additional reduction reallocated from any diligent Settling State 
or States. Pennsylvania refers to these as the "First Tier" and "Second Tier" of the NPM 
Adjustment. Depending on how many Settling States are determined to be diligent, the Second 
Tier reallocation may be substantially greater than the First Tier reduction, subject to the limit 
that each non-diligent Settling State can lose no more that its full share of the annual payment. 
Despite the universal enactment of Qualifying Statutes by all of the Settling States, the 
PMs experienced Market Share Loss. NPM Adjustments for 1999 through 2002 were resolved 
by settlement as to all of the States. The NPM Adjustment for 2003 (and for subsequent years) 
was not. Regarding 2003, the Independent Auditor determined that the MSA's first condition for 
application of a NPM Adjustment was satisfied: the PMs experienced a Market Share Loss for 
that year. Subsequently, an independent economic consultant was retained and determined 
disadvantages experienced by the PMs as a·result of provisions of the MSA were a significant 
factor contributing to the Market Share Loss in 2003. Following this determination, the PMs 
requested that the Independent Auditor apply the NPM Adjustment as a credit against _their MSA 
Payment. The Settling States, however, opposed the request, instead asking the Independent 
Auditor to presume diligent enforcement and refuse to apply the 2003 adjustment. With the 
absence of diligent enforcement determinations for the States, the Independent Auditor decided 
not to apply the NPM Adjustment. 
Given the impasse, the PMs requested the Settling States arbitrate the dispute pursuant to 
the arbitration clause contained in the MSA, which provides that: 
[a]ny dispute ... arising out of or relating to calculations performed by, or any 
determinations made by, the Independent Auditor (including, without limitation, 
any dispute concerning the operation or application of any adjustments, 
reductions, offsets, carry ... forwards and all allocations described in subsection 
5 
__ / 
IX(j) or subsection XI(j)) shall be submitted to binding arbitration before a panel 
of three neutral arbitrators, each of whom shall be a former Article III federal 
Judge. Each of the two sides to the dispute shall select one arbitrator. The two 
arbitrators so selected shall select the third arbitrator. 
MSA § XI(c). The clause further provides, "[t]he arbitration shall be governed by the United 
States Arbitration Act." MSA § XI( c ). 
Pennsylvania and the other Settling States did not agree to submit their disputes to 
arbitration and instead sought relief in their individual state courts. Pennsylvania, for example, 
sought relief by filing a motion in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in April 
2006 seeking a declaration that it had diligently enforced its Qualifying Statute in 2003 and that 
the Independent Auditor had properly determined the 2003 NPM Adjustment should not be 
applied. Consistent with their request that the States arbitrate the issue, the PMs filed a motion 
to compel arbitration in response, arguing the question of diligence was subject to arbitration and 
should be resolved by a uniform set of rules. 
In December 2006, a court of coordinate jurisdiction (the Honorable William J. 
Manfredi) decided the PMs' motion to compel arbitration and "reluctantly" held the matter was 
subject to arbitration. (Mem. Opinion p.7.) The court was reluctant to so hold in part because it 
predicted ari arbitration proceeding under the MSA would compel up to 52 Settling States with 
competing interests to join in the selection of a single arbitrator to decide an issue that it 
determined was "very much a local one" based on its conclusion that "[t]he vagaries of 
population size and distribution, geography, market penetration by NPMs, to name but a few 
factors, must be taken into account in determining whether a state has been diligent[;]" a 
conclusion the court highlighted by positing "that which constitutes diligence in our sister state 
of North Dakota will assuredly be far different from diligence in our neighbor New York." 
(Mem. Opinion p. 7.) However, while noting "it almost inconceivable that a mechanism for 
6 
•· 
determining activity so integral to the agreement--diligence of enforcement of a qualifying 
statute-upon which question so many millions of dollars hang in the balance, was neither ... 
defined in the MS.A,, nor the subject of specific, well-delineated means of ascertainment," the 
court nevertheless concluded the law required the matter be arbitrated and the parties left "to 
their bargain, however, flawed and ill-conceived it may be." (Mem. Opinion p. 7 n.4.) 
With the courts of every Settling State but Montana similarly ordering arbitration of the 
2003 NPM Adjustment dispute, the PMs and most of the Settling States, including Pennsylvania, 
eventually entered into an Agreement Regarding Arbitration ("ARA"). When the Arbitration 
Panel ("Panel") was seated on July 1, 2010, the only Settling State that was not a party to the 
ARA was Montana. The Panel consisted of: the Honorable Abner J. Mikva (picked by the 
Settling States); the Honorable William G. Bassler (picked by the PMs); and the Honorable Fem 
¥ M. Smith (picked by the other two). 
Initially, the Panel ruled on various threshold issues. In doing so, the Panel determined 
that each Settling State would bear the burden of proving that it had diligently enforced its 
Qualifying Statute for 2003. The Panel also determined that if any Settling State's diligence was 
not contested by any party after the·conclusion of discovery on the issue and deadlines set to 
contest the issue, the State would be deemed to have diligently enforced its Qualifying Statute 
for2003. · 
Regarding its first determination, the Panel concluded the "plain language of [the MSA] 
... and the context overall of [section] IX" show that "the diligent enforcement provision should 
be construed as a contract exception, and the States should bear the burden of proving ... they 
fall within the purview of such exception." (Panel's Order re: Burden of Proof pp. 6"". 7.) In 
rejecting the contention that the Settling States should presumptively be treated diligent, the 
7 
7 
Panel stated "no language in the MSA supports a finding that the States can by-pass an inquiry 
regarding whether they satisfied their contractual obligation for avoiding a payment adjustment 
through the NPM Adjustment .... " (Panel's Order re: Burden of Proof p. 11.) 
Regarding its second determination, the Panel set a deadline of November 3, 2011 for the 
PMs to contest the diligence of the States and a deadline of December 5, 2011 for the States to 
c_ontest the diligence of other States if the PMs did not do so first. Having been asked to clarify 
the effect of these deadlines, the Panel ruled that a State whose diligence was not contested by 
either the PMs or another State after these deadlines would be deemed diligent. In so ruling, the 
Panel stressed (1) that it was only deciding a "procedural" question of "[ w ]hether or not to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing when a state's diligent enforcement is not challenged" and (2) 
that "the only way to 'not be subject' to the otherwise applicable NPM Adjustment is to 
diligently enforce a Qualifying Statute" and (3) that "the reallocation provisions of the MSA 
[i.e., the Second Tier reduction] d(id] not apply unless and until 'diligent enforcement 
determinations are made for those states whose diligence is contested by either the PMs or [a 
State by the above-deadlines]." (Panel's Order re: PMs' Mot. for Clarification on No-Contest 
Issue pp. 13-15.) 
· Initially, the PMs challenged the diligence of every Settling State. After the conclusion 
of discovery, the PMs filed detailed "Statements of Contest" against 35 of the States by the 
above-mentioned deadlines, leaving the diligence of 17 of the States uncontested. In May 2012, 
the Panel began holding individual hearings for the 35 States whose diligent enforcement for 
2003 was contested as of the deadlines. 
In November 2012, a hearing for Pennsylvania was held. Over the course of four days, 





introduced the testimony of three expert witnesses and one lay witness, while the 
Commonwealth introduced the testimony of seven lay witnesses, one expert witness, and a Rule 
1006 witness to summarize voluminous documents. 
As this national arbitration process slowly progressed, a subset of the Settling States 
entered into settlement negotiations with the PMs. As a result thereof, the PMs and 19 of the 
Settling States entered into a term sheet agreement ("Tenn Sheet") in November 2012. This 
occurred shortly after Pennsylvania's hearing but before all the individual State hearings had 
been conducted. All of the other Settling States were invited to join the settlement and 3 more 
ultimately did. Of these 22 "Compromising States," the diligence of 20 of them had been 
contested by the PMs following discovery and the above-mentioned deadlines. Two Settling 
States whose diligence was not contested also settled. In total, these 22 Compromising States 
represent approxirnat~ly 46% of the aggregate allocable share of the MSA. 
Under the Term Sheet, each of the Compromising States agreed to a reduction of their 
MSA Payments in an amount equal to 46% of their Allocable Share of the NPM Adjustment.6 
The Tenn Sheet did not address the MSA's Reallocation Provision at all, nor most significantly 
did it consider how the Reallocation Provision would apply to the States that did not sign the 
Term Sheet 
6 The Term Sheet went well beyond settling just the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute. 
Under the Term Sheet, the PMs receive 46% of the Compromising States' Allocable Share of the 
NPM Adjustments for the years 2003 through 2012, which will be funded by billions of dollars 
in credits against the PMs' MSA Payments in the next five years. In addition, the Term Sheet 
provided for the early release of part of the funds that certain PMs deposited into a "Disputed 
Paym.ent Account," which allowed some of the Compromising States to balance their budgets in . 
a time of need; imposed significant new enforcement obligations on the Compromising States for 
future years; and created a·new formula for calculating the amount of future NPM Adjustments 





In December 2012, the PMs informed the Panel of the Term Sheet. The next day, 
Pennsylvania and other Settling States wrote the Panel to object to the settlement based on, 
among other things, their concern that the PMs would argue the settlement alters how the MSA's 
Reallocation Provision applies to them. 
In January 2013, the Panel held a two-day status conference regarding the partial 
settlement. Following the status conference, the PMs, in conjunction with the Compromising 
States, filed a Proposed Stipulated Partial Award ("PMs' Proposed A ward"). The PMs' 
Proposed Award presented two alternatives for how the MSA' Reallocation Provision would be 
applied in light of the settlement. Both alternatives provided that the Compromising States 
would be treated as "not subject to the 2003 NPM Adjustment for purposes of section 
IX(d)(2)(B)-(C) of the MSA" even though the PMs had contested the diligence of20 of the 
Compromising States for nearly a year after the deadlines for deciding which States diligence 
would be contested and those States had not proven their diligence. (See PM's Proposed Award 
pp. 9, 11.) 
The Panel initially accepted briefs and then in March 2013 held a hearing on the PMs' 
Proposed Award. Just two business days later, the Panel entered a Stipulated Partial Settlement 
and Award (the "Partial Settlement Award"), which largely tracked the PMs' Proposed Award. 
In the Partial Settlement Award, the Panel adopted the PMs' second alternative referred to as the 
''pro rata" alternative for how the MSA's Reallocation Provision would be applied to the States 
that did not join the Term Sheet. 
To implement its adoption of the ''pro rata" alternative, the Panel directed the 
Independent Auditor to treat the Compromising States as "not subject to the 2003 NPM 
Adjustment for purposes of section IX( d)(2)(B)-(C) of the MSA." (Partial Settlement Award p. 
10 
(-"") 9.) Acknowledging "potential prejudice arising from the settlement's removal of 
[Compromising] States from further contribution towards the 2003 NPM Adjustment," the Panel 
further provided that any non-diligent non-Compromising States would receive the benefit of a 
''pro rata reduction, under which the dollar amount of the [aggregate] 2003 NPM Adjustment 
[would] be reduced by a percentage equal to the aggregate Allocable Shares of the 
[Compromising] States." (Partial Settlement Award pp. 10, 13.) These holdings are sometimes 
referred to collectively as the "Reallocation Determination." 
In the Partial Settlement Award, the Panel asserted its belief that the "pro rata reduction" 
would provide "appropriate and adequate protection" to the non-Compromising States. (See 
Partial Settlement Award pp. 10, 11, 13.) In one of its few changes from the PMs' Proposed 
Award, however, the Panel invited "any Objecting State, found by the Panel to be non-diligent, 
[that has] a good faith belief that the pro rata deduction does not adequately compensate [it] for 
a [Compromising] State's removal from the re-allocation pool ... [to] appeal to [its] individual 
MSA court." (Partial Settlement Award p. i4.) 
After the Panel issued the Partial Settlement Award, the arbitration continued with 
respect to those Settling States that had not agreed to the Term Sheet, including Pennsylvania. In 
September 2013, the Panel entered final awards for the 15 Settling States whose diligent 
enforcement for 2003 remained contested after the initial deadlines for contesting diligence and 
the settlement. The Panel found that Pennsylvania and five other Settling States were not 
diligent and that the other nine States were diligent. 
In the final award for Pennsylvania (the "Final Award"), the Panel began its analysis by 
' i 
addressing its findings/conclusions on certain issues it found to be common to all the parties, 
including the general standard and specific factors that it used to assess diligent enforcement. 
11 
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-Uere, the Panel defined "Diligent Enforcement" as: "an ongoing and intentional consideration 
of the requirements of a Settling State's Qualifying Statute, and a significant attempt by the 
Settling State to meet those requirements, taking into account a Settling State's competing laws 
and policies that may conflict with its MSA contractual obligations." (Final Award pp. 13-14.) 
The Panel noted its definition is measured by an objective standard and that it considered 
numerous factors, including eight that it specifically delineated, in determining whether its 
definition was met The Panel also noted it had not ranked the factors, but rather "considered 
them as a whole in making its determination." (Final Award p. 14.) The specific factors were: 
(1) collection rate; (2) lawsuits filed; (3) gathering reliable data; (4) resources allocated to . 
enforcement; (5) preventing future sales by non-compliant NPMs; (6) legislation enacted; (7) 
actions short of legislation; and (8) efforts to be aware of other Settling State's enforcement 
efforts: 
The Panel then proceeded to make state-specific findings for Pennsylvania. Based on its 
state-specific finding for Pennsylvania, the Panel concluded Pennsylvania did not diligently 
enforce its Qualifying Statute in 2003 because it "had a low collection rate, failed to adequately 
file and pursue lawsuits, and cavalierly declined to consider the impact of ["Roll Your Own" 
("RYO")] sales on its obligations under the MSA" and that ''there were no counterbalancing 
efforts or results that sufficiently outweighed [these] deficiencies." (Final Award pp. 20-25.) 
On November 4, 2013, Pennsylvania filed a motion with this court to modify or vacate 
the Final Award, which is presently before this court for disposition. Therein, Pennsylvania 
initially addressed the issue of whether standards of review prescribed by Pennsylvania law or 
;,::_, 
the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") should be applied. Citing Trombetta v. Raymond James 
Financial Services, Inc., 907 A.2d 550 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), Pennsylvania stated that 
12 
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(_) ''[a]lthough section XI(c) of theMSA provides that arbitrations will be 'governed by' the FAA, 
that section does not invoke the FAA' s standards of review, which [instead] apply only to federal 
courts." (PA Mem.: re Final Award p. 22.) Rather, the Commonwealth advanced that the 
Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA") standards of review apply here and, in 
particular, section 7302(d)(2) of the UAA "requires this [c]ourt to modify an award involving the 
Pennsylvania government where the award is contrary to law and is such that had it been a 
verdict of a jury the court would have entered a different judgment or a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict" (PA Mem.: re Final Award p. 23 (quotations omitted).) Under this 
standard, the Commonwealth argued this court has the power to correct the award where the 
arbitration panel commits an error oflaw or the award is against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Having argued for the above-standard, Pennsylvania proceeded to contend the Panel 
committed an error of law by not applying the correct definition of diligence to section 
IX(d)(2)(B). Citing cases addressing the standard of"due diligence" for speedy trials in the 
state, the Commonwealth asserted Pennsylvania common law required it to be found to have 
"diligently enforced" its Qualifying Statute if it made "reasonable efforts" to enforce the statute. 
(PA Mem.: re Final Award p. 25 ( emphasis removed).) The Commonwealth then argued this 
court should modify the Final Award and find Pennsylvania was diligent in 2003 because "no 
conclusion can be reached other than that Pennsylvania made reasonable efforts to enforce [its 
statute]" based on its record of enforcement. (PA Mem.: re Final Award p. 26.) Pennsylvania, 
however, also argued that it satisfied the Panel's definition of diligent enforcement, if that 
definition had been rationally and consistently applied to its efforts, and, therefore, that the Final 
Award should be modified under that definition as well. 
Regarding its record of enforcement for 2003, the Commonwealth highlighted that: 
13 
•. ''while Pennsylvania's overall collection rate was 44% ... , Pennsylvania either 
collected or actively pursued 93% of the payable escrow funds for 2002 sales[;]" 
• while Pennsylvania did not have a blanket policy in 2003 regarding when to file 
lawsuits and did not sue seven of the ten largest non-compliant NPMs, "Pennsylvania 
did have a litigation strategy of targeting larger NMPs with an actual potential for 
recovery[;]" and 
• "[a]lthough the Panel stated that its negative comments regarding RYO sales were not 
material·or necessary to the Final Award, the Panel's decision making was ... flawed 
... to that ... factor as [well]" because Pennsylvania does not tax RYO sales and the 
MSA puts no demand on the Settling States to change their laws in such a manner. 
(PA Mem.: re Final Award pp. 28-30.) 
In the alternative, Pennsylvania argued the Final Award should be vacated because: (1) 
the decisions the Panel reached were not consistent across states and/or (2) the Panel ignored 
relevant evidence in the form of the enforcement records for the 20 Compromising States whose 
diligence had been contested. Regarding the irrationality of the Panel's decisions, the 
Commonwealth noted the following three apparent inconsistencies. First, the Panel described 
Pennsylvania's 44% collection rate as "relatively low'' while it described Ohio's 44% collection 
rate. as "in the mid-range" for the contested Settling States. (PA Mem.: re Final Award p. 36.) 
Second, five States that did not file a single lawsuit in 2003 were found diligent while 
Pennsylvania filed four lawsuits in 2003 and was found non-diligent. Finally, the Panel excused 
Oregon's failure to collect escrow on RYO as "general confusion over RYO" and found Oregon 
diligent while it refused to excuse Pennsylvania's failure to do the same and rather viewed this as 
"circumstantial evidence of the Commonwealth's general attitude of compliance." (PAMem.: re 
14 
Final Award pp. 36-37 (quotations omitted).) Having so argued, the Commonwealth asked that 
tlte Final Award be vacated and remanded with the instruction that the Panel apply 
Pennsylvania's definition of diligence ( or its own definition of diligence) and "consider all 
relevant evidence in a rational, consistent, and non-arbitrary manner[.]" (See PA Me~.: re Final 
Award p. 43.) 
In response, the PMs argued that the standard of review in this case should be the 
standard of review supplied in the FM. Here, the PMs asserted that by agreeing at section XI( c) 
of the MSA that "[t]he arbitration shall be governed by the United States Federal Arbitration 
Act," "[tJhe parties were obviously agreeing upon the law that would govern the entire dispute-
resolution process-not just the conduct of the arbitration by the Panel, but also review and 
enforcement of the arbitration by the courts of the [Settling States]."7 (OPM Mem.: re Final 
Award p. 17.) The PMs, however, also· argued that the FM would preempt the UAA in this 
case because, first, application of the UAA in this case would undermine the goals and policies 
of the.FAA and, second, thatthe Commonwealth incorrectly interprets Trombetta 's reach. 
Under the FAA, the PMs stated the standard of review is very narrow and '"the question 
for a judge is not whether the arbitrator construed the parties' contract correctly, but whether [the 
arbitrator] construed it at all."' (OPM Mem.: re Final Award p. 14 (quoting Oxford Health 
Plans, LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2071 (2013)) (emphasis added).) Itis "[o]nly if'the 
arbitrator[s] ... issu[ed] an award that simply reflects [their] own notions of economic justice 
rather than.drawing its essence from the contract ... may a court overturn [their] decision.'" 
(OPM Mem.: re Final A ward p.14 (quoting Oxford Health, 133 S. Ct at 2068).) If the 
arbitrators were even arguably construing or applying the contract, the PMs asserted this court 
7 While the opposition to the Commonwealth's motions was filed by certain OPMs and 
certain SPMs, for ease of discussion we will referto these parties as 'The PMs." 
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(=") cannot overrule even grave errors of contract interpretation or application under the FAA. 
Rather, the parties' are stuck with '" [t]he arbitrator[ s '] construction [ of the contract] ... , however 
good bad, or ugly."' (OPM Mem.: re Final Award p. 14 (quoting Oxford Health, 133 S. Ct. at 
2071-72).) 
In terms of the Final Award, the PMs argued "the FAA indisputably forecloses the 
Commonwealth's attacks on the Panel's good-faith legal and factual determinations." (OPM 
Mem.: re Final Award p. 15.) The PMs noted the Panel was composed of three respected former 
federal judges who "unanimously detemiined that the Commonwealth was not diligent in 2003 
after considering the MSA and interpreting the evidentiary record." (OPM Mem.: re Final 
Award p. 15.) The PMs then argued: 
Not even Pennsylvania contends that.these arbitrators willfully ignored the law 
and the facts in favor of their own notions of justice, as would be required to 
vacate the award under the FAA. 
Rather, ... the Commonwealth (incorrectly) argues that the Panel's legal 
conclusions and factual findings are merely wrong-or, at worst, irrational. But 
such arguments, even if they were correct, do not permit vacatur under the FAA. 
(OPM Mem.: re Final Award pp. 15-16 (citations omitted).) 
Alternatively, the PMs argued the Commonwealth's motion also fails under the UAA. 
While acknowledging that section 7302(b) of"the UAA does provide a special modification 
standard for some arbitrations involving the Commonwealth government," the PMs argued 
''Pennsylvania ignores that the courts have repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of merits 
review that this provision allows." (OPM Mem.: re Final Award p. 25 (quotations and citations 
omitted).) Regarding the scope of review, the PMs stated the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
has h.eld that the 'judgment n.o.v./error oflaw concept set forth in the special standard in§ 
7302(d)(2) is the same as the 'essence test' that ... specially governs arbitrations concerning 
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r, collective bargaining agreements." (See OPM Mero.: re Final Award pp. 25-26 (quotations, 
citations, and brackets omitted).) Under the "essence test," "an arbitral award 'is to be respected 
by the judiciary if [it] can in any rational way be derived from the agreement."' (OPM Mem.: re 
Final Award p. 26 (quoting Cnty. of Centre v. Musser, 548 A.2d 1194, 1199 (Pa. 1998)).) The 
PMs argued under this standard the most the Commonwealth is entitled to is "limited review of 
whether the Panel's determinati?ns can in any rational way be derived from the MSA after 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the PMs." (OPM Mem.: re Final Award p. 26 
(citing Musser, 548 A2d at 1199 and Trombetta, 907 A2d at 571) (quotations and brackets 
omitted).) 
In terms of the Commonwealth's arguments for modifying the Final Award, the PMs 
argued the Panel's determinations more than satisfied these low thresholds. 
First, the PMs asserted: 
Contrary to the Commonwealth's claim, it is utterly implausible to presume that, 
when the parties to this national agreement used the general term "diligently 
enforced" in MSA § IX( d)(2)(E), they intended for that term in Pennsylvania to 
incorporate the random definition of"due diligence" that happens to be employed 
in the Commonwealth's speedy-trial provisions governing criminal trials. 
. *** 
By contrast, the Panel's more stringent definition [of] "an ongoing and intentional 
consideration of the requirements of a [Settling State's Qualifying Statute], and a 
significant attempt by the ... State to meet those requirements";-is consistent 
with common dictionary definitions of"diligence": e.g., "[c]onstant and earnest 
effort to accomplish what is undertaken." IV The Oxford English Dictionary 665 
(2d ed. 1989). In short, there is no basis whatsoever for setting aside the Panel's 
interpretation of the "diligent enforcement" standard. 
(OPM Mero.: re Final Award pp. 28-29.) Next, the PMs argued the Panel's determination that 
Pennsylvania was not diligent in 2003 because "[t]he Commonwealth's record in this case is best 
described as mediocre" cannot be second-guessed here. (OPM Mero.: re Final Award p. 29.) 
Moreover, the PMs asserted Pennsylvania is clearly cherry-picking the record, highlighting: 
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• in terms of its collection rate, the Panel "expressly considered and rejected the 
Commonwealth's assertion that it had actively pursued an additional 49% of the 
escrow due in 2003 [;]" 
• in terms of it having a litigation strategy of targeting larger NPMs with an actual 
potential for recovery, "abundanrevidence supported the Panel's conclusion that no 
such strategy ever existed, and that the Commonwealth's escrow officials instead met 
sporadically to discuss how to move forward with its cases[;]" and 
• in terms ofRYO sales, "[a]lthough the Panel did hold States are not required to 
elevate their diligent-enforcement obligations above other statutory or rational policy 
considerations, that plainly _did not foreclose the Panel from nevertheless holding that 
it militates against a diligence :finding when States, like Pennsylvania, cavalierly 
decline to consider the impact of their existing statutes on their escrow obligations." 
(OPM Mem.: re Final Award pp. 31-32, 34, 36 (quotations and brackets omitted).) 
Regarding the Commonwealth's arguments for vacating the Final Award, the PMs stated 
the Panel did consider all relevant evidence in a rational, consistent, and non-arbitrary manner. 
Rather, the PMs asserted the Commonwealth's three apparent inconsistencies were not 
inconsistencies at all. First, regarding the collection rate in Ohio, the PMs noted ''the Panel· 
concluded that the rate ha[ d] to be adjusted substantially upwards because almost 50% of the 
cigarettes on which escrow was not paid were sold by Carolina Tobacco Company, whose sales 
the Panel decided generally should not be held against the States." (OPM Mem.: re Final Award 
p. 38 (quotations omitted).) Second, in terms of the diligence :findings for five States that did not 
file lawsuits in 2003, the PMs noted ''the Panel found that each of those States, unlike 
Pennsylvania, carried its burden of proving its lack of lawsuits in 2003 was based on legitimate 
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(,....,) strategic reasons, such as focusing instead on settlement negotiations with the largest non-
compliant NPMs" and that "the Panel also found those States had substantially higher collection 
rates than Pennsylvania did, ranging from 60%to 99% .... " (OPM Mem.: re Final Award pp. 
38-39 (citations omitted).) Third, regarding Oregon's failure to collect escrow on RYO, the PMs 
noted ''the Panel found that, unlike Pennsylvania's cavalier approach, 'much time was spent in 
[Oregon] discussing the subject' and 'the State formally changed its position in 2007. "' (OPM 
Mem.: re Final Award p. 39 (quoting OR Final Award pp. 20-21).) Finally, the PMs argued the 
enforcement records for the 20 Compromising States whose diligence had been contested were 
not material because the Panel was making objective determinations of diligence for each State. 
On December 13, 2013, Pennsylvania filed a motion with this court to modify, or vacate 
in part, the Partial Settlement Award, which is also presently before this court for disposition. 
Therein, Pennsylvania made the same arguments regarding standard of review. After again 
advocating for application of section 7302( d)(2) of the UAA in this case, the Commonwealth 
argued modification of the Partial Settlement Award is required because the Panel's adoption of 
the pro rata reallocation method proposed by the PMs violates the clear language of section 
IX(d)(2) of the MSA. While the Panel found "the MSA does not directly speak ... to the process 
to be used when some States settle diligent enforcement and some do not[,]" (Partial Settlement 
Award p. 14), the Commonwealth argued: 
Section IX(d)(2) of the MSA explicitly provides that the 2003 NPM Adjustment 
"shall apply" to "all" states "except" those states that "continuously had a 
Qualifying Statute ... in full force and effect ... and diligently enforced the 
provisions of such statute during such entire calendar year." That section contains 
no exceptions and therefore applies eqruµly to all factual situations that may arise, 
includmg a partial settlement. 
(PA Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 20 (quoting MSA § IX(d)(2)).) Moreover, "[b[ecause section 
IX(d)(2) of the MSA is unambiguous, the Panel had no authority to 'interpret' the MSA 
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r·\ differently to facilitate the PMs preferred implementation of the Tenn Street or for any other 
~ J' 
:reason[,]" according to the Commonwealth. (PA Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 20.) 
The Commonwealth furtherargued the Partial Settlement Award amounted to an 
amendment of the MSA in violation of section XVIII(j), which prohibits amendment unless it is 
"'by a written instrument executed by all ... settling States affected by the amendment."' (PA 
Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 22 (quoting MSA § XVIIIG) (emphasis added by the 
Commonwealth).) Here, the Common.wealth argued: 
While the PMs were free to settle with the Compromising States as to the amounts 
of their annual payments that will be recovered by the PMs, under section 
XVIII(j) of the MSA they could not do so in a fashion that "affected" the rights of 
Pennsylvania. 
*** 
The only way to accomplish that would have been to treat as non-diligent the 20 
Compromising States whose diligence was contested and riot proved when 
calculating the NPM Adjustment for the other Settling States. 
(PA Mem.: re Partial Settlement pp. 23-24.) 
In terms of vacating the Partial Settlement Award, Pennsylvania also argued the Panel 
exceeded its powers under the ARA with the Reallocation Determination. "Therefore, if the 
Partial Settlement A ward is not modified by this Court as described above, then it must be 
vacated in part to strike the Reallocation Determination as· it relates to Pennsylvania[,]" 
according to the Commonwealth. (PA Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 24.) 
In response, the PMs made the same argument regarding standard of review. After again 
advocating for application of the FAA in this case, the PMs argued modifying or vacating the 
Partial Settlement Award would be inappropriate under any standard. First, the PMs argued 
"under any standard of review, this [c]ourt cannot second-guess the merits of the Panel's 
reasonable contractual interpretation of how to apply the MSA's NPM Adj'us1ment reallocation 
provisions after a partial settlement, especially given the unreasonableness of the 
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() Commonwealth's contrary interpretation." (OPM Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 6 (emphasis 
' ' 
original).) Viewing Pennsylvania's interpretation as unreasonable because there is no factual 
basis to support the position that none of the Compromising States would have been found 
diligent by the Panel absent the settlement, the PMs argued the MSA is silent on reallocating the 
NPM Adjustment among non-Compromising States ~'where the diligence of [Compromising] 
States is no longer contested by the PMs due to a settlement and it therefore remains unknown 
whether or not those ... parties were diligent." (OPM Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 9 
(emphasis removed).) And based on this supposed silence, the PMs argued the Panel's 
conclusion that the Compromising States should be deemed diligent, but that the non-
Compromising States should receive a pro rat a reduction of their liability on the First Tier 
adjustment, does not amount to an improper amendment of the MSA and is unassailable under 
any standard of review. 
Finally, the PMs argued "the Panel indisputably had jurisdiction to determine how the 
2003 NPM Adjustment should be reallocated among the non-diligent [non-Compromising] 
States in light of the PMs' settlement with the [Compromising] States." (OPM Mem.: re Partial 
Settlement p.13.) Here, the PMs noted that it had already been decided in compelling the 
Commonwealth to arbitrate the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute that "a 'dispute is arbitrable' 
under 'the plain language of[section XI(c) of the MSA]' when 'it concerns ... the operation [or] 
application of the NPM Adjustment.'" (OPM Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 14 (quoting Mem. 
Opinion p. 6).) Moreover, the PMs noted ''the Panel explained, once a dispute is committed to 
arbitration, the arbitrators normally have the authority to decide all matters necessary to dispose 
of the claim, including authority to determine the existence or effect of a settlement." (OPM 
Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 14 (quotations and brackets omitted).) Thus, under section XI(c) 
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of the MSA, ''the Panel's authority to dispose of the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute clearly 
include[ d] determining how the partial settlement affects the allocation of the 2003 NPM 
Adjustment among the [non-Compromising] States[,]" according to the PMs. (OPM Mem.: re 
Partial Settlement p. 14.) 
Having held a hearing on March 7, 2014, this court now has before it for disposition both 
the Commonwealth's motion to vacate or modify the Final Award and its motion to vacate in 
part or modify the Partial Settlement Award. The base amount owed to Pennsylvania for 2003 is 
$369,807,760.89. If the Final Award is upheld, the reduction thereto will be $116,457,190.73 for 
Pennsylvania, for a total amount payable of$253,350,570.16. If the Final Award and the Partial 
Settlement Award are upheld, the reduction will be $242,309,663.54 for Pennsylvania, for a total 
amount payable of$127,498,097.35. Thus, at stake for the Commonwealth is over $242 million 
it would otherwise use to fund numerous state programs at the Departments of Health, Public 
Welfare, Aging, and Community & Economic Development that support or provide things such 
as: medical assistance for workers with disabilities; home and community-based care; long-term 
care; and biomedical research in the fight against cancer. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
A major point of contention and a preliminary issue that needs-to be resolved is what 
standard or standards of review should be applied in disposing of the Commonwealth's motions. 
In the opinion of this court, Trombetta and the facts of this case dictate review is governed by 
standards set forth in the UAA. 
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1. An overview of Trombetta v. Raymond James. 
In that case, the Trombettas and Raymond James arbitrated a securities litigation dispute 
before a three-member National Association of Securities Dealers arbitration panel. 907 A.2d at 
554. Following an unfavorable ruling, the Trombettas filed a petition for vacatur in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Allegheny County and argued they were entitled to factual and legal de novo 
review of the panel's rulin~ pursuant to a passage in the parties' agreement that addressed 
arbitration. Id. at 554,556. Raymond James,on the other hand, filed a petition to confirm the 
panel's ruling and argued the Trombettas were not entitled to de novo review because the de 
novo review clause they cited was no longer applicable as it was subsequently modified by a 
newsletter it sent to all Raymond James investors. Id. at 554, 557-58. The lower court, the 
Honorable Stanton Wettick, denied the Trombettas' petition for vacatur and granted Raymond 
James' petition to confirm the arbitration award. Id. at 556. 
On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed, holding the clause providing for de novo review 
governed as a matter of contract as it had not been subsequently modified, but that under the 
applicable Pennsylvania standards of review set forth in the UAA ''de novo review clauses 
contained in arbitration agreements are unenforceable as a matter oflaw in Pennsylvania'' Id. at 
577. In reaching this holding, the court addressed a number of preliminary issues including 
''whether federal or Pennsylvania standards of review govem[ed] [the] dispute." Id. 
Before answering the issue, the Trombetta court made a number of observations. First, 
the court noted the parties stipulated that the arbitration agreement was created under the FAA 
Id. at 562-63. Next, the court stated that if it concluded the FAA standards of review were 
controlling, it would be bound by Supreme Court and Third Circuit case law interpreting whether 
de novo review clauses are enforceable and if it found Pennsylvania standards of review were 
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controlling, it would "need to develop a rule oflaw in Pennsylvania answering the question of 
whether de novo review clauses are enforceable." Id. at 563. Finally, the court observed 
Pennsylvania appellate courts had "never addressed the issue of whether the federal or state 
standards of review govern a petition filed in the Pennsylvania state courts to enforce or vacate 
, , , 
an arbitration award entered in an arbitration proceeding governed by the Federal Arbitration 
Act." Id .. 
To answer the issue, the Superior Court first looked to United States Supreme Court 
cases applying the doctrine of preemption in the context of the FAA. Id. at 564. After careful 
analysis of these cases~ the Sup~rior Court concluded a dichotomy has emerged whereby the 
FAA preempts state laws that are "inherently substantive in the sense they affectO the 
enforceability of the underlying arbitration agreement" whereas it does not preempt state laws 
that are "inherently procedural and d[ o] not affect the enforceability of the underlying arbitration 
agreement." See id. at 564-67 (emphasis original). Thus, the court held: 
the FAA standards of review cannot pre-empt the Pennsylvania standards of 
review for arbitration awards unless the Pennsylvania standards of review 
:frustrate the underlying objectives of the FAA, as standards of review are an 
inherently procedural mechanism used to facilitate judicial resolution of 
controversies after the underlying arbitration agreement already has been 
enforced in accordance with the FAA. 
Id. at 568 ( emphasis original). 
Next, the court looked at the language of section 10 of the FAA, which provides the 
circumstances by which an arbitration award may be vacated under the FAA. · As that section 
, explicitly states that it is "the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was 
made, ... " that may vacate an arbitration award under these enumerated circumstances, 9 U.S.C. 
§ 10, the Superior Court concluded that by its plain language section 10 only applies to 
proceeding in United States district courts and "[t]he FAA standards of review do not apply to a 
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c·-,) state trial court's review over an arbitration award created and enforced under the F AA[,r id. at 
569. 
Next, the Superior Court addressed whether the common law standards of review set 
forth in section 7341 of the UAA "violate the core objective and principles underlying the FAA." 
Id. In concluding that they did not, the court stated "the primary purpose of the FAA is to 
overcome judicial hostility towards arbitration, without displacing state arbitration schemes, by 
giving arbitration agreements equal standing with other contractual agreements" arid 
"Pennsylvania common law arbitration standards of review are on par with those outlined in 
FAA § 10, and promote the goals of enforcing arbitration agreements and placing arbitration 
agreements upon the same footing as contracts." Id. (quotations omitted). 
Finally, the court stated "[i]n Pennsylvania, contracting parties are not free to impose 
their own standards of review on a court and the parties to an arbitration agreement receive no 
support for doing so under the guise of arbitration, thereby putting those agreements in a superior 
position" and held it was state standards ofreview.at section 7341 of the UAA that were 
applicable and Pennsylvania case law that would dictate ''whether parties can impose de novo 
review on our trial courts by virtue of contractual agreements." Id. 
2. The MSA does not expressly adopt the FAA's standards of review. 
Here, the PMs argued that by agreeing at section XI(c) of the MSA that "[t]he arbitration 
shall be governed by the United States Federal Arbitration Act," "[t]he parties were obviously 
agreeing upon the law that would govern the entire dispute-resolution process-not just the 
conduct of the arbitration by the Panel, but also review and enforcement of the arbitration by the 
courts of the [Settling States]." (OPM Mem.: re Final Award p. 17.) This court does not agree. 
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While section XI(c) of the MSA provides "[t]he arbitration shall be governed by the 
United States Arbitration Act[,]" MSA § XI(c), thatsection only speaks tohowthe arbitration 
was to be conducted, it does not speak to what standards of review should be applied in post-
arbitration proceedings. That question is answered by other sections of the MSA. First, section 
XVIII(n) of the MSA states that the MSA "shall be governed by the laws of the relevant Settling 
State, without regard to the conflict oflaw rules of such Settling State." MSA § XVIII(n). Next, 
at sections II(p) and VII(a) the MSA provides it is "the respective court of each Settling State" 
that has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the MSA. MSA §§ II(p), VII(a). 
Therefore, under the plain language of the MSA, while section XI( c) requires the arbitration 
itself be conducted in accordance with the FAA, sections II(p ), VII( a), and XVIII(n)-and, as 
will be discussed below, Pennsylvania law-dictate it is the law of the Commonwealth that 
provides the standards of review for post-arbitration proceedings in this court. 
3. The appropriate standards of review for this case are found at 
. sections 7302(d)(2) and 7314 of the UAA. 
In the opinion of this court, the laws of the Commonwealth that provide the standards of 
review are sections 7302( d)(2) and 7314 of the UAA and associated case law. As a preliminary 
matter, there are two types of contractual arbitration under Pennsylvania law: statutory 
arbitration under subchapter A of the UAA and common law arbitration under subchapter B of 
. the UAA. 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 7301-20, 7341-42. An agreement to arbitrate on a contractual basis is 
conclusively presumed to provide for common law arbitration under subchapter B "unless the 
agreement to arbitrate is in writing and expressly provides for arbitration pursuant to ... 
subchapter [A] or any other similar statute," in which case the agreement is conclusively 
presumed to provide for statutory arbitration under subchapter A. See 42 Pa C.S. § 7302(a). 
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Here, the agreement to arbitrate was in writing. Additionally, as will be discussed in. 
more detail below, the FAA and the UAA are similar in that they both mandate enforcement of 
arbitration awards and only provide for limited review of those awards. Thus, as section XI( c) of 
th.e MSA provides for arbitration pursuant to the FAA and the FAA and the UAA are similar 
statutes, it brings the MSA with.in the purview of statutory arbitration under subchapter A of the 
UAA. 
Sections 7302(d)(2) and 7314 of the UAA are both in subchapter A. As relevant here, 
section 7302(d)(2) provides that when "[t]he Commonwealth government submits a controversy 
to arbitrationL] ... a court in reviewing an arbitration award ... shall ... modify or correct the 
award where the award is contrary to law and is such that had it been a verdict of a jury the court 
would have entered a different judgment or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict." 42 Pa. C.S. 
§ 7302( d). -Section 7314, on the other hand, provides the general circumstances under which a 
court must vacate a statutory arbitration award. See 42 ia. C.S. § 7314. These circumstances 
include when the "arbitrators exceed[] their powers" or refuse to hear evidence material to the 
controversy that substantially prejudices the rights of a party. 42 Pa. C.S. § 7314( a)( 1 )(iii)-(iv). 
In regard to section 7302(d)(2), the Commonwealth argued th.is court has the power to· 
modify the award where the arbitration panel commits an error of law and the award is against 
the clear weight of the evidence. The PMs, on the other hand, argued the Commonwealth 
ignores that the courts have repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of merits review that this 
provision allows and the error oflaw/judgment n.o.v. concept set forth in section 7302(d)(2) is 
the same as the "essence test," which requires a court to uphold an arbitrator's award if it 
represents a reasonable interpretation of the contract between the parties. The Commonwealth, 
however, countered the issue of the essence test is a ''red herring" as that test has only been 
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n applied to collective bargaining agreements and the MSA is not a collective bargaining 
agreement. (PA Reply re: Final Award p. 10.) 
Here, we agree with the PMs. While the essence test was adopted by our Supreme Court 
in the context of a collective bargaining agreement in Community College of Beaver County v. 
Community College of Beaver College, Society of the Faculty, 375 A.2d 1267 (Pa. 1977), in 
doing so the Court made clear that when modification of an award is sought as being "against the 
law and ... such that had it been the verdict of the jury, the court· would have entered different or 
other judgment notwithstanding the verdict[,]" the standard does not dictate "a closer or different 
scrutiny of an arbitration award [than] would be available than under the ["essence" test]." State 
Sys. of Higher Educ. v. State Coll. Univ. Prof'/ Ass'n, 743 A.2d 405,411 (Pa 1999) (analyzing 
Community College of Beaver County). Moreover, in adopting the "essence" test standard, the 
Court stated where a task of the arbitrators "has been to determine the intention of the parties as 
evidenced by their [ contract] and the circumstances surrounding its execution, then the 
. arbitrator[ s '] award is based on a resolution of a question of fact" and the s~andard of review .is 
the "essence" test whereunder the arbitrators' award "is to be respected by the judiciary if the 
interpretation can in any rational way be derived from. the agreement, viewed in light of its 
language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention[.]" Cmty. Coll., 375 A.2d at 
1275 (quotations omitted). Under this approach, the arbitrators' "interpretation of the contract 
must be upheld ifit is a reasonable one." Cmty. Coll., 375 A.2d at 1275 (quotations omitted). 
While the essence test was adopted and has only been applied in the context of collective 
bargaining agreements, it is this court's opinion that the logic of our Supreme Court in 
Community College of Beaver County is equally applicable here as a task of the Panel was to 
determine the intention of the parties as evidenced by the MSA and, thus, in this case, the 
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n essence test is the appropriate standard to be applied under section 7302(d)(2) of the UAA. See 
Cmty. Coll., 375 A.2d at 1273-75. See also Musser, 548 A.2d at 1200 (stating "the 'essence' test 
remains the standard of judicial review for arbitration awards which, like the one at bar, are 
subject to section 7302(d)(2) ... and are challenged under that provision."). 
However, as the Commonwealth made a colorable argument that the essence test should 
only be applied to collective bargaining agreements, this court also looked at the issues under the 
judgment n.o.v }error oflaw standard. But in keeping with our Supreme Court's pronouncement 
that "that the judgmentn.o.v./error oflaw standard and the essence test are essentially the same," 
Tunkhannock Area Sch. Dist. v. Tunkhannock Area Educ. Ass 'n, 992 A.2d 956, 958 (Pa 
Cornrow. Ct. 2010), it did not lead to any different results in this case. 
Under the judgment n.o. v. /error of law standard, a court will modify an award "if, and 
only if, viewing all the evidence (including inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom) most 
favorable to the [ award] winner, the elements of the cause of action or defense asserted have not, 
as a matter oflaw, been established." Cmty. Coll., 375 A2d at 1273. "Although a court may 
modify .... the award for errors of law by the arbitrators, [ a court] may not disturb their findings 
unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence." Pennsylvania Tpk Comm'n v. Litton 
RCS, Inc., 20 Pa Cmwlth. 577,583,342 A.2d 108, 112 (1975). ''In passing on a motion for 
judgment n.o. v., findings of fact will not be disturbed if supported by evidence." Cmty. Coll., 
375 A2d at 1273. Thus, as explained by the court in Trombetta,judgment n.o.vJerror oflaw 
review "is still very limited." 907 A.2d at 571. 
Based on the above, the Commonwealth is not entitled to plenary review of the law 
nor broad review of the facts. Rather, at most, it is entitled to limited review of whether the 
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<"") :Panel's determinations can in any rational way be derived from the MSA after viewing the 
\ J 
evidence in the light most favorable to the PMs. 
4. The standards of review outlined in sections 7302(d)(2) and 7314 of 
the UAA are not preempted by the FAA. 
The FAA does not expressly preempt state arbitration laws. Trombetta, 907 A.2d ~t 564, 
citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 
(1989). Nor does it "reflect a Congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.'' 
Trombetta, 907 A.2d at 564, citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 477. However, "[e]ven when Congress has 
not completely displaced state regulation in an area, ... state law may nonetheless be pre-empted 
to the extent that it conflicts with federal law; that is, to the extent that it 'stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Trombetta, 
907 A.2d at 564, quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 477. It was in this vein that the PMs argued the FAA 
preempts the UAA. 
To prevail on this argument, the PMs must show the UAA "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Volt, 489 U.S. 
at 4 77. Here, the PMs made two arguments. First, the PMs argued the primary purpose of the 
FAA is to ensure '"that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms"' 
and that application of the UAA in this case "would thwart the FAA's primary purpose by 
nullifying the parties' agreed-upon standard for judicial review of their arbitration." (OPM 
Mem.: re Final Award p. 18 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 470) (emphasis original)).) Second, 
quoting Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576,588 (2008), the PMs argued 
the F AA's standards of review "substantiat[e] a national policy favoring arbitration with just the 
limited review needed to maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes 
straightway" that would not be met if even one Settling State could second-guess the merits of 
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~ the Panel's determinations under a laxer state law standard. (See OPM Mem.: re Final Award 
. \ 
\ . ./ 
pP. 19-20.) 
Regarding the PMs first argument, as addressed above, the MSA does not expressly 
adopt the FAA 's standards of review, but rather looks to the law of the Commonwealth to 
provide the standards for review. And, "[i]nterpreting a choice-of-law clause to make applicable 
state rules governing [post-arbitration judicial review]- ... does [not] offend any ... policy 
embodied in the FAA." See Volt, 489 U.S;· at 476. Thus, application oftheUAA would not 
nullify the parties' agreed-upon standard for post-arbitration judicial review in this case, but 
rather enforce it under circumstances that do not offend any policies embodied in the FAA. Thus, 
we concluded the PMs' first argument is not a basis for preemption. 
Regarding the PMs' second argument, if this was a basis for preemption, the FF A would 
preempt any state law that provided for a more searching review than allowed by the FAA, 
regardless of the parties' intent via any particular agreement regarding arbitration. But the Court 
in Hall Street passed on this very issue when it said: 
In holding that § § 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the review provided by 
the [FAA] statute, we do not purport to say that they exclude more searching 
review based on authority outside the statute as well. The FAA is not the only 
way into court for parties wanting review of arbitration awards: they may 
contemplate enforcement under state statutory or common law, for example, 
where judicial review of different scope is arguable. 
552 U.S. at 590. Moreover, in Volt, the Court held "'[t]here is no federal policy favoring 
arbitration under a certain set of proceduralrules[,]," Mocatiello v. JJB. Hilliard, 939 A.2d 
325,329 (Pa. 2007), quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added), and "standards of review 
are an inherently procedural mechanism used to facilitate judicial resolutions of controversies 
after the underlying arbitration agreement has already been enforced ... [,]" Trombetta, 907 A.2d 
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at 568 (emphasis original). Therefore, we concluded the PMs' second argument is not a basis 
for preemption. 
The primary purpose of the FAA is to ensure that agreements to arbitrate are enforced in 
the first instance and treated like any other contracts, not to ensure limited judicial review. See, 
e.g., Moscatiello, 939 A.2d at 328 ("Congress enacted the FAA to overrule the judiciary's 
longstanding refusal to enforce arbitration agreem~nts; its purpose is to place arbitration 
agreements on equal legal ground with other contracts.") "'[T]he federal policy is simply to 
ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate."' 
Moscatiello, 939 A.2d at 329, quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 476. Thus, "[t]he federal policy ... is 
limited to Congress's intent to make arbitration agreements enforceable [and] [t]he FAA does 
not preempt the procedural rules governing arbitration in state courts, as that is beyond its 
reach." Moscatiello; 939 A.2d at 329. That is why only section 2 of the FAA, which demands 
that an arbitration provision be treated like any other contractual term, has been held to preempt 
state law. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 477 n.6. See also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (providing "[a] written provision 
in any ... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... or an agreement in writing to submit to 
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract ... shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract."). 
However, even if a "national policy" of limited review of arbitration decisions could be 
said to preempt state law to the contrary, the UAA would remain unaffected. Unlike the standard 
to which the parties agreed to in Hall Street, the UAA standards applicable here do not provide 
de novo review. Under section 7302(d)(2), the UAA adopts the judgment n.o.v./error oflaw 
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standard and Pennsylvania state courts apply the "essence" test to arbitration awards like those at 
bar. These standards of review are very limited and do not "standO as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Volt, 489 U.S. 
at 4 77; Trombetta, 907 A.2d at 571. Thus, they do not trigger preemption. 
5. Even if the MSA expressly called for post-arbitration judicial review 
to be governed by the FAA, contracting parties are not free to impose 
their own standards of review on a Pennsylvania state trial court. 
Finally, even if the MSA expressly called for post-arbitratiori:jU:dicial review to be 
governed by the FAA, Trombetta dictates that we not allow parties to arbitration to contractually 
mandate what standards of review are applied to their awards by Pennsylvania's state trial courts. 
While the parties in Trombetta purported to agree to a broader standard of review than was 
provided for by the FAA or the UM-namely, de novo review-the statement in Trombetta 
could not have been clearer: 
· In Pennsylvania, contracting parties are not free to impose their own standards of 
review on a court and the parties to an arbitration agreement receive no support 
for doing so under the guise of arbitration, thereby putting those agreements in a 
superior position. 
907 A.2d at 569. As a trial court, this court is bound to apply binding precedent from 
Pennsylvania's appellate courts. Rudisill v. Com., Dep't ofTransp., 2011 WL 10876936 (Pa 
Commw. Ct. 2011). Thus, even if the MSA expressly required or it was the parties' intent that 
post-arbitration judicial review be governed by the FAA. this court would be duty-bound to 




B. The Motion to Modify or Vacate the Final Award8 
Because the Panel did not apply the wrong definition of diligence and its determination 
that Pennsylvania was not diligent in 2003 can rationally be derived from the MSA and is not 
. . 
against the clear weight of the evidence, its detennination cannot be ~odified by this court. Nor 
can i~ determination be vacated by this court as the Panel didconsiderrelevant evidence in a 
rational, consistent, and non-arbitrary manner and the failure to also consider the enforcement 
record for the 20 Compromising States whose diligence had been contested was not shown to (1) 
· have been the result of the Panel refusing to consider the evidence or to (2) have substantially 
prejudiced the Commonwealth. 
1. The Panel did not apply the wrong definition of diligence. 
Given that the MSA does not define "diligent enforcement," the Panel interpreted those 
words to mean that there was "an ongoing ~d intentional consideration of the requirements of a 
Settling State's Qualifying Statute, and a significant attempt by the Settling State to meet those 
requirements, talcing into account a Settling State's competing laws and policies that may 
conflict with its MSA contractual obligations." (Final Aw~d pp. 13-14.) The Panel further 
noted its definition was an objective one and included eight factors it thought "provide[d] a 
reliable and objective metric to assess" whether an individual State diligently enforced its 
8 The PMs also argued with respect to the Commonwealth's November 4, 3013 motion to 
modify or vacate the Final Award that if the UAA standards of review applied (as this court has 
determined), the Commonwealth's motion was untimely because it was not filed within 30 clays 
of the Panel's September 11, 2013 decision, but rather within 30 days of the Panel's denial of the 
Commonwealth's motion for correction of the September 11th decision. 
The Commonwealth's motion regarding the Final Award was timely under the UAA. In 
preliminary proceedings, the Panel ruled that the Conflict Prevention.& Resolution Procedures 
and Clauses ("CPR") would be used as guidelines for the arbitration. The CPR specify that if a 
correction of an award is sought, the award is not "final and binding on the parties" until "such 
clarification, correction or additional award is made." (PA Mot re: Final Award Ex: 51.) Thus, 
in the context. of this arbitration, the Final Award did not become "final" until the Panel denied 
the Commonwealth's motion for correction. 
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Qualifying Statute giv~n its "existing policies and circumstances in 2003." (Final Award pp. 13-
14, 20.) 
Here, the Commonwealth argued the Panel erred because the words "diligently enforced" 
in the MSA equate with the words "due diligence" in Pennsylvania's rule for speedy trials in 
criminal cases. As a result, Pennsylvania law required the Panel to have found the 
Commonwealth diligently enforced its Qualifying Statute if it made "reasonable efforts" to 
enforce its statute as that is all that is required in the criminal context to satisfy the requirement 
of due diligence. The Commonwealth further took exception to the eight factors the Panel 
identified as none "are found in the MSA or Pennsylvania law" and they ''were not disclosed to 
Pennsylvania or the other States until the Final Awards were handed down .... " (PA Mem. re: 
Final Award p. 27.). 
In developing its standard for determining diligent enforcement, the Panel did not make 
an error of}aw and its interpretation is a reasonable one. First, the Panel's definition of diligent 
enforcement is in keeping with common dictionary definitions of"diligence." See, e.g., N The 
Oxford English Dictionary 665 (2d ed. 1989) ( defining diligence as "[ c ]onstant and earnest effort 
to accomplish what is undertaken."). Second, cases interpreting the phrase "due diligence" used 
in Pennsylvania's rule for speedy trials in criminal cases have not created a common law 
definition that should have been used to interpret the different phrase "diligent enforcement" 
used in the MSA. 
Finally, regarding the factors the Panel came up with, while preferable for the 
Commonwealth to know in advance what evidence the Panel was going to focus on in making its 
diligence determinations, the Panel had to utilize some framework to decide the issue of 
diligence and the factors seem to be derived from evidence the Panel was receiving from the 
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various parties on the issue. As such, this court cannot say that the Panel erred as matter of law 
in coming up with its factors or that its factors are not in any way rationally derived from the 
MSA or Pennsylvania law. 
2. The Panel's determination that Pennsylvania was not diligent in 2003 
can rationally be derived from the MSA and is not against the clear 
weight of the evidence. 
While this court is sympathetic to the efforts the Commonwealth made to diligently 
· enforce its Qualifying Statute in 2003, the major· flaw with the Commonwealth's attack on the 
Panel, s non-diligence finding is that it ignores (1) adverse evidence upon which the Panel relied 
and (2) that the Panel explained its decision required weighing the evidence and making 
"determinations as to the credibility of witnesses" and considering "inferences that could or 
could not be drawn from the testimony and documents." (See Final Award pp. 20:-25.) 
Regarding its record of enforcement for 2003 and the Panel's findings, the 
Commonwealth highlighted the following: 
• "while Pennsylvania's overall collection rate was 44% ... , Pennsylvania either 
collected or actively pursued 93% of the payable escrow funds for 2002 sales[;]" 
• while Pennsylvania did not have a blanket policy in 2003 regarding when to file 
lawsuits and did not sue seven of the ten largest non-compliant NPMs, "Pennsylvania 
did have a litigation strategy of targeting larger NMPs with an actual potential for 
recovery[;]" and 
• "[a]lthough the Panel stated that its negative comments regarding RYO sales were not 
material or necessary to the Final Award, the Panel's decision ,making was ... flawed 
... to that ... factor as [well]" because Pennsylvania does not tax RYO sales and the 
MSA puts no demand on the Settling States to change their laws in such a manner. 
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(PA Mero..: re Final Award pp. 28-30.) 
However, as highlighted by the PMs: 
• regarding the collection rate, the Panel "expressly considered and rejected the 
Commonwealth's assertion that it had actively pursued an additional 49% of the 
escrow due in 2003[;]" 
• regarding having a litigation strategy of targeting larger NPMs with an actual 
potential for recovery, "abundant evidence supported the Panel's conclusion that no 
such strategy ever existed, and that the Commonwealth's escrow officials instead met 
sporadically to discuss how to move forward with its cases[;]" and 
• regarding RYO sales, "[a]lthough the Panel did hold States are not required to elevate 
their diligent-enforcement obligations above other statutory or rational policy 
considerations, that plainly did not foreclose the Panel from nevertheless holding that 
it militates against a diligence finding when States, like Pennsylvania, ... decline to 
consider the impact of their existing statutes on their escrow obligations." 
(OPM Mem.: re Final Award pp. 31-32, 34, 36 (quotations and brackets omitted).) 
When "there [ wa ]s no blanket policy regarding when to file lawsuits and whom to target" 
(or for much of anything else); (see Final Award pp. 21, 24); those tasked with enforcing 
Pennsylvania's statute would only "meet sporadically to discuss how to move forward with 
cases[;]" (Final Award p. 21); and the ''primary attorney tasked with NPM enforcement spent 
less than 100 hours in 2003 in ... pursuit of' the three NPMs against whom suit was filed; (PMs 
Mem. re: Final Award pp. 32-33) (emphasis and quotations removed)); this court was unable to 
conclude there was "an ongoing and intentional consideration of the requirements of [its] 
Qualifying Statute, and a significant attempt by [it] to meet those requirements, taking into 
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account [its] competing laws and policies that may conflict with its MSA contractual 
obligations[,]" (Final Award pp. 13-14), such that this court should modify the award of three 
respected former federal judges who found otherwise. In the end, while sympathetic to the 
efforts the Commonwealth did make in 2003 (including those of the Commonwealth's 
investigator, Kenneth Bateman, who was lauded by the Panel for his diligence), this court 
ultimately concludes the Panel's determination that Pennsylvania was not diligent in 2003 can be 
rationally derived from the MSA and is not against the clear weight of the evidence and; thus, 
should not be modified. 
3. The Panel considered relevant evidence in a rational, consistent, and 
non-arbitrary manner. 
In the context of the "essence" test, an award may be vacated when it is irrational. See 
Del. Cnty. v. Del. Cnty. Prison Emps. Indep. Union, 713 A.2d l 13~, 1137-38 (Pal998) 
(applying the essence test and finding vacatur appropriate where there is "no rational manner" in 
which the arbitrators could have reached their decision, and the decision is "a plain departure 
from the terms of the agreement."). Noting three apparent inconsistencies, the Commonwealth 
argued the Final Award was irrational and inconsistent when compared to awards for other States 
and, thus, should be vacated. The three apparent inconsistencies are: the Panel describing 
Pennsylvania's 44% collection rate as relatively low while describing Ohio's 44% collection rate 
. as middle of the range for the contested Settling States; the Panel finding five States that did not 
file a single lawsuit in 2003 were diligent while finding Pennsylvania that filed four lawsuits in 
2003 was non-diligent; and the Panel excusing Oregon's failure to collect escrow on RYO as 
general confusion over RYO while refusing to excuse Pennsylvania's failure to do the same. 
Here, the PMs adequately explained away the Commonwealth's three apparent 
/ inconsistencies. First, regarding the collection rate in Ohio, as PMs noted ''the Panel concluded 
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/~\ that the rate ha[ d] to be adjusted substantially upwards because almost 50% of the cigarettes on 
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which escrow was not paid were sold by Carolina Tobacco Company, whose sales the Panel 
decided generally shoul_d not be held against the States." (OPM Mem.: re Final Award p. 38 
(quotations omitted).) Second, in terms of the diligence findings for five States that did hot file 
lawsuits in 2003, the PMs explained ''the Panel found that each of those States, unlike 
Pennsylvania, carried its burden of proving its lack of lawsuits in 2003 was based on legitimate 
strategic reasons, such as fo·cusing instead on settlement negotiations with the largest non-
compliant NPMs" and that ''the Panel also found those States had substantially higher collection 
rates than Pennsylvania did, ranging from 60% to 99% .... " (OPM Mem.: re Final Award pp. 
38-39 (citations omitted).) Finally, regarding Oregon's failure to collect escrow on RYO, the 
PMs explained "the Panel found that, unlike [in Pennsylvania], 'much time was spent in 
[Oregon] discussing the subject' and 'the State formally changed its position in 2007."' (OPM 
Mem.: re Final Award p. 39 (quoting OR Final Award pp. 20-21).) With their above-analysis, 
the PMs further satisfied this court that the Final Award was rational and (in addition to not 
being modified) should not be vacated. 
4. Any failure to also consider the enforcement record for the 20 
Compromising States whose <l:iligence had been contested has not 
been shown to have been the result of the Panel refusing to do so or to 
have substantially prejudiced the Commonwealth. 
Under section 7314 of the UAA, an award may be vacated when the arbitrators refuse fo 
hear evidence material to the controversy that substantially prejudices the rights of a party. 42 
Pa C.S. § 7314(a)(l)(iv). In its motion, Pennsylvania argued that it met that standard and the 
Final Award should be vacated because: 
the Panel engaged in a comparative analysis in reaching its conclusion that 
Pennsylvania was non~diligent. But that analysis was fundamentally flawed 





did so by reference to only 14 other States and wrongly excluded evidence from at 
least 20 other allegedly non-diligent States. 
(PA Mem. re: Final Award p. 39.) If the Panel considered this evidence, Pennsylvania argu.ed its 
''position on the broader spectrum would have been dramatically [better]" because these 20 
Compromising States "h~d the most substantial ... compliance issues." (PA Mem. re: Final 
Award p. 42.) 
The Commonwealth's arguments fail for two reasons. First, the_ Commonwealth failed to 
show it requested, but the Panel refused to hear, evidence of the enforcement records for the 20 
Compromising States whose diligence had been contested. Pennsylvania acknowledged this, but 
argued that it only failed to request the Panel consider this evidence because it did not know until 
the final awards were issued that the Panel was going to be "making comparisons between the 
States .... " (PA Reply re: Final Award p. 23.) In the opinion of this court, that does not 
necessarily mean the onus was not upon Pennsylvania to make the request in the first place. But 
regardless, in making its diligence determinations, the Panel explained it was deciding "each 
State's diligence ... individually, based on the factual and legal determinations specific to that 
State." (Panel Order re: Deposition Procedures p. 3.) Accordingly, even assuming that most or 
all of these Compromising States were less diligent than Pennsylvania as it contends, that does 
not mean the Panel would have. found Pennsyivania to have been diligent. Rather, the Panel 
would just have found that many more States to have been non-diligent. It is not axiomatic that 
the Panel would have changed its decision and found Pennsylvania was objectively diligent 
simply upon deciding that all or most of these 20 Compromising States were relatively less 
diligent or non-diligent 
Second, the Commonwealth failed to show it was substantially prejudiced by the Panel 





diligence had been contested. While the Commonwealth's assertion that all or most of these 20 
Compromising States had more substantial compliance issues than Pennsylvania could be valid, 
without evidentiary support of prejudice this court is not in a position to vacate the award 
Accordingly, it is the opinion of this court that the Final Award should not be vacated as 
the Panel did consider relevant evidence in what must be considered a-rational, consistent, and 
non-arbitrary manner and the failure to also consider the enforcement record for the 20 
Compromising States whose diligence had been contested was not shown to (I) have been the 
result of the Panel refusing to consider the evidence or to (2) have substantially prejudiced the 
Commonwealth. 
C. The Motion to Modify, or Vacate in Part, the Partial Settlement Award 
While the Panel had jurisdiction to determine how the 2003 NPM Adjustment should be 
allocated among the non-diligent non-Compromising States, the Panel's adoption of the ''pro 
rata" reallocation method cannot rationally be derived from the MSA and amounts to an error of 
law as it violates the unambiguous language of section IX( d)(2), which provides the NPM 
Adjustment "shall apply" to "all" Settling States unless they prove their diligence. As 20 of the 
Compromising States diligence was contested, but not proven, the only way for the Partial 
Settlement Award to not affect Pennsylvania's rights-. and amount to an unauthorized 
amendment of the MSA-. is for these 20 Compromising States to be treated as non-diligent when 
calculating the NPM Adjustment for Pennsylvania. Accordingly, for these reasons and the 
reasons that follow, this court will order the "independent Auditor to treat the 20 Compromising 
States whose diligence was contested but not proven as non-diligent when calculating the NPM 
Adjustment applicable to the amount owed to Pennsylvania for 2003. 
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1. The Panel had jurisdiction to determine how the 2003 NPM 
Adjustment should be allocated among the non-diligent non-
Compromising States. 
It is the Commonwealth's position that the Panel exceeded its powers under the ARA 
with its Reallocation Determination. Specifically, the Commonwealth argued that "although the 
ARA states that the arbitration would proceed pursuant to [s]ection XI(c) .of the MSA," ''the 
ARA's plain language states that the consolidated arbitration would only address the '2003 NPM 
Adjustment Dispute,' which the ARA defines as 'the dispute regarding whether Participating 
Manufacturers are entitled to a 2003 NPM Adjustment, including the diligent enforcement of 
individual Settling States.'" (PA Mem. re: Partial Settlement p. 24 (quoting ARA §§ l(f), 2(a)) 
{some quotations omitted).) This limited the scope of the arbitration to "determination of the 
PM's entitlement to a 2003 NPM Adjustment and the Settling State's diligenceL]" according to 
the Commonwealth. (PA Mem. re: Partial Settlement p. 24.) Moreover, the Commonwealth 
argued with section 2(j)(i) of the ARA, "the parties themselves resolved how the Reallocation 
Provision would be applied .... " (PA Mem. re: Partial Settlement p. 25.) That section 
provides: 
In the event the Arbitration panel determines that a Signatory State did not 
diligently enforce a Qualifying Statute during 2003 (a ''Non-Diligent Signatory 
State"), for purposes ofthe 2003 NPM Adjustment, such determination will give 
rise to transfers from the Disputed Payments Account or offsets as provided in 
Section XI(i)(2) of the MSA as follows. 
(i) Upon the disclosure of such determination ... , the Parties shall jointly 
and promptly instruct the Independent Auditor to calculate for each Non-
Diligent Signatory State the aggregate amount of the 2003 NPM 
Adjustment that would be allocated pursuant to [ s] ections IX( d)(2) and 
IX(d)(4) of the MSA to that Non-Diligent Signatory State's Allocable 
Shar.e of the MSA payments from all Signatory PMs. In performing that 
calculation, the Independent Auditor shall (A) regard as imal the 
Arbitration panel's ... determination as to any Settling State's diligent 
enforcement, (B) assume that a Settling State diligently enforced a 
Qualifying Statute during 2003 in the event the Signa.tory :eMs have 
42 
given written notice to all Notice Parties (as identified by NAAG) that 
they are no longer contesting that Settling State's diligent 
enforcement, and (C) assume that a Settling State did not diligently 
enforce a Qualifying Statute during 2003 in the event its diligent 
enforcement both continues to be contested by the Signatory PMs and 
has not yet been determined by the Arbitration panel .... The Parties 
shall jointly and promptly provide the Independent Auditor with all 
determinations and notices necessary to perform those calculations .... 
(ARA§ 2(j)(i) (emphasis added).) The Commonwealth contended that the 20 Compromising 
States whose diligence was contested but not proven fit into category "C," and the ARA required 
all the parties join together after the partial settlement was reached to inst:ru.ct the Independent. 
Auditor to assume these 20 "Compromising States were non-diligent for purposes of applying 
the MSA's Reallocation Provision to the other Settling States, including Pennsylvania." (PA 
Mem. re: Partial Settlement pp. 26-27.) 
It is the court's position that the Panel had jurisdiction to determine how the 2003 NPM 
Adjustment should be allocated among the non-diligent non:-Compromising States as "it is 
·beyond reasonable debate" that: (1) ''the Panel had authority under the MSA to determine how 
the 2003 NPM Adjustment should be reallocated among the [ non-diligent non-Compromising] 
States given the partial settlement" and (2) ''the ARA does not purport to strip the Panel of its 
power to perform this central aspect of its job in resolving the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute." 
(OMPs Mero. re: Partial Settlement p. 13.) 
Regarding the first point, in compelling arbitration of the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute, 
Judge Manfredi has already held a dispute is arbitrable under the plain language of section XI( c) 
of the MSA when "it concerns ... the operation [or] application of the NPM Adjustment." 
(Mem. Opinion p. 6).) And the Panel has already explained, "[o]nce a dispute is committed to 
· arbitrationt "the arbitrators normally have the authority to decide all matters necessary to 
dispose of the claim," "includ[ing] [the] authority to determine the existence or effect of a 
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(~_, ; settlement." (Partial Settlement Award pp. 2-3 (citing cases).) Thus, under section XI(c) of the 
NSA, "the Panel's authority to dispose of the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute clearly include[d] 
determining how the partial settlement affect[ ed] the allocation of the 2003 NPM Adjustment 
among" the non~diligent non-Compromising States. (OMPs Mem. re: Partial Settlement p. 14.) 
Regarding the second point, the ARA does not resolve the issue nor strip the Panel of its 
power to address this aspect of the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute. The Commonwealth does 
not cite "a single provision of the ARA that affirmatively purports to remove reallocation · 
disputes from the Panel's jurisdiction." (OMPs Mem. re: Partial Settlement p. 15.) Rather, the 
Commonwealth argued section 2G)(i) of the ARA "resolved how the Reallocation Provision 
would be applied." (PA Mem. re: Partial Settlement pp. 25-27.) While creative, the 
. Commonwealth's argument was not convincing. 
As will be discussed below, there are ramifications under the MSA to the fact that the 
Partial Settlement Agreement was reached after "[t]he deadline imposed by the Panel for the 
[PMs] to decide not to contest [ the diligence of] Settling States[,]" (PA Reply re: Partial 
Settlement p. 19.) That does not mean the PMs continued to contest the diligence of these 20 
Compromising States once the settlement was reached, and these States plainly fit into 
subsection C of section 2G)(i) of the ARA; a section that also arguably only addressed "the 
procedural issue of how NPM Adjustment funds would.be distributed during the interim period 
after the Panel began making determinations as to which States were subject to the 2003 NPM 
Adjustment but before all those determinations had been made and judicially reviewed," (OMPs 
Mem. re: Partial Settlement p. 16 ( emphasis removed)). 
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2. The Panel's adoption of the "pro rata" reallocation method cannot 
rationally be derived from the MSA and amounts to an error of la:w as 
it violates the unambiguous language of section IX( d)(2), which 
provides the NPM Adjustment "shall apply" to "all" Settling States 
unless they prove their diligence. · 
The Commonwealth argued the Panel's ~doption of the ''pro rata" reallocation method 
violated the clear language of section IX(d)(2), which provides an NPM Adjustment "shall 
apply" to "all" Settling States "except" those States that "continuously had a Qualifying Statute . 
. . . in full force and effect ... and diligently enforced the provisions of such statute during such 
entire calendar year." MSA § IX(d)(2). It is the Commonwealth's position that the "section 
contains no exceptions and therefore applies equally to all factual situations that may arise, 
including a partial settlement." (PA Mem. re: Partial Settlement p. 20.) It is also the 
Commonwealth's position that the only way for the Partial Settlement Award not to amount to 
an improper amendment of the MSA would be to ''to treat as non-diligent the 20 Compromising 
States whose diligence was contested and not proved when calculating ~e NPM Adjustment for 
the other Settling States." (PA Mem. re: Partial Settlement p. 24.) If these 20 Compromising 
States are treated as non-diligent and the Panel's pro rata reduction is removed from the 
equation, Pennsylvania's MSA Payment for 2003 would be reduced by $116,457,190.73 rather 
than $242,309,663.54.9 
The PMs, on the other hand, argued ''under any standard of review, this [ c ]ourt cannot 
second-guess ... the Panel's reasonable contractual interpretation of how to apply the MSA's 
NPM Adjustment reallocation provisions after a partial settlement, especially given the 
unreasonableness of the Commonwealth's contrary interpretation." (OPM Mem.: re Partial 
9 For ease of reference and as a helpful illustrative tool, diagrams from the 
Commonwealth's brief that depict these calculations are attached hereto as "Attachment I.'~ (Or 
see PA Mem. re: Partial Settlement pp. q-14.) 
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(J Settlement p. 6.) The PMs viewed Pennsylvania's interpretation of the MSA as unreasonable 
\-._ J 
because there is no factual basis to support the position that none of these 20 Compromising 
States would have been found diligent by the Panel absent the settlement. Rather, the PMs 
argued the MSA is silent on reallocating the NPM Adjustment among non-Compromising States 
"where the diligence of [Compromising] States is no longer contested by the PMs due to a 
settlement and it therefore remains unknown whether or not those ... parties were diligent" and 
"a reasonable mind could derive the pro rata method from the MSA's reallocation provision and 
default judgment-reduction principles in a rational way" and, thus, the Panel's interpretation 
cannot be second-guessed here. ( OPM Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 8-9 ( emphasis, brackets, 
and quotations removed).) 
The problem with the PMs' opposition is that it "suffers from the same flaws as the 
Partial Settlement Award itself: It ignores the plain language of the MSA." (PA Reply re: 
Partial Settlement p. 4.) It is a fundamental principle of Pennsylvania contract law that when the 
language of a contract is unambiguous, there is no basis to look beyond its express language, as 
the Panel did here. See Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659,661 (Pa 1982) (holding that "when 
a written contract is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its contents alone. 
It speaks for itself and a meaning cannot be given to it other than that expressed."). 
The PM's opposition failed to identify any ambiguity in the language of section IX(d)(2). 
Rather, the PMs argued the MSA is silent on reallocating the NPM Adjustment among non-
Compromising States '\¥here the diligence of [Compromising] States is no longer contested by 
the PMs due to a settlement and it therefore remains unknown whether or not those ... parties 
were diligent." (OPM Mem.: re Partial Settlement p. 9 (emphasis removed).) That type of 
argument, however, does not create ambiguity where there is none. See, e.g., Del. Cnty. v. Del. 
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,,,,---.."'c. Cnty. Prison Employees Jndep. Union, 713 A.2d 1135 (Pa. 1998) (holding that because "[n]o 
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limits on [the county's] power [to subcontract work and lay off employees] were set forth in the 
agreement" at issue, the arbitrator "was obliged to apply the agreement as written, without 
:imposing additional terms that modify and limit what the parties expressed."). As aptly 
explained by the Commonwealth: 
The MSA does not address many specific permutations. That does not render it. 
ambiguous and subject to the Panel's reading in new terms. For example, it does 
not specifically address how reallocation should be handled in regardto·an 
arbitration ruling issued on a Wednesday. It would be absurd, of course, to 
suggest that this is an ambiguity that would allow an arbitration panel to create 
special rules for rulings on Wednesdays. That is because there are clear and 
generally applicable terms that cover all scenarios, regardless of what day it is. 
Likewise, the terms of the MSA explicate that the default status quo rule is that all 
States are subject to the NPM Adjustment. *** [T]he MSA provides only one way 
for a State to escape the Adjustment for a given year ... : prove its diligence. That 
clear governing rule applies in all contexts. It does not depend on what day of the 
week it is, what the temperature is outside~ or whether the State has decided to 
settle rather than litigate its diligence. 
(PA Reply re: Partial Settlement p. 6 ( citations omitted).) 
In its entirety, section IX(d)(2) of the MSA provides: 
' (A) The NPM Adjustment set forth in subsection (d)(l) shall apply to the 
Allocated Payments of all Settling States, except as set forth below. 
(B) A Settling State's Allocated Payment shall not be subject to an NPM 
Adjustment: (i) if such Settling State continuously had a Qualifying Statute (as 
defined in subsection (2)(E) below) in full force and effect during the entire 
calendar year immediately preceding the year in which the payment in question is 
due, and diligently enforced the provisions of such statute during such entire 
calendar year; or (ii) if such Settling State enacted the Model Statute (as defined 
in subsection (2)(E) below) for the first time during the calendar year 
immediately preceding the year in which the payment in question is due, 
· continuously had the Model Statute in full force and effect during the last six 
. months of such calendar year, and diligently enforced the provisions of such 
statute during the period in which it was in full force and effect. 
MSA § IX( d)(2)( emphasis added). Thus, under the plain language of the MSA, the default rule 
is a Settling State is treated as subject to the NPM Adjustment. And in order to earn an 
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/' ex.emption, the State must show it "diligently enforced" its qualifying statute during the year in 
\, 1 
qu.estion; no exceptions. 
This is not just the court's and the Commonwealth's reading of the MSA, it was the 
Fanel's reading as well. As examples, this court agrees with the Panel's statement in its burden 
of proof order that "no language in the MSA supports a finding that the States can by-pass an 
inquiry regarding whether they satisfied their contractual obligation for avoiding a payment 
adjustment through the NPM Adjustment[,]" (Panel's Order re: Burden of Proof p. 11 ), and the 
Panel's statement in the Final Award that "States are ... not required either to enact or enforce [a 
Qualifying Statute], but if they want the benefit of the contractual exemption from the NPM 
Adjustment, they must do both." (Final Award p. 6.) 
Thus, there is no ambiguity as to how the 20 Compromising States whose diligence was 
contested, but not proven, are to be treated for the purposes of the NPM Adjustment. In the 
language of the Panel's Final Award, these 20 Compromising States failed to "demonstrateO that 
they enacted and 'diligently enforced' a 'Qualifying Statute."' (Final Award p. 6.) Therefore, 
they are not entitled to "the benefit of the contractual exemption from the NPM Adjustment[,]" 
(Final Award p. 6), and they must be treated as non-diligent when calculating the NPM 
Adjustment applicable to the amount owed to Pennsylvania for 2003. 
3. The Panel's use of a judgment reduction method borrowed from tort 
law confirms that the Panel was not properly interpreting the MSA. 
Moreover, there was no basis for the Panel to consider "standard" judgment reduction 
methods derived from tort law. Neither the Partial Settlement Award nor the PMs' opposition 
cited legal authority for importing tort law to "interpret'' the parties' contractual rights under the 
MSA. 
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Indeed, looking at cases regarding allocation of damages is improper here. *** 
[T]he NPM adjustment bears no relation to a damage action for breach of the 
MSA. Rather, applying the NPM Adjustment is simply a question of carrying out 
a contract in accord with its terms. The contract specifies that all States are 
subject to the NPM Adjustment, unless a State satisfies the contractual exception 
by proving its diligence. The operation of the reallocation terms of the contract 
has dramatic implications for the finances of the States and must be strictly 
followed. Neither an arbitration panel nor a court has the right to rewrite or revise 
those terms based on its own concepts of fairness. 
(PA Reply re: Partial Settlement pp. 12-13.) 
As previously explained, the NPM Adjustment is allocated using a two-tiered process. If 
a Settling State fails to prove its diligence, it is subject to an initial reduction of its MSA 
Payment in the First Tier equal to its Allocable Share of the total NPM Adjustment amount. 
MSA § IX( d)(2). That same Settling State is then subject to an additional reduction of its MSA 
Payment in the.Second Tier based on the Allocable Share(s) of any diligent Settling State(s), 
whose shares are "reallocated among all [non-diligent] Settling States pro rata in proportion to 
their respective Allocable Shares." MSA § IX( d)(2(C) (italicization added). As stated by the 
Commonwealth, "(t]his complex system involves concepts completely foreign to tort law: a 
fixed Allocable Share for each 'defendant' and a two~tiered built-in reallocation provision 
separate and apart from any pro rata reallocation regime. These features of the MSA make it 
impossible to coherently apply a generalized 'pro rata' judgment reduction method to this case." 
(PA Reply re: Partial Settlement p. 13 (italicization added).) But in any event, there was no basis 
for the Panel to consider "standard" judgment reduction methods derived from tort law and the 
Panel was not properly interpreting the MSA when it grafted its pro rata reallocation method 
ontotheMSA 
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() In sum, the Panel's adoption of the pro rata reallocation method is contrary to the plain 
language of the MSA, is not rationally derived therefrom, and amounts to an error oflaw that 
nust be modified by this court. 
4. The Panel's adoption of the ''pro rata" reallocation. method violates 
section XVIIl(j) of the MSA, which prohibits amendments to the MSA 
that are not signed by all Settling States "affected" by such 
amendment. 
In adopting the "pro rata" reallocation method, the Panel also violated section XVIII(j) 
of the MSA, which provides the MSA can only be amended ''by a written instrument executed 
by all ... Settling States affected by the amendment." MSA § XVIII(j) ( emphasis added). 
When the Panel adopted the pro rata reallocation method and instructed the Independent Auditor 
to treat all of the Compromising States as diligent it effectively rewrote the MSA and affected 
Pennsylvania's contractual rights. 
While the PMs were free to settle with the Compromising States as to the amounts of 
their annual payments, these parties could not do so in a way that "affected" the rights of 
Pennsylvania. In entering the Partial Settlement Award, the Panel should have done so in a way 
that would not even potentially implicate the rights of the other Settling States as it was beyond 
the authority of the Panel to enter the Partial Settlement Award in a way that affected the rights 
of any other Settling State without that Settling State's consent. Modifying the Partial 
Settlement Award so that the Independent Auditor is instructed to treat the 20 Compromising 
States whose diligence was contested but not proven as non-diligent, when calculating the NPM 
Adjustment applicable to the amount owed to Pennsylvania for 2003, will ensure that the Partial 
Settlement Award does not "affect" Pennsylvania's rights and will bring the Partial Settlement 
Award in line with the plain language of sections XVIII(j) and IX( d)(2) of the MSA. 
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( 
It is also worth noting here that, in terms of"affecting" Pennsylvania's contractual rights, 
the Panel's No-Contest Order and the Partial Settlement Agreement are not at all comparable. In 
its No-Contest Order, the Panel decided the "procedural question" of ''whether or not to conduct 
an. evidentiary hearing when a [S]tate's diligent enforcement is_ not challenged" by "[]either the 
JlMs, []or any State." (Panel's Order re: PMs' Mot. for Clarification oii No-Contest Issue p. 13.) 
Tu determining that a Settling State whose diligence was never contested by any PM or any sister 
State would be deemed diligent without undergoing an evidentiary heariug, the Panel did not 
affect the contractual rights of any of the parties. The decision was "procedural" because all of 
the parties had a timely opportunity to contest diligence, and if they failed to do so, there was 
agreement as to the diligence of any particular State. (See Panel's Order re: PMs' Mot. for 
Clarification on No-Contest Issue p. 13 ("Ifno PM or [S]tate challenges the diligent enforcement 
of a particular [S]tate, when all have had the opportunity to do so, there is no rational basis for 
conducting a hearing. Where there is no challenge to a [S]tate' s claim to diligent enforcement, a 
No Contest decision can be interpreted by the Panel as the functional equivalent of diligent 
enforcement by the uncontested [S]tate. Such construction of diligent enforcement would comply 
with the terms of the MSA that require diligent enforcement by a [S]tate before that [S]tate is 
exempted from the NPM Adjustment").) 
However, with the Partial Settlement Award, the Panel's deadlines for both the PMs and · 
other Settling States to decide not to contest, or "no contest," a State's diligence had long passed 
Here, the PMs had contested and then vigorously litigated ( or prepared to vigorously litigate) the 
non-diligence of20 oftlie Compromising States before the Panel. And faced with the 
evidentiary submissions and arguments made by the PMs, these 20 Compromising States agreed 
to forgo their claims of diligence and instead entered into the Tenn Sheet with the PMs under 
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(~) "Which they lose millions of dollars every year to the PMs. As explained by the Commonwealth, 
the PMs and these 20 Compromising States entering into the Term Sheet was ''hardly analogous 
to a timely 'no contest' decision, where all of the parties are in agreement as to the diligence of 
the particular State." (PA Reply re: Partial Settlement p. 10.) With a timely "no contest" 
decision by the PMs, another Settling State would have had the opportunity to make a timely 
challenge to its sister State's diligence. The Panel's Partial Settlement Award ruling denied the 
Commonwealth the right to exercise that contractual right. 
The reallocation determination in the Partial Settlement Award requiring that · 
the[se] 20 States be deemed diligent for the purposes of the MSA's Reallocation 
Provision undeniably concerned more than just procedure. In so ruling, the Panel 
invented an answer to a question already answered by the MSA. The MSA 
explains how to handle the NPM Adjustment allocation and reallocation when a 
State decides to abandon its efforts to prove its diligence. All States are subject to 
the NPM Adjustment, unless they prove their diligence. Without the agreement 
of all of the PMs and all of the other States that a State was diligent, if that State 
aban<;Ions its hearing and no longer seeks to litigate and prove its diligence, then, 
under the unambiguous terms of the MSA, it must be treated as non-diligent. 
The Panel here, instead, decided that for the purposes of the M:SA' s Reallocation 
Provision 20 such States should be treated as "diligent." That dramatic deviation 
from the terms of the contract cannot be brushed off as "procedural." 
For the purposes of calculating its payment and its share of the NPM Adjustment, 
the Commonwealth has a contractual right under the MSA to have the[ se] 20 
Compromising States that joined the Term Sheet treated as non-diligent. The 
Panel took away that right ... [ and this] is hardly procedural. 
(PAReplyre: Partial Settlementpp. 10-11.) 
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5. The PMs' speculation that at least some of the Compromising States 
might have been found diligent by the Panel is irrelevant in light of 
the plain language of the MSA. 
Lastly, the PMs' speculation that at least some of the 20 Compromising States whose 
diligence was contested but not proven might have been found diligent by the Panel is irrelevant 
in light of the plain language of the MSA. Under the MSA, each Settling State must bear its 
Allocable Share of the NPM Adjustment unless it affirmatively proved its diligence. And 
another State's share of the NPM Adjustment cannot be reallocated to the Commonwealth under 
the MSA without such a finding. 20 Compromising States failed to sustain that burden. thus, 
under the contract, they must be treated as non-diligent for the purposes of the NPM 
Adjustment's Reallocation Provision. 
The PMs contended that at least some of the 20 Compromising States initially contested 
by the PMs "probably would have been found diligent by the Panel absent the settlemen~." 
OPMs Mem. re: Partial Award p. 10.) Maybe, maybe not. There remains that possibility, 
however, there is no way of knowing what the outcomes of those Compromising States' 
diligence proceedings would have been because the PMs and those States ceased litigating their 
diligence after the Partial Settlement A ward was entered But having never proven their 
diligence, these 20 Compromising States may not be exempted from the calculation of NPM 
Adjustment applicable to the amount owed to Pennsylvania for 2003. The PM's speculation of 
what might have happened absent the settlement is irrelevant to this contractual issue. 
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Neither the PMs nor the Settling States contested the diligence of two of the 
Compromising States-New Jersey and Wyoming-by the dea4lines prescribed by the Panel. 
Thus,. for ·purposes of these calculations, Pennsylvania treats those two states as diligent. 
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
The Court has before it the State of Missouri's Amended Motion 
for Vacatur and Declaratory Relief, and Motion to Compel a Single-
State Arbitration to Determine Whether Missouri Diligently Enforced 
its Qualifying Statute in 2004. The Court now rules as follows. 
In 1998, Missouri and 51 other states and territories 
{collectively, "states") , entered into the tobacco Master 
Settlement Agreement { "MSA") with certain Participating 
Manufacturers of tobacco products ("PMs"). Under the MSA, in 
exchange for a release of liability from the states' consumer fraud 
and products-liability claims, the PMs agreed to make annual 
payments to the states in perpetuity. Each state receives a 
percentage of the PMs' annual payments, called its "Allocable 
Share." Missouri's Allocable Share is 2.2746011%. 
The annual payments are subject to a reduction called the "NPM 
Adjustment" if the PMs lose more than 2% of national market share 
to "Non-Participating Manufacturers" ("NPMs") due to the MSA. When 
an NPM Adjustment applies, it can reduce each state's payment for 
that year. But a state can avoid having its payment reduced by 
proving it "diligently enforced" its "qualifying statute," which is 
legislation each state successfully enacted to avoid giving NPMs an 
advantage in the marketplace. It is the individual state's burden 
to prove it diligently enforced its qualifying statute. Those 
states who cannot prove diligent enforcement are then hit twice 
with a reduction in their annual payment: first, their payment is 
reduced by the pro rata amount of the NPM Adjustment allocable to 
that state, and then the state's payment is reduced again because 
the amount of the NPM Adjustment that would have otherwise been 
allocated pro rata to those states who prove diligent enforcement 
is reallocated to the non-diligent states. Therefore, the greater 
the number of diligent states, the further the payments are reduced 
to the non-diligent states. 
In 200 3, the PMs lost more than 2%- of their 1997 national 
market share to NPMs. The Independent Auditor determined that no 
NPM Adjustment should be applied, but the PMs objected, resulting 
in arbitration of the issue of whether the PMs were entitled to an 
NPM Adjustment and the issue of whether any state was entitled to 
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an exemption to the NPM Adjustment due to ~diligent enforcement" of 
its qualifying statute. 
Missouri volunteered to have its hearing first, and a four-
and-a-half day hearing was held on Missouri's diligent enforcement. 
After Missouri's hearing, but before the arbitration panel had 
completed all the hearings, nineteen states and the PMs agreed to a 
settlement (the "partial settlement"). Three more states have since 
joined the partial settlement. The 22 "signatory statesn to the 
partial settlement had a combined allocable share of approximately 
46%. 
The 27 ~non-signatory states," including Missouri, objected to 
the partial settlement. On March 12, 2013, the arbitration panel 
entered a "Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award" rejecting the 
objections. The panel determined that the signatory states l ' • WOU..1..0 oe 
treated as "not subject to the 2003 NPM Adjustment," but that the 
reallocation among any non-signatory states found to be non-
diligent would be reduced by the signatory states' "pro rata share" 
of approximately 46%. The panel determined that the non-signatory 
states would not be prejudiced by the partial settlement if their 
NPM Adjustment was reduced accordingly. 
Following the close of Missouri's hearing, eighteen other 
states tried their cases before the arbitration panel. In twelve of 
the eighteen hearings, statements and arguments regarding 
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Missouri's enforcement efforts were heard. Missouri's counsel was 
not present during these other states' hearings. 
On September llr 2013, the arbitration panel issued final 
awards for fteen states that had had hearings. Nine states were 
found diligent. Six states, including Missouri, were found not 
diligent. 
Missouri's annual payment, which was to be payable on April 
15, 2014, would have been $130 million if there had been no NPM 
Adjustment for 2003. Instead, Missouri's payment was reduced by $20 
million due to the pro rata amount of the NPM Adjustment 
attributable to Missouri, and then it was further reduced by 
another $50 million due to the reallocation of the NPM Adjustment 
attributable to the diligent states, resulting in a net payment to 
the state of $60 million. 
VACATUR- MARCH 12, 2013 STIPULATED PARTIAL SETTLEMENT AND AWARD 
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") permits vacatur "where the 
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct ... in refusing to hear evidence 
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other 
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced," 
9 U.S.C. §l0(a) (3); or "where the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and 
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." 
Id., §l0(a) (4). Under Missouri's Uniform Arbitration Act, vacatur 
is required where the arbitrators engage in "misconduct prejudicing 
4 
the rights of a party," or where the arbitrators conduct the 
hearing "so as to prejudice substantially the rights of any party.u 
Section 4 3 5. 4 0 5. l RS Mo. The Court cannot reweigh the evidence 
presented to the arbitration panel, but can only look to whether 
there was misconduct in the proceedings. Crawford Group, Inc. v. 
Holekamp, 543 F.3d 971, 978 (8th Cir. 2008). 
Missouri first contends that the arbitration panel exceeded 
its authority in approving the "Stipulated Partial Settlement and 
Award" and applying a "pro rata adjustment" to the non-signatory 
states. Missouri argues that the partial settlement must be vacated 
to the extent that it affected Missouri's allocation, because the 
arbitrators exceeded their authority in entering such an award. 
Missouri argues that the partial settlement caused Missouri to bear 
a greater portion of the 2003 NPM Adjustment than it should have 
under the MSA. Missouri argues that the Signatory States should be 
treated as non-diligent for the purpose of calculating Missouri's 
share, otherwise Missouri is allocated a disproportionate amount of 
the NPM adjustment. 
On April 10, 2014, a Pennsylvania court decided this very 
issue in favor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. It held that 
"the Independent Auditor shall treat each Settling State Lhat has 
signed the Term Sheet referenced in the Stipulated Partial 
Settlement and Award as if such Settling State did not diligently 
enforce a Qualifying Statute for purposed of section IX(d) of the 
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MSA when the Independent Auditor calculates the amounts owed to 
Pennsylvania under the MSA for the sales year 2003, unless the 
diligence of of such Settling Stat:e was not contested or t:he 
arbitration panel issued a separate final award determining that 
such Settling State was diligent." 
The PMs acknowledge that Missouri is worse off under the pro 
rata reallocation than it would be if there had been no partial 
settlement, unless the signatory states were "disproportionately 
diligent." Specifically, if more than 27% of the signatory states 
would have been found non-diligent, Missouri would be disadvantaged 
under the pro-rata reduction applied by the panel pursuant to the 
partial settlement. The PMs had contested the diligence of 20 out 
of 22 of the signatory states, or over 90%. Nonetheless, the PMs 
argue that the panel's decision to apply the pro rata adjustment 
cannot be disturbed. 
The MSA does not expressly address how to reallocate the NPM 
Adjustment among the non-signatory states where the diligence of 
the signatory states is no longer contested due to a settlement; 
however, the issue is clearly within the scope of the arbitration 
agreement. Because the partial settlement related to the NPM 
Adjustment, any disputes regarding the partial settlement were 
themselves subject to arbitration. See United Steel Union v. Trirnas 
Corp., 531 F.3d531, 539 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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The arbitration panel concluded that the pro rata adjustment 
complied with the MSA and was the equitable way to determine the 
reallocation. The Signatory States were treated as diligent for the 
purposes of the pro-rata adjustment, even though the PMs had 
contested the diligence of 20 of the 22 Signatory States prior to 
the partial settlement. 
Although the panel had the authority to determine the 
reallocation method, s pro rata reallocation method is clearly 
erroneous as it violates the MSA's procedure for amending the MSA. 
The MSA prohibits amendment unless it is "by a written instrument 
executed by all ... Settling States affected by the amendment." MSA 
§XVIII (j). MSA section IX (d) (2) states that an NPM Adjustment 
"shall apply" to "all" Settling States "except" those that 
"continuously had a Qualifying Statute ... in full force and effect ... 
and diligently enforced the provisions of such statute during such 
entire calendar year." The Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award 
effectively amends §IX(d) (2)r since the signatory states are no 
longer subject to the NPM Adjustment and do not have to prove their 
diligent enforcement. 
There is no question that Missouri is materially affected by 
the Partial Settlement and the pro rata reallocation of the NPM 
Adjustment. Missouri, and the other non-signatory states, did not 
agree to such amendment of the calculation of their annual payment. 
The Court believes that the only way for the Partial Settlement 
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Award to not af feet Missouri's rights is for the 20 signatory 
states whose diligence was contested, but not proven, to be treated 
as non-diligent when calculating the NPM Adjustment for Missouri. 
Accordingly, this Court will order the Independent Auditor to treat 
the 20 signatory states whose diligence was contested but not 
proven as non-diligent when calculating the NPM Adjustment 
applicable to the amount owed to Missouri for 2003. 
VACATUR- SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 FINAL AWARD RE: STATE OF MISSOURI 
Missouri next argues that the Final Award must be vacated as 
to Missouri, because the arbitration panel engaged in misconduct 
and misbehavior and exceeded its authority by relying on ex parte 
communications rather than evidence in the Missouri record. 
Section 435.370(2) RSMo states that parties to an arbitration 
"are entitled to be heard, to present evidence material to the 
controversy and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the 
hearing." It is a fundamental principle of fairness in arbitration 
that awards must be based solely on evidence presented at the 
hearings, with all parties in attendance. Totem Marine Tug & Barge, 
Inc. v. North American Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 
1979). Therefore, the ex parte receipt of evidence by arbitrators 
from one party, wi t:hout notice to the other party, is 
"misbehavior" prejudicial to the innocent party's rights. Id. 
However, communications are not generally considered "ex 
parte" when they occur in "open court,« even if a party is not 
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present. See United States v. Barta, 888 F.2d 1220, 1226 (8th Cir. 
1989). Further, ex parte contacts do not justify vacatinq an 
arbitration award per se; there must also be a showing of improper 
intent or influence. Hahn v. A. G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 164 Ill. 
App. 3d 660, 667 (Ill.App. 1987). 
Missouri was found in the Final Award to be not diligent. The 
panel defined "diligent enforcement" as ~an ongoing and intentional 
consideration of the requirements of a Settling State's Qualifying 
Statute, and a significant attempt to meet those requirements, 
taking into account a Settling State's competing laws and policies 
that may conflict with s MSA contractual obligations." The 
factors considered by the panel in making the determination were 
{l) collection rate; (2) lawsuits filed; (3) gathering reliable 
data; (4) resources allocated to enforcement; (5) preventing future 
sales by non-compliant NPMs; ( 6) legislation enacted; ( 7) act ions 
short of legislation; and (8) efforts to be aware of other Settling 
States' enforcement efforts. 
The panel found Missouri to be not diligent based on evidence 
that demonstrated that "NPM non-compliance was extensive and that 
it persisted throughout 2003, with NPMs continuing to sell large 
volumes of cigarettes without l:aving paid the escrow due on them." 
The panel further found that Missouri's collection rate "was among 
the lowest collection rate among all the States whose diligent 
enforcement is now being decided," that Missouri ~did not le any 
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lawsuits in 2003," and that Missouri "took no action on the pending 
suits filed in prior years." 
Missouri argues that the arbitration panel's findings of 
Missouri's non-diligence were based on ex parte testimony procured 
after the close of Missouri's state-specific case. For example, 
Missouri argues that in the Connecticut hearing, the PMs' expert 
testified that there had been a high incidence of distributor 
underreporting in Missouri. In the Kentucky hearing, the panel 
heard testimony from an employee of a wholesaler who admitted to 
intentionally underreporting sales in Missouri. 
In the Indiana hearing, Indiana's counsel argued that Missouri 
had filed no lawsuits in 2003 regarding non-compliant NPM 
cigarettes sold in Missouri, while Indiana had filed 13. In 
Missouri's hearing, Missouri presented evidence that it had filed 
eight lawsuits in 2003. Missouri argues that the panel's finding 
that Missouri had filed no lawsuits could only have come from the 
statements made at the Indiana hearing, which Missouri was not 
given the opportunity to rebut. 
The PMs argue that because Missouri's case was first, certain 
information was repeated later, but nothing was brought up in later 
states' cases that was not brought up during Missouri's hearing. 
The PMs further argue that there is no evidence that the panel 
actually considered and relied upon those references to Missouri in 
other hearings in determining Missouri's diligence. The PMs state 
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that "Missouri's 24 % compliance rate is ... clearly supported by the 
Missouri record. The panel based this finding on calculations 
performed by the PMs' expert for the Missouri hearing using the 
data provided by Missouri." Regarding the number of lawsuits filed, 
the Missouri record is clear that Missouri filed eight seizure and 
forfeiture actions against distributors in 2003, but there is no 
dence of lawsuits against non-compliant NPMs. 
After review of the arguments and the submissions of the 
parties, the Court finds that Missouri has not shown that the 
arbitration panel was unduly influenced by any ex parte 
communications in other states' hearings. There is abundant 
evidence in the Missouri record to support the finding that 
Missouri failed to diligently enforce its escrow statute in 2003. 
The motion to vacate the final award is denied. 
SINGLE-STATE ARBITR.P,TION 
For the sales year 2004, the Independent Auditor again 
determined not to apply an NPM adjustment, and the PMs again have 
disputed the auditor's determination and have asked for 
arbitration. Missouri concedes that the issue of its diligent 
enforcement is subject to arbitration. However, Missouri moves this 
Court to compel a "single-state arbitrationu rather than a 
nationwide arbitration. Missouri argues that the MSA does not 
require a nationwide arbitration, and Missouri therefore cannot be 
compelled into a nationwide arbitration. Missouri points to the 
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issues that occurred in the nationwide arbitration regarding the 
2003 NPM Adjustment as further argument against compelling another 
nationwide arbitration. 
"Arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be 
required to arbitrate a dispute that it has not agreed to 
arbitrate." Dunn Industrial Group, Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112 
S.W.3d 421, 435 (Mo. bane 2003). A party may not be compelled to 
submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for 
concluding that the party agreed to do so. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010). The goal the 
FAA is to enforce the agreement of the parties, not to effect the 
most e:zpedi t ious resolution of claims. Dorniniuin Aust in Partners, 
L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 728 (8th Cir. 2001). As such, an 
arbitration agreement should be enforced nin accordance with its 
terms." Id. 
The parties disagree on whether the MSA explicitly authorizes 
a single, nationwide arbitration. The MSA's tration Provision 
provides: 
Resolution of Disputes: Any dispute, controversy or claim 
arising out of or relating to calculations performed by, 
or any determinations made by, the Independent Auditor 
{including without limitation, any dispute concerning the 
operation or application of any of the adjustments, 
reductions, offsets, carry-forwards and allocations 
described in subsection IX(j) or subsection XI{i)) shall 
be submitted to binding arbitration before a panel of 
three neutral arbitrators, each of whom shall be a former 
Article III federal judge. Each of the two sides to the 
dispute shall select one arbitrator. The two arbitrators 
so selected shall select the third arbitrator. The 
arbitration shall be governed by the United States 
Federal Arbitration Act. 
The Agreement refers to "two sides" to the dispute. Missouri 
argues that it is one "side" to a dispute about its diligent 
enforcement, and the PMs are the other "side." It argues that no 
other state can be said to be on its "side,,, since the states' 
interests are adverse. There is no question that the states' 
interests are not the same; if shown to be non-diligent, each state 
has a vital and conflicting interest to show that other states are 
also non-diligent. 
The Court does not believe that this necessarily means the 
states are not on one "side." The court frequently sees cases where 
there are more than two parties involved. There may be numerous 
defendants, for instance, whose interests are conflicting and 
adverse to each other. Nonetheless, they are "aligned" as party 
defendants, and, in that sense, are "one side." 
The two "parties" to the MSA are the "Participating 
Manufacturers" and the "Settling States." See MSA p.3, and terms 
defined on p.11-12 and p.15. It is clear that these two groups are 
the "two sides" envisioned by the arbitration provision, and all 
the Settling States collectively comprise one side. 
By ordering a nationwide arbitration, the Court is not 
"consolidating" arbitrations as was criticized in Baesler v. 
Continental Grain Co.r 900 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1990). In Baesler, 
each safflower producer had a separate contract with an arbitration 
agreement with Continental Grain, and one of the producers wanted 
to consolidate their separate arbitration proceedings. Here, by 
contrast, there is only one agreement i:::o arbi t_i::-ate to which all 
states are a party. 
Missouri acknowledges that the NPM Adjustment is a "zero sum 
game" and that each non-diligent state's annual payment is 
deoendent on the diligence or non-diligence of each other state. 
Because of the interconnectedness of the states' diligent 
enforcement determinations, the Court believes that a single 
decisionmaker has the best chance of producing consistent awards. 
The Court finds that a nationwide arbitration was envisioned by the 
parties in drafting i:::he MSA, and it is the most logical mechanism 
for the resolution of the dispute. The motion to compel a single-
state arbitration is denied. 
THEREFORE, it is Ordered and Decreed that Missouri's Amended 
Motion for Vacatur and Declaratory Relief is GRANTED IN PART. 
The Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award dated March 12, 
2013 is MODIFIED as to how Missouri's award is calculated. The 
Independent Auditor shall treat each Settling State that has signed 
the Term Sheet referenced in the Stipulated Partial Settlement and 
Award as if such Settling State did not diligently enforce a 
Qualifying Statute for purposes of section IX(d) of the MSA when 
the Independent Auditor calculates the amounts owed to Missouri 
14 
under the MSA for the sales 2003, unless the diligence of such 
Settling State was net contested for the arbitration panel issued a 
separate final award determining that such Settling State was 
diligent. 
The Motion to Vacate is DENIED in all other respects. 
Missouri's Motion to Compel a Single-State Arbitration to Determine 




Dated: May 2, 2014 
cc: counsel of record 
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MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
This Master Settlement Agreement is made by the undersigned Settling State officials ( on 
behalf of their respective Settling States) and the undersigned Participating Manufacturers to 
settle and resolve with finality all Released Claims against the Participating Manufacturers and 
related entities as set forth herein. This Agreement constitutes the documentation effecting this 
settlement with respect to each Settling State, and is intended to and shall be binding upon each 
Settling State and each Participating Manufacturer in accordance with the terms hereof. 
I. RECITALS 
WHEREAS, more than 40 States have commenced litigation asserting various claims for 
monetary, equitable and injunctive relief against certain tobacco product manufacturers and 
others as defendants, and the States that have not filed suit can potentially assert similar claims; 
WHEREAS, the Settling States that have commenced litigation have sought to obtain 
equitable relief and damages under state laws, including consumer protection and/or antitrust 
laws, in order to further the Settling States' policies regarding public health, including policies 
adopted to achieve a significant reduction in smoking by Youth; 
WHEREAS, defendants have denied each and every one of the Settling States' allegations 
of unlawful conduct or wrongdoing and have asserted a number of defenses to the Settling 
States' claims, which defenses have been contested by the Settling States; 
.lR1008 
WHEREAS, the Settling States and the Participating Manufacturers are committed to re-
ducing underage tobacco use by discouraging such use and by preventing Youth access to 
Tobacco Products; 
WHEREAS, the Participating Manufacturers recognize the concern of the tobacco grower 
community that it may be adversely affected by the potential reduction in tobacco consumption 
resulting from this settlement, reaffirm their commitment to work cooperatively to address con-
cerns about the potential adverse economic impact on such community, and will, within 30 days 
1 
after the MSA Execution Date, meet with the political leadership of States with grower commun-
ities to address these economic concerns; 
WHEREAS, the undersigned Settling State officials believe that entry into this Agreement 
and uniform consent decrees with the tobacco industry is necessary in order to further the Set-
tling States' policies designed to reduce Youth smoking, to promote the public health and to 
secure monetary payments to the Settling States; and 
WHEREAS, the Settling States and the Participating Manufacturers wish to avoid the fur-
ther expense, delay, inconvenience, burden and uncertainty of continued litigation (including 
appeals from any verdicts), and, therefore, have agreed to settle their respective lawsuits and 
potential claims pursuant to terms which will achieve for the Settling States and their citizens 
significant funding for the advancement of public health, the implementation of important tobac-
co-related public health measures, including the enforcement of the mandates and restrictions 
related to such measures, as well as funding for a national Foundation dedicated to significantly 
reducing the use of Tobacco Products by Youth; 
.lR1009 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT KNOWN THAT, in consideration of the implementation of 
tobacco-related health measures and the payments to be made by the Participating Manufactur-
ers, the release and discharge of all claims by the Settling States, and such other consideration as 
described herein, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the Settling States and the 
Participating Manufacturers, acting by and through their authorized agents, memorialize and 
agree as follows: 
II. DEFINITIONS 
[II](a) "Account" has the meaning given in the Escrow Agreement. 
.lR1010 
[II]( e) "Agreement" means this Master Settlement Agreement, together with the exhibits 
hereto, as it may be amended pursuant to subsection XVIIIG). 
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[II](f) "Allocable Share" means the percentage set forth for the State in question as listed 
in Exhibit A hereto, without regard to any subsequent alteration or modification of such State' s 
percentage share agreed to by or among any States; or, solely for the purpose of calculating pay-
ments under subsection IX(c)(2) (and corresponding payments under subsection IX(i)), the per-
centage disclosed for the State in question pursuant to subsection IX(c)(2)(A) prior to June 30, 
1999, without regard to any subsequent alteration or modification of such State's percentage 
share agreed to by or among any States. 
[Il](g) Allocated Paymen means a particular ettling tate s Allocable hare of th sum 
of all of the payments to be made by th Original Participating Manufactur rs in th year in que -
tion pursuant to ub ctions IX c 1 and IX c 2 as such pa ments ha e be n adjusted reduced 
and allocated pu.r uant to clause First· through th first en nee of claus ifth ofsub 
IXG but before application of the other offsets and adjustments described in clauses "Sixth" 
through "Thirteenth" of subsection IXG). 
l.R1014 
[II]( o) "Consent Decree" means a state-specific consent decree as described in subsection 
XIIl(b )( 1 )(B) of this Agreement. 
[II](p) "Court" means the respective court in each Settling State to which this Agreement 
and the Consent Decree are presented for approval and/or entry as to that Settling State. 
[II](q) "Escrow" has the meaning given in the Escrow Agreement. 
[II](r) "Escrow Agent" means the escrow agent under the Escrow Agreement. 
l.Rl015 
[II]( s) "Escrow Agreement" means an escrow agreement substantially in the form of 
Exhibit B. 
[II](w) "Independent Auditor" means the firm described in subsection XI(b). 
3 
[II](x) "Inflation Adjustment" means an adjustment in accordance with the formulas for 
inflation adjustments set forth in Exhibit C . 
..LR1016 
[II](z) "Market Share" means a Tobacco Product Manufacturer's respective share (ex-
pressed as a percentage) of the total number of individual Cigarettes sold in the fifty United 
States, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico during the applicable calendar year, as mea-
sured by excise taxes collected by the federal government and, in the case of sales in Puerto 
Rico, arbitrios de cigarillos collected by the Puerto Rico taxing authority. [Formulas for roll-
your-own tobacco omitted.] 
[II](cc) "Non-Participating Manufacturer" means any Tobacco Product Manufacturer that 
is not a Participating Manufacturer. 
..LR1017 
[II](ft) "NPM Adjustment" means the adjustment specified in subsection IX(d). 
[II](gg) "NPM Adjustment Percentage" means the percentage determined pursuant to sub-
section IX( d). 
[II](hh) "Original Participating Manufacturers" means the following: Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corporation, Lorillard Tobacco Company, Philip Morris Incorporated and R.J. Rey-
nolds Tobacco Company, and the respective successors of each of the foregoing. 
1-R1018 
[II]Gj) "Participating Manufacturer" means a Tobacco Product Manufacturer that is or 




[II](kk) "Previously Settled States Reduction" means a reduction determined by multiply-
ing the amount to which such reduction applies by 12.4500000%, in the case of payments due in 
or prior to 2007; 12.2373756%, in the case of payments due after 2007 but before 2018; and 
11.0666667%, in the case of payments due in or after 2018. 
J_R1022 
[II]( qq) "Settling State" means any State that signs this Agreement on or before the MSA 
Execution Date. . . . "Settling State" shall not include (1) the States of Mississippi, Florida, 
Texas and Minnesota; and (2) any State as to which this Agreement has been terminated. 
J_R1023 
[II](tt) "Subsequent Participating Manufacturer" means a Tobacco Product Manufacturer 
(other than an Original Participating Manufacturer) that: (1) is a Participating Manufacturer, and 
(2) is a signatory to this Agreement, regardless of when such Tobacco Product Manufacturer be-
came a signatory to this Agreement. 
ffi1025 
[II](aaa) "Volume Adjustment" means an upward or downward adjustment in accordance 




[VII](a) Jurisdiction. Each Participating Manufacturer and each Settling State acknow-
ledge that the Court: 
[/] (1) has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action identified in Exhibit Din such 
Settling State and over each Participating Manufacturer; 
[/] (2) shall retain exclusive jurisdiction for the purposes of implementing and enforcing 
this Agreement and the Consent Decree as to such Settling State; and 
[/] (3) except as provided in subsections IX(d), XI(c) and XVII(d) and Exhibit 0, 1-Rl056 
shall be the only court to which disputes under this Agreement or the Consent Decree are 
presented as to such Settling State. 
[Provisions regarding Escrow Agreement and Escrow Court omitted.] 
[VII](b) Enforcement of Consent Decree. Except as expressly provided in the Consent 
Decree, any Settling State or Released Party may apply to the Court to enforce the terms of the 
Consent Decree ( or for a declaration construing any such term) with respect to alleged violations 
within such Settling State. A Settling State may not seek to enforce the Consent Decree of an-
other Settling State; provided, however, that nothing contained herein shall affect the ability of 
any Settling State to (1) coordinate state enforcement actions or proceedings, or (2) file or join 
any amicus brief. In the event that the Court determines that any Participating Manufacturer or 
Settling State has violated the Consent Decree within such Settling State, the party that initiated 
the proceedings may request any and all relief available within such Settling State pursuant to the 
Consent Decree. 
[VII](c) Enforcement of this Agreement. 
[VIII(c)](l) Except as provided in subsections IX(d), XI(c), XVII(d) and Exhibit 0, 
any Settling State or Participating Manufacturer may bring an action in the Court to en-
force the terms of this Agreement ( or for a declaration construing any such term ("Declara-






[IX](a) All Payments Into Escrow. All payments made pursuant to this Agreement ... 
shall be made into escrow . .. , and shall be credited to the appropriate Account 1-Rl 062 estab-
lished pursuant to the Escrow Agreement. uch payments shall be disbursed to the beneficiaries 
or r turned to the Participating Manufacturer only as provided in section XI and th E cro 
gr ment. 
1-R1063 
[IX]( c) Annual Payments and Strategic Contribution Payments. 
[IX(c)]( l) On April 15, 2000 and on April 15 of each year thereafter in perpetuity, 
each Original Participating Manufacturer shall severally pay to the Escrow Agent (to be 
credited to the Subsection IX(c)(l) Account) its Relative Market Share of the base amounts 











































The payments mad by th Original Parti ipating anufa turers pursuant to thi ubsec-
tion (c l shall be subject to the Inflation djustmen the Volume Adjustment, the Pr vi-
ou I ettJed tates Reduction th on- tiling tate Reduction the PM Adjustm n 
the offset for miscalculated or disputed payments described in subsection XI(i), the Federal 
Tobacco Legislation Offset, the Litigating Releasing Parties Offset, and the offsets for 
claims over described in subsections XII(a)(4)(B) and XII(a)(8). 
[IX(c)](2) On April 15, 2008 and on April 15 ... through 2017, each Original Parti-
cipating Manufacturer shall severally pay ... (to be credited to the Subsection IX( c )(2) 
Account) its Relative Market Share of the base amount of $861,000,000, as such payments 
are modified in accordance with this subsection ( c )(2). The payments made ... 1-R1065 ... 
pursuant to this subsection ( c )(2) shall be subject to the Inflation Adjustment, the Volume 
Adjustment, the NPM Adjustment, the offset for miscalculated or disputed payments de-
scribed in subsection XI(i), the Federal Tobacco Legislation Offset, the Litigating Releas-
ing Parties Offset, and the offsets for claims over described in subsections XII(a)(4)(B) and 
XII(a)(8). [Provisions for Non-Settling States Reduction omitted]. 
[IX](d) Non-Participating Manufacturer Adjustment. 
[IX(d)](l) Calculation ofNPM Adjustment for Original Participating Manufactur-
ers. To protect the public health gains achie ed by this Agreement, certain paym nts mad 
pursuant to this greement shall be subject to an M l.R1066 Adjustment. Payments by 
the Original Participating Manufacturers to which the NPM Adjustment applies shall be 
adjusted as provided below: 
[IX( d (1)] A) ubj ct to the provisions of sub 
(d 2) below each llocated Payment shall be adjusted by ubtracting from uch 
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Allocated Payment the product of such Allocated Payment amount multiplied by the 
NPM Adjustment Percentage. The "NPM Adjustment Percentage" shall be calcu-
lated as follows: 
[IX(d)(l)(A)](i) If the Market Share Loss for the year immediately pre-
ceding the year in which the payment in question is due is less than or equal to 
0 (zero), then the NPM Adjustment Percentage shall equal zero. 
[IX(d)(l)(A)](ii) If the Market Share Loss ... is greater than O (zero) and 
less than or equal to 16 2/3 percentage points, then the NPM Adjustment Per-
centage shall be equal to the product of (x) such Market Share Loss and (y) 3 
(three). 
[IX(d)(l)(A)](iii) If the Market Share Loss ... is greater than 16 2/3 per-
centage points, then the NPM Adjustment Percentage shall be equal to the sum 
of(x) 50 percentage points and (y) the product of (1) the Variable Multiplier 
and (2) the result of such Market Share Loss minus 16 2/3 percentage points . 
..LR1067 
[IX(d)(l)](B) Definitions: 
[IX(d)(l)(B)](i) "Base Aggregate Participating Manufacturer Market 
Share" means the result of (x) the sum of the applicable Market Shares (the 
applicable Market Share to be that for 1997) of all present and former Tobacco 
Product Manufacturers that were Participating Manufacturers during the entire 
calendar year immediately preceding the year in which the payment in question 
is due minus (y) 2 (two) percentage points. 
[IX(d)(l)(B)](ii) "Actual Aggregate Participating Manufacturer Market 
Share" means the sum of the applicable Market Shares of ... Participating 
Manufacturers during the entire calendar year immediately preceding the year 
in which the payment in question is due .... 
[IX(d)(l)(B)](iii) "Market Share Loss" means the result of (x) the Base 
9 
Aggregate Participating Manufacturer Market Share minus (y) the Actual Ag-
gregate Participating Manufacturer Market Share. 
[IX(d)(l)(B)](iv) "Variable Multiplier" equals 50 percentage points di-
vided by the result of (x) the Base Aggregate Participating Manufacturer Mar-
ket Share minus (y) 16 2/3 percentage points . 
...LR1068 
[IX( d)( 1) ]( C) On or before February 2 of each year following a year in which 
there was a Market Share Loss ... , a nationally recognized firm of economic consult-
ants (the "Firm") shall determine whether the disadvantages experienced as a result 
of the provisions of this Agreement were a significant factor contributing to the Mar-
ket Share Loss for the year in question. If the Firm determines that th disad an-
tages ... were a ignificant factor contributing to the Marki t hare Lo ... , th M 
Adjustment ... shall apply. If the Firm determines that the disadvantages ... were 
not a significant factor ... , the NPM Adjustment ... shall not apply. 
1-R1069 
[IX(d)(l)](D) [Provision that there is no NPM Adjustment if PM sales in-
crease from 1997 levels omitted.] 
1-R1070 
[IX( d)] (2) Jlocation among 
Participating Manufacturers. 
[IX(d)(2)](A) The NPM Adjustment set forth in subsection (d)(l) shall apply 
to the Allocated Payments of all Settling States, except as set forth below. 
[IX(d)(2)](B) A ettling tate s Allocated Payment hall not be subject to an 
NPM Adju tinent: i) if uch ettling tate continuously had a Qualifying tatute (as 
defined in subsection 2 (E) belo in full force and effe t during the entire calendar 
10 
year immediately preceding the year in .lRl 071 which the payment in question is 
due, and diligently enforced the provisions of such statute during such entire calen-
dar year; .... 
[IX(d)(2)](C) The aggregate amount of the NPM Adjusonents that would have 
applied to the Allocated Payments of those ettling tate that are not subject to an 
M Adjustment pursuant to subsection (2 (B shall be reallocated among all other 
ettling tates pro rata in proportion to their respective Allocable Shares . . . and 
uch other ttling tates Allocated Payments shall be further reduced ac ordingly. 
[IX(d)(2)](D) This subsection (2)(D) shall apply if the amount of the NPM 
Adjustment applied ... to any Settling State plus the amount of the NPM Adjust-
ments reallocated to such Settling State ... would ... (i) exceed such Settling State's 
Allocated Payment in that year .... For each Settling State ... described in the pre-
ceding sentence, the excess amount ofNPM Adjustment shall be further reallocated 
among all other Settling States ... subject to an NPM Adjustment ... that do not have 
such an excess, pro rata ... , and such other Settling States' Allocated Payments 
1-R1072 shall be further reduced accordingly . ... [f]his sub ection (2 (D hall be 
repeatedly applied ... until either i) the aggregate amount of M djustment has 
been fully reallocated or (ii) the full amount of the M Adjustments ... cannot be 
fully reallocated ... because (x) the Allocated Pa ment in that year of each ttling 
tate that is ubject to an NPM Adjustment ... has been reduced to zero ... . 
[IX(d)(2)](E) A "Qualifying Statute" means a Settling State's statute ... 
(applicable everywhere the Settling State has authority to legislate) that effectively 
and fully neutralizes the cost disadvantages that the Participating Manufacturers 
experience vis-a-vis Non-Participating Manufacturers within such Settling State as a 
result of the provisions of this Agreement. Ea h Participating Manufacturer and 
each ettling tate agree that the model statute in the form et forth in Exhibit T th 
'Model tatute if enacted without modification or addition (except for particular-
11 
ized state procedural or technical requir ments) and not in conjunction with any 
other legislative or regulatory proposal, shall constitute a Qualifying Statute. 
J_R1082 
[IX(d)](4) NPM Adjustment for Subseguent Participating Manufacturers. Subject to 
the provisions of subsection IX(i)(3), a ub equent Participating Manufacturer hall be en-
titled to an NPM Adjustment. .. in an y ar during which an M dju tm nt is applic-
able ... to pa ment due ..LRl 083 fr m the Original Participating anufacturers. The 
amount of such NPM Adjustment shall equal the product of (A) the NPM Adjustment 
Percentage ... multiplied by (B) the sum of the payments due ... from such Subsequent 
Participating Manufacturer that correspond to payments due from Original Participating 
Manufacturers pursuant to subsection IX(c) ( . . . adjusted and allocated pursuant to clauses 
"First" through "Fifth" of subsection IX(j)). The NPM Adjustment to payments by each 
Subsequent Participating Manufacturer shall be allocated and reallocated among the 
Settling States in a manner consistent with subsection ( d)(2) above. 
J_R1085 
[IX](i) Payments by Subsequent Participating Manufacturers. 
[IX(i)](l) A Subsequent Participating Manufacturer shall have payment obligations 
under this Agreement only in the event that its Market Share in any calendar year exceeds 
the greater of ( 1) its 1998 Market Share or (2) 125 percent of its 1997 Market Share . . . . In 
the year following any such calendar year, such ub equ nt Participating Manufacturer 
hall make payments corresponding to those due ... from the Original Participating Manu-
facturers pursuant to sub ctions ... IX c 1 [and] IX c 2) ... . The amounts of such . . . 
payments . .. are in addition to the ... payments that are due from the Original Participating 
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Manufacturers and shall be determined as described in subsections (2) and (3) below. 
Such payments by a Subsequent Participating Manufacturer shall ... (C) be paid, allocated 
and distributed in the same manner as such corresponding payments. 
[IX(i)](2) The base amount due from a Subsequent Participating Manufacturer ... 
shall be determined by multiplying (A) the ... base amount due ... from all of the Original 
Participating Manufacturers 1-R1086 (as such base amount ... is adjusted by the Volume 
Adjustment ... , but before such base amount is modified by any other adjustments, reduc-
tions or offsets) by (B) the quotient produced by dividing (i) the result of (x) such Subse-
quent Participating Manufacturer's applicable Market Share ... minus (y) the greater of ( 1) 
its 1998 Market Share or (2) 125 percent of its 1997 Market Share, by (ii) the aggregate 
Market Shares of the Original Participating Manufacturers .... 
[IX(i)](3) Any payment due from a Subsequent Participating Manufacturer under 
subsections (1) and (2) above shall be subject ... to the Inflation Adjustment, the Non-
Settling States Reduction, the NPM Adjustment, the offset for miscalculated or disputed 
payments described in subsection XI(i), the Federal Tobacco Legislation Offset, the Liti-
gating Releasing Parties Offset and the offsets for claims over described in subsections 
XII(a)(4)(B) and XII(a)(8), to the extent that such adjustments, reductions or offsets would 
apply to the corresponding payment due from the Original Participating Manufacturers. 
1-R1087 
[IX(i)](4) For purposes of this subsection (i), the 1997 (or 1998, as applicable) Mar-
ket Share (and 125 percent thereof) of those Subsequent Participating Manufacturers that 
either (A) became a signatory to this Agreement more than 60 days after the MSA Execu-
tion Date or (B) had no Market Share in 1997 ( or 1998, as applicable), shall equal zero. 
[IX]G) Order of Application of Allocations, Offsets, Reductions and Adjustments. The 
payments due under this Agreement shall be calculated as set forth below. The "base amount" 
referred to in clause "First" below shall mean 
13 
[/] (1) in the case of payments due from Original Participating Manufacturers, the base 
amount referred to in the subsection establishing the payment obligation in question; and 
[/] (2) in the case of payments due from a Subsequent Participating Manufacturer, the base 
amount referred to in subsection (i)(2) for such Subsequent Participating Manufacturer. 
In the event that a particular adjustment, reduction or offset referred to in a clause below does not 
apply to the payment being calculated, the result of the clause in question shall be deemed to be 
equal to the result of the immediately preceding clause. (If clause "First" is inapplicable, the 
result of clause "First" will be the base amount of the payment in question prior to any offsets, 
reductions or adjustments.) 
[IXG))] First: the Inflation Adjustment shall be applied to the base amount of the payment 
being calculated; 
J..R1088 
[IXG))] Second: the Volume Adjustment . . . shall be applied to the result of clause "First" ; 
[IXG))] Third: the result of clause "Second" shall be reduced by the Previously Settled 
States Reduction; 
[IX(j))] Fourth: the result of clause "Third" shall be reduced by the Non-Settling States 
Reduction; 
[IX(j))] Fifth: in the case of payments due under subsections IX c 1) and I c 2 the re-
ults of clause ourth . . . hall be apportion d among th ettling tate pro rat.a in proportion 
to their respe tive Allocabl hares and the resulting amounts for each particular tiling tat 
hall th n be add d tog th r to fonn such ettling tat s Allocated Paym nt. In the case of 
payments due under subsection IX(i) that correspond to payments due under subsections IX(c)(l) 
or IX(c)(2), the results of clause "Fourth" for all such payments due from a particular Subsequent 
Participating Manufacturer ... shall be apportioned among the Settling States pro rata ... , and the 
resulting amounts for each particular Settling State shall then be added together. (In the case of 
all other payments made pursuant to this Agreement, this clause "Fifth" is inapplicable. ; 
[IX(j))] Sixth: the NP Adjustment hall be applied to th r suits of clause Fifth pursu-
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ant to subsections IX(d)(l) and (d)(2) (or, in the case of payments due from the Subsequent Par-
ticipating Manufacturers, pursuant to subsection IX( d)( 4)) ; 
[IX(j))] Seventh: in the case of payments due from the Original Participating Manufactur-
ers to which clause "Fifth" (and therefore clause "Sixth") does not apply, the J_R1089 result of 
clause "Fourth" shall be allocated among the Original Participating Manufacturers according to 
their Relative Market Shares. In the case of payments du from the Original Participating Manu-
facturer to which clause Fifth applies: 
[/] (A) the Allocated Payments of all ettling tates determined pursuant to claus Fifth 
(prior to reduction pursuant to clause beth ) shall be added together; 
[/] (B) the resulting sum shall be allocated among the Original Participating Manufacturers 
according to their Relative Market Shares ... ; 
[/] (C) the ailable M djustment (as determined pursuant to clause ixth ) ball be 
allocated among the Original Participating Manufacturers pursuant to sub ection IX d 3 ; 
[/] (D) the respective result of step (C) above for each Original Participating Manufacturer 
shall be subtracted from the respective result of step (B) above for such Original Parti-
cipating Manufacturer; and 
[/] (E) the r ulting payment amount du from each Original Participating anufacturer 
shall then be allocated among the ettling tates in proportion to the re pective results of 
clause ixth for each ettling tate. 
The offsets described in clauses "Eighth" through "Twelfth" shall then be applied separately 
against each Original Participating Manufacturer's resulting payment shares (on a Settling State 
by Settling State basis) according to each Original Participating Manufacturer ' s separate entitle-
ment to such offsets, if any, in the calendar year in question. (In the case of payments due from 
Subsequent Participating Manufacturers, this clause "Seventh" is inapplicable.); 
[IX(j))] Eighth: the offset for miscalculated or disputed payments described in subsection 
XI(i) (and any carry-forwards arising from such offset) shall be applied to the results of clause 
"Seventh" (in the case of payments due from the Original Participating J_R1090 Manufacturers) 
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or to the results of clause "Sixth" (in the case of payments due from Subsequent Participating 
Manufacturers); 
[IXG))] Ninth: the Federal Tobacco Legislation Offset ... shall be applied to the results of 
clause "Eighth"; 
[IXG))] Tenth: the Litigating Releasing Parties Offset . . . shall be applied to the results of 
clause "Ninth"; 
[IXG))] Eleventh: the offset for claims over pursuant to subsection XII(a)( 4)(8) ... shall 
be applied to the results of clause "Tenth"; 
[IXG))] Twelfth: the offset for claims over pursuant to subsection XIl(a)(8) ... shall be 
applied to the results of clause "Eleventh"; and 
[IXG))] Thirteenth: in th case of payment to bich claus Fifth applie the ttling 
tate allocat d bares of the pa ments du from each Participating Manufactur r (as such 
shares have been determined in step (E) of clause "Seventh" in the case of payments from the 
Original Participating Manufacturers or in clause "Sixth" in the case of payments from the Sub-
sequent Participating Manufacturers, and have been reduced by clauses "Eighth" through 
"Twelfth") shaJl be added tog ther to ta the aggregate payment obligation of each Participat-
ing Manufacturer with respect to th payments in question. (In the case of a payment to which 
clause "Fifth" does not apply, the aggregate payment obligation of each Participating Manufac-
turer with respect to the payment in question shall be stated by the results of clause "Eighth.") 
1-Rl093 
XI. CALCULATION AND DISBURSEMENT OF PAYMENTS 
[XI](a) Independent Auditor to Make All Calculations. 
[XI(a)](l) ... [A]n Independent Auditor shall calculate and determine the amount of 
all payments owed pursuant to this Agreement, the adjustments, reductions and offsets 
thereto (and all resulting carry-forwards, if any), the allocation of such payments, adjust-
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ments, reductions, offsets and carry-forwards among the Participating Manufacturers and 
among the Settling States, and shall perform all other calculations in connection with the 
foregoing (including, but not limited to, determining Market Share, Relative Market Share, 
Base Aggregate Participating Manufacturer Market Share and Actual Aggregate Partici-
pating Manufacturer Market Share). [Provisions regarding submission, collection and 
confidentiality of information omitted.] 
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[XI](b) Identity oflndependent Auditor. The Independent Auditor shall be a major, na-
tionally recognized, certified public accounting firm jointly selected by agreement of the Origi-
nal Participating Manufacturers and ... the Settling States . . . . . .. .J..R1095 . . . The agreement 
retaining the Independent Auditor shall provide that the Independent Auditor shall perform the 
functions specified for it in this Agreement, and that it shall do so in the manner specified in this 
Agreement. [Provision for compensating the Independent Auditor omitted.] 
[XI]( c) Resolution of Disputes. Any dispute contro ersy or claim arising out of or r lat-
ing to calcuJations performed by or any d terminations mad by the Ind pendent uditor in-
cluding, without limitation, any dispute concerning the operation or application of any of the 
adjustments, reductions, offsets, carry-forwards and allocations described in subsection IX(j) or 
subsection XI(i)) hall be ubmitted to binding arbitration before a panel of three neutral arbitra-
tors each of wh m hall be a ti rmer Article ill federal judge. Each of the two sides to the dis-
pute shall select one arbitrator. The two arbitrators so selected shall select the third arbitrator. 
Tb arbitration hall be go emed b the United tates Federal Arbjtration ct. 
[XI]( d) General Provisions as to Calculation of Payments . 
..LRllOO 
[XI(d)](7) Each Participating Manufacturer shall be obligated to pay by the Payment 
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Due Date the undisputed portion of the total amount calculated as due from it by the Inde-
pendent Auditor's Final Calculation. Failure to pay such portion shall render the Partici-
pating Manufacturer liable for interest ... , in addition to any other remedy available under 
this Agreement. 
[XI(d)](8) As to any disputed portion of the total amount calculated to be due pursu-
ant to the Final Calculation, any Participating Manufacturer that by the Payment Due Date 
pays such di puted portion into the Di pu~ d Payments Account ... shall not be liable for 
int re t thereon even if the amount disputed was in fact properly due and owing. Any 
Participating Manufacturer that by the Payment Due Date does not pay such disputed 
portion into the Disputed Payments Account shall be liable for interest ... if the amount 
disputed was in fact properly due and owing . 
..LR1101 
[XI](e) General Treatment of Payments. The cro gent may disbur amounts from 
an Account only if permitted and only at such time as permitt d by this greement and the s~ 
cro Agr m nt. No amounts may be disbursed to a Settling State other than funds credited to 
such Settling State ' s State-Specific Account (as defined in the Escrow Agreement). The Inde-
pendent Auditor, in delivering payment instructions to the Escrow Agent, shall specify: the 
amount to be paid; the Account or Accounts from which such payment is to be disbursed; the 
payee of such payment (which may be an Account); and the Business Day on which such pay-
ment is to be made by the Escrow Agent. Except as expres ly provided in subsection f) below 
in no ev nt ma any amount be di bur d from an Account prior to Final ppro al. 
l..R1102 
[XI](f) Disbursements and Charges Not Contingent on Final Approval. Funds may be dis-
bursed from Accounts without regard to the occurrence of Final Approval in the following cir-
cumstances and in the following manner: 
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[XI(f)](2) Payments to and from Disputed Payments Account. Tb lndepend nt 
uditor hall instruct the E cro Agent to credit funds from an ccount to the Disputed 
Payments Account when a dispute arises as to such funds and shall instruct the Escrow 
Agent to credit funds from the Di puted Payments Account to the appropriate payee when 
such dispute i re olved with finality . ... [Notice provisions omitted.] 
..LR1109 
[XI(f)](6) Determination of amounts paid or held for the benefit of each individual 
Settling State. For purposes of subsections (f)(3), (f)(5)(A) and (i)(2), th portion of a pay-
ment that is made or held for the benefit of each individual ettling tate shall be deter-
mined: ... (B) in the case of a payment credited to the Subsection IX(c)(l) Account or the 
Subsection IX( c )(2) Account, by the results of clause Twelfth of .lRl 110 subsection 
IXG) for each individual Settling State . 
.lRllll 
[XI](i) Miscalculated or Disputed Payments. 
[XI(i)](l) Underpayments . 
.lR1113 
[XI(i)(l)](B) To the extent a dispute as to a prior payment is resolved with fi-
nality against a Participating Manufacturer: 
[/] (i) ... where the disputed amount has been paid into the Disputed Payments 
Account ... , the Independent Auditor shall instruct the Escrow Agent to 
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transfer such amount to the applicable payee Account(s); 
[/] (ii) . . . where the disputed amount has not been paid into the Disputed Pay-
ments Account and ... was identified prior to the Payment Due Date ... by 
delivery of a statement . . . identifying such dispute, the Independent Auditor 
shall calculate interest on the disputed amount from the Payment Due Date .. . 
and the allocation of such amount and interest among the applicable payees, 
and shall provide notice of the amount owed (and the identity of the payor and 
payees) ... ; and 
[/] (iii) in all other cases, the .lR1114 procedure described in subsection (ii) 
shall apply, except that the applicable interest rate shall be the Prime Rate. 
[XI(i)](2) Overpayments. 
[XI(i)(2)](A) If a dispute as to a prior payment is resolved with finality in 
favor of a Participating Manufacturer where the disputed amount has been paid into 
the Disputed Payments Account ... , the Independent Auditor shall instruct the Es-
crow Agent to transfer such amount to such Participating Manufacturer. 
[XI(i)(2)](B) If ... a dispute as to a prior payment is resolved with finality in 
favor of a Participating Manufacturer where the disputed amount has been paid but 
not into the Disputed Payments Account, such Participating Manufacturer shall be 
entitled to a continuing dollar-for-dollar offset as follows : 
[IX(i)(2)(B)](i) . . . in the case of offsets arising from payments under .. . 
IX(b) or IX( c )(1 ), subsequent payments under any of such subsections; in the 
case of offsets arising from payments under ... IX( c )(2), subsequent payments 
under such subsection or ... .lR1115 ... under ... IX(c (1 ; 
[IX(i)(2) B)] ii) in the case of offs ts ... against paym nts under ... 
IX c th offset ... shall be apportioned among th ettling tate pro rata in 
proportion to th ir re pecti e share of such payments ... determined pursuant 
to step E of clau venth .. . payments due from the riginal Participatin 
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Manufacturer or .1R1116 clause "Sixth ( .. . payments du from the Subse-
quent Participating Manufacturers) of sub ection IXG) (e cept here the offset 
arises from an o erpayment applicable olely to a particular Settling State); 
XVIII. MISCELLANEOUS 
1-R1140 
[XVIII](j) Amendment and Waiver. This Agreement may be amended by a written in-
strument executed by all Participating Manufacturers affected by the amendment and by all Set-
tling States affected by the amendment. The tenns of any such amendment shall not be nforc -
able in any ttling tate that is not a signatory to such am nd.ment. The waiver of any rights 
conferred hereunder shall be effective only if made by written instrument executed by the waiv-
ing party or parties. The waiver by any party of any breach of this Agreement shall not be 
deemed to be or construed as a waiver of any other breach, whether prior, subsequent or contem-
poraneous, nor shall such waiver be deemed to be or construed as a waiver by any other party . 
..LR.1142 
[XVIIl](n) Governing Law. This Agr ement otb r than th crow Agr ement) shalJ 
go emed by the law of the relevant ettling tate, without regard to the conflict of law rules of 




FORM OF ESCROW AGREEMENT 
This Escrow Agreement is entered into as of _______ , 1998 by the undersigned 
State officials ( on behalf of their respective Settling States), the undersigned Participating 
Manufacturers and _________ as escrow agent (the "Escrow Agent"). 
WI1NESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the Settling States and the Participating Manufacturers have entered into a 
settlement agreement entitled the "Master Settlement Agreement" (the "Agreement"); and 
WHEREAS, the Agreement requires the Settling States and the Participating Manufac-
turers to enter into this Escrow Agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
SECTION 1. Appointment of Escrow Agent. 
The Settling States and the Participating Manufacturers hereby appoint ______ _ 
to serve as Escrow Agent under this Agreement on the terms and conditions set forth herein, and 
the Escrow Agent, by its execution hereof, hereby accepts such appointment and agrees to 
perform the duties and obligations of the Escrow Agent set forth herein. The Settling States and 
the Participating Manufacturers agree that the Escrow Agent appointed under the terms of this 
Escrow Agreement shall be the Escrow Agent as defined in, and for all purposes of, the 
Agreement. 
SECTION 2. Definitions. 
(a) Capitalized terms used in this Escrow Agreement and not otherwise defined herein 
shall have the meaning given to such terms in the Agreement. 
(b) "Escrow Court" means the court of the State of New York to which the Agreement is 
presented for approval, or such other court as agreed to by the Original Participating Manufactur-
ers and a majority of those Attorneys General who are both the Attorney General of a Settling 
State and a member of the NAAG executive committee at the time in question. 
SECTION 3. Escrow and Accounts. 
(a) All funds received by the Escrow Agent pursuant to the terms of the Agreement shall 
be held and disbursed in accordance with the terms of this Escrow Agreement. Such funds and 
any earnings thereon shall constitute the "Escrow" and shall J_Rl892 be held by the Escrow 
Agent separate and apart from all other funds and accounts of the Escrow Agent, the Settling 
States and the Participating Manufacturers. 
(b) The Escrow Agent shall allocate the Escrow among the following separate accounts 
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( each an "Account" and collectively the "Accounts"): 
Subsection VI(B) Account 
Subsection VI(C) Account (FIRST) 
Subsection VI(C) Account (SUBSEQUENT) 
Subsection VIII(B) Account 
Subsection VIII(C) Account 
Subsection IX(B) Account (FIRST) 
Subsection IX(B) Account (SUBSEQUENT) 
Subsection IX(C)(l) Account 
Subsection IX(C)(2) Account 
Subsection IX(E) Account 
Disputed Payments Account 
State-Specific Accounts With Respect To Each Settling State In Which 
State-Specific Finality Occurs. 
( c) AU amounts credited to an Account hall be retained in such ccount until disbursed 
therefrom in accordance with the provisions of this E row greement pursuant to (i) written 
instruction from the Independent Auditor or (ii written instructions from all of the following: 
aU of the Original Participating Manufacturers· all of th ub quent Participating Manufacturers 
that contributed to such amounts in such Account; and all of the ettling tate (collectively the 
row Parties . In the event of a conflict, instructions pursuant to clause (ii) shall govern 
over instructions pursuant to clause (i). 
23 




(a) Cigarette smoking presents serious public health concerns to the State and to the 
citizens of the State. The Surgeon General has determined that smoking causes lung cancer, 
heart disease and other serious diseases, and that there are hundreds of thousands of tobacco-
related deaths in the United States each year. These diseases most often do not appear until 
many years after the person in question begins smoking. 
(b) Cigarette smoking also presents serious financial concerns for the State. Under 
certain health-care programs, the State may have a legal obligation to provide medical assistance 
to eligible persons for health conditions associated with cigarette smoking, and those persons 
may have a legal entitlement to receive such medical assistance. 
(c) Under these programs, the State pays millions of dollars each year to provide medi-
cal assistance for these persons for health conditions associated with cigarette smoking. 
( d) It is the policy of the State that financial burdens imposed on the State by cigarette 
smoking be borne by tobacco product manufacturers rather than by the State to the extent that 
such manufacturers either determine to enter into a settlement with the State or are found 
culpable by the courts. 
( e) On ___ , 1998, leading United States tobacco product manufacturers entered 
into a settlement agreement, entitled the "Master Settlement Agreement," with the State. The 
Master Settlement Agreement obligates these manufacturers, in return for a release of past, pre-
sent and certain future claims against them as described therein, to pay substantial sums to the 
State (tied in part to their volume of sales); to fund a national foundation devoted to the interests 
of public health; and to make substantial changes in their advertising and marketing practices and 
corporate culture, with the intention of reducing underage smoking. 
(f) It would be contrary to the policy of the State if tobacco product manufacturers who 
determine not to enter into such a settlement could use a resulting cost advantage to derive large, 
short-term profits in the years before liability may arise without ensuring that the State will have 
an eventual source of recovery from them if they are proven to have acted culpably. It is thus in 
the interest of the State to require that such 1-R1329 manufacturers establish a reserve fund to 
guarantee a source of compensation and to prevent such manufacturers from deriving large, 
short-term profits and then becoming judgment-proof before liability may arise. 
[A State may elect to delete the "findings and purposes" section in its entirety. Other changes or 
substitutions with respect to the "findings and purposes" section ( except for particularized state proce-
dural or technical requirements) will mean that the statute will no longer conform to this model.] 
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Section . Definitions. 
(a) "Adjusted for inflation" means increased in accordance with the formula for inflation 
adjustment set forth in Exhibit C to the Master Settlement Agreement. 
(b) "Affiliate" means a person who directly or indirectly owns or controls, is owned or 
controlled by, or is under common ownership or control with, another person. Solely for pur-
poses of this definition, the terms "owns," "is owned" and "ownership" mean ownership of an 
equity interest, or the equivalent thereof, of ten percent or more, and the term "person" means an 
individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation or any other organization or group of 
persons. 
(c) "Allocable share" means Allocable Share as that term is defined in the Master Settle-
ment Agreement. 
( d) "Cigarette" means any product that contains nicotine, is intended to be burned or 
heated under ordinary conditions of use, and consists of or contains (1) any roll of tobacco 
wrapped in paper or in any substance not containing tobacco; or (2) tobacco, in any form, that is 
functional in the product, which, because of its appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, 
or its packaging and labeling, is likely to be offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a cigar-
ette; or (3) any roll of tobacco wrapped in any substance containing tobacco which, because of 
its appearance, the type of tobacco used in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is likely to be 
offered to, or purchased by, consumers as a cigarette described in clause (1) of this definition. 
The term "cigarette" includes "roll-your-own" (i.e., any tobacco which, because of its appear-
ance, type, packaging, or labeling is suitable for use and likely to be offered to, or purchased by, 
consumers as tobacco for making cigarettes). For purposes of this definition of "cigarette," 0.09 
ounces of "roll-your-own" tobacco shall constitute one individual "cigarette." 
( e) "Master Settlement Agreement" means the settlement agreement ( and related docu-
ments) entered into on ___ , 1998 by the State and leading United States tobacco product 
manufacturers. 
(f) "Qualified escrow fund" means an escrow arrangement with a federally or State 
chartered financial institution having no affiliation with any tobacco product manufacturer and 
having assets of at least $1,000,000,000 where such arrangement requires that such financial 
institution hold the escrowed funds' principal for the benefit of releasing parties and prohibits the 
tobacco product manufacturer placing the funds into escrow from using, accessing or directing 
the use of the funds' principal except as consistent with section _(b )-( c) of this Act. 
..LR1330 
(g) "Released claims" means Released Claims as that term is defined in the Master Set-
tlement Agreement. 
(h) "Releasing parties" means Releasing Parties as that term is defined in the Master Set-
tlement Agreement. 
(i) "Tobacco Product Manufacturer" means an entity that after the date of enactment of 
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this Act directly (and not exclusively through any affiliate): 
(1) manufactures cigarettes anywhere that such manufacturer intends to be sold in 
the United States, including cigarettes intended to be sold in the United States through an 
importer ( except where such importer is an original participating manufacturer ( as that 
term is defined in the Master Settlement Agreement) that will be responsible for the pay-
ments under the Master Settlement Agreement with respect to such cigarettes as a result of 
the provisions of subsections II(mm) of the Master Settlement Agreement and that pays the 
taxes specified in subsection II(z) of the Master Settlement Agreement, and provided that 
the manufacturer of such cigarettes does not market or advertise such cigarettes in the 
United States); 
(2) is the first purchaser anywhere for resale in the United States of cigarettes 
manufactured anywhere that the manufacturer does not intend to be sold in the United 
States; or 
(3) becomes a successor of an entity described in paragraph (1) or (2). 
The term "Tobacco Product Manufacturer" shall not include an affiliate of a tobacco 
product manufacturer unless such affiliate itself falls within any of (1) - (3) above. 
(i) 'Units old m ans the number of individual cigarette sold in the tate by th ap-
plicable tobacco product manufactur r whether directly or through a distributor retailer or imi-
lar intermediary or intermediaries during th year in question as measured by excise tax col-
lected by th tate on pack or roll-your-own tobacco containers bearing the exci tax stamp 
of th tale. The [ fill in name of responsible state agency] shall promulgate such regulations as 
are necessary to ascertain the amount of State excise tax paid on the cigarettes of such tobacco 
product manufacturer for each year. 
Section _. Requirements. 
Any tobacco product manufacturer selling cigarettes to consumers within the State 
(whether directly or through a distributor, retailer or similar intermediary or intermediaries) after 
the date of enactment of this Act shall do one of the following: 
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(a) become a participating manufacturer (as that term is defined in section II(ij) of the 
Master Settlement Agreement) and generally perform its financial obligations under the Master 
Settlement Agreement; or 
(b) (1) place into a qualified escrow fund by April 15 of the year following the year in 
question the following amounts (as such amounts are adjusted for inflation) --
1999: $.0094241 per unit sold after the date of enactment of this Act;2 
[All per unit numbers subject to verification] 
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2000: $.0104712 per unit sold after the date of enactment of this Act;3 
for each of 2001 and 2002: $.0136125 per unit sold after the date of enactment 
of this Act; 
for each of 2003 through 2006: $.0167539 per unit sold after the date of enact-
ment of this Act; 
for each of 2007 and each year thereafter: $.0188482 per unit sold after the 
date of enactment of this Act. 
(2) A tobacco product manufacturer that places funds into escrow pursuant to paragraph 
(1) shall receive the interest or other appreciation on such funds as earned. Such funds them-
selves shall be released from escrow only under the following circumstances --
(A) to pay a judgment or settlement on any released claim brought against such to-
bacco product manufacturer by the State or any releasing party located or residing in the 
State. Funds shall be released from escrow under this subparagraph (i) in the order in 
which they were placed into escrow and (ii) only to the extent and at the time necessary to 
make payments required under such judgment or settlement; 
(B) to the extent that a tobacco product manufacturer establishes that the amount it 
was required to place into escrow in a particular year was greater than the State's allocable 
share of the total payments that such manufacturer would have been required to make in 
that year under the Master Settlement Agreement ( as determined pursuant to section 
IX(i)(2) of the Master Settlement Agreement, and before any of the adjustments or offsets 
described in section IX(i)(3) of that Agreement other than the Inflation Adjustment) had it 
been a participating J_R1332 manufacturer, the excess shall be released from escrow and 
revert back to such tobacco product manufacturer; or 
(C) to the extent not released from escrow under subparagraphs (A) or (B), funds 
shall be released from escrow and revert back to such tobacco product manufacturer 
twenty-five years after the date on which they were placed into escrow. 
(3) Each tobacco product manufacturer that elects to place funds into escrow pursuant to 
this subsection shall annually certify to the Attorney General [or other State official] that it is in 
compliance with this subsection. The Attorney General [ or other State official] may bring a civil 
action on behalf of the State against any tobacco product manufacturer that fails to place into es-
crow the funds required under this section. Any tobacco product manufacturer that fails in any 
year to place into escrow the funds required under this section shall --
(A) be required within 15 days to place such funds into escrow as shall bring it into 
compliance with this section. The court, upon a finding of a violation of this subsection, 
may impose a civil penalty [to be paid to the general fund of the state] in an amount not to 
exceed 5 percent of the amount improperly withheld from escrow per day of the violation 
[The phrase "after the date of enactment of this Act" would need to be included only in the calen-
dar year in which the Act is enacted.] 
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and in a total amount not to exceed 100 percent of the original amount improperly withheld 
from escrow; 
(B) in the case of a knowing violation, be required within 15 days to place such 
funds into escrow as shall bring it into compliance with this section. The court, upon a 
finding of a knowing violation of this subsection, may impose a civil penalty [to be paid to 
the general fund of the state] in an amount not to exceed 15 percent of the amount 
improperly withheld from escrow per day of the violation and in a total amount not to 
exceed 300 percent of the original amount improperly withheld from escrow; and 
(C) in the case of a second knowing violation, be prohibited from selling cigarettes 
to consumers within the State (whether directly or through a distributor, retailer or similar 
intermediary) for a period not to exceed 2 years. 
Each failure to make an annual deposit required under this section shall constitute a sepa-
rate violation.4 
4 [A State may elect to include a requirement that the violator also pay the State's costs and attor-
ney's fees incurred during a successful prosecution under this paragraph (3).) 
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